THE EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY, 1958-1988

A Dissertation

by

BETTY JO ROSSER

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of

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August 1995

Major Subject: Political Science

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ABSTRACT

The Effects of United States Intervention in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Political Instability, 1958-1988. (August 1995)

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In contrast to conventional wisdom, United States intervention in Latin America from 1958-1988 often exacerbates political instability. A quantitative analysis shows that United States intervention in the form of total aid, especially military aid, to repressive authoritarian regimes does not facilitate political stability; rather it has served to increase instability in existing volatile situations which United States policy was designed to reduce or eliminate. A synthesis of the theories of Karl Marx, Ted Gurr, and Charles Tilly is used to provide a more thorough analysis of the prevailing political environment in selected Latin American States. Standard and pooled regression techniques are used to analyze the data overall, regionally, by individual country, and by type of polity. Political instability is investigated by aggregating the

data to illustrate the "pressure cooker effect" and then disaggregating it for analysis of separate categories of the dependent variable. Critical policy issues for the 1990s are discussed, and alternative policy options are suggested. Rehabilitation of the U.S. image in Latin America is shown to be an important policy priority for the future of U.S.-Latin American relations.

To my husband, Don. Thank you
for your patience, support and understanding.
You have truly been "the wind under
my wings."

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Political Instability in Perspective

This dissertation examines long-term effects of the United States policy of intervention on political instability in eight Central and South American states from 1958 up to 1988. For the purpose of this dissertation, I define political instability as rational (goal-oriented) protest activity which challenges the authority of the state. I address three severe and ongoing problems in regard to U.S. policy in Latin America since the 1940s. First, there is the difficulty in achieving stable democratic governments in Latin America in spite of the vast sums of money which the U.S. has spent for that purpose. Second, the issue of individual rights versus the rights of the group in the organic state, and the dilemma this poses for democratic government remains unresolved, and may be a crucial factor in promoting instability. Third, the problem of inequality as a major determinant of political instability is a recurring theme among classical, modern and contemporary political theorists.

The research problem is one that has received extensive treatment in the literature of comparative

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Style follows American Political Science Review.

politics but which remains unsettled. Many causal variables have been identified as catalysts of instability, including landlessness (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987), inequality in patterns of land distribution (Midlarsky, 1988), landlessness with income inequality (Muller and Seligson, 1987, 1989), various forms of dependent relations with the United States (Baran, 1968; Gunder Frank, 1969), disparate levels of political and economic development (Lipset 1963, 1981), the rapid pace of modernization (Lerner, 1958; Huntington, 1968), relative deprivation (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970), incongruence of structure and culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) and political participation (Huntington, 1965).

This study will test major contemporary theories of inequality against my hypothesis that U.S. intervention in Latin American political and economic affairs significantly and adversely affects the prospects for political stability in the region. Therefore I construct a general inequality model which will demonstrate the linkage between U.S. intervention, an authentic democratic society, inequality, and political instability. I contend that political instability in South and Central America is one unintended consequence of current U.S. policies which fail to consider these vital linkages.

The purpose of this dissertation is (1) to test the hypothesis that United States intervention in the political and economic affairs of Latin America is a significant long-term contributor to political instability in the region, (2) to develop a composite model which tests the explanatory power of this hypothesis against major competing theories of instability in order to suggest areas critical to future research, (3) to examine the emergence of elite strategies which may aid in the diffusion of political tension (mitigating factors), and (4) to evaluate the potential of alternate policy options in achieving the policy objectives of promoting democratization and protecting United States national security, economic and strategic interests in Latin America.

Direct intervention, or the alternate option of utilizing economic or military aid to pursue political objectives, may have served the U.S well as short-term instruments for maintenance of political order in Latin America. Yet this policy has been inefficient; many questions remain unresolved. What have been the long-term effects of interventionist policy? Have there been adverse unintended consequences as a result of regarding democratization as a desirable but secondary objective to the primary goal of protecting national security? What factors facilitate political instability in Latin

America? Examining these questions is the core objective. Secondary, but significant objectives include clarification and critical analysis of concepts such as political instability, income and democracy.

In addition, I hope to further progress on the study of political instability by reexamining classical literature for treatment of relevant variables, utilizing a longer historical perspective, providing a theoretical synthesis in order to contribute to a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of political conflict, and explaining vital linkages.

This dissertation will also incorporate and synthesize interdisciplinary literature in order to increase the scope of the study and provide a more comprehensive analysis; therefore relevant literature from such diverse fields as sociology, economics, psychology, history and political science will be included as a matter of course.

Overview of Research Directions

Theories of instability among the classical political theorists assumed an economic dimension of instability derived from conditions of inequality in land, income, or property. Locke (1980) stated in his initial justification for ownership of private property that man has a right to ownership of that property with which he has mixed his labor. This belief is prevalent

in much of the Third World with landless peasants as well as the aristocracy. Land is the primary source of income in agrarian economies; for peasants, land is the key to survival. Therefore the economics of land access has assumed great importance in classical, as well as modern and contemporary studies of underdeveloped Third World states.

Marx viewed revolution as the inevitable result of the process of industrialization in which the proletariat endured a life of bare subsistence in which they no longer owned the means of production, forcing them to sell their labor (Marx, 1971). In these cases, the aristocracy owns the means of production--land, capital, credit, fertilizer, and tools-- while peasants labor on large estates.

More recent scholarly research on political instability has also concentrated on land or income inequality as a major contributing factor. Midlarsky (1988) found that one could observe clear patterns of unequal land distribution in Latin America in which peasant landholdings have become increasingly smaller over time, while large landholdings become increasingly larger. He argues that this pattern is a factor in political instability.

Prosterman and Riedinger (1987) stressed that it was not patterns of land distribution, but landlessness

itself, which was responsible for instability. Muller and Seligson (1987, 1989) reported that land inequality was important only when linked to income inequality.

The Latin American dependency school, in reacting against the modernization paradigm, postulated that the problem was not internal, as modernization theorists would have it, but external; the consequence of (primarily) U.S. imperialism. Penetration of periphery economies by the core led to the "development of underdevelopment " (Baran, 1968; Gunder Frank, 1969). The contention of the dependency school that U.S intervention in its various forms in Latin American politics is not a response to political instability, but a major determinant is not new.

Walter LaFeber (1984, 1985, 1993) in his historical analyses of the Latin American predicament, suggests that this is indeed the case. As LaFeber notes (LaFeber, 1993, 12), "U.S. power has been the dominant outside (and often inside) force shaping the societies against which Central Americans have rebelled." LaFeber's (1984, 1993) Inevitable Revolutions represents one of the most comprehensive, critical and penetrating historical analyses of the United States presence in Central America.

Among other modern theorists of political instability, Lipset (1955, 1965), in his seminal work,

Political Man, attempted to establish requisites for democracy and was widely criticized for having measured requisites for stability. Nevertheless, he advocated mass participation in the political process, indicating that high levels of participation were not destabilizing. Conversely, Huntington (1965, 387-430) found that widespread participation before democratic institutions were in place led to political unrest because mass demands overloaded the political system. Gurr (1968) noted that mass demands resulted from a comparison of one's own situation to that of others. Comparison could result in aggression if demands were not realized.

Taking another direction, Almond and Verba (1963) explained political instability as the result of incongruence of structure and culture. By implication, a repressive authoritarian structure imposed on a society desiring democratic government would produce instability.

Because LaFeber's contemporary analysis is controversial and vulnerable to criticism as a subjective interpretation of historical events, I will test the LaFeber thesis along with my hypotheses, as well as the impact of income inequality and level of development, through quantitative analysis of four Central American states, and extend the analysis to four selected countries in South America. My choice of U.S. intervention as the primary independent variable of

interest represents, to a great extent, an attempt to refute or confirm the charge that the U.S. bears much responsibility for political instability in Latin America.

This study is to be cast in terms of measurable variables employing interval level data in order to assess the impact of the various independent variables on political stability. In this dissertation I examine the numerous explanations offered in the literature and select variables which reflect ideas from various interdisciplinary theories of political instability.

Clearly, there are numerous contenders for explanatory primacy among variables; however, the following independent variables have been chosen from the literature for their longevity, (general acceptance and survival through time). The independent variables which appear to have the greatest explanatory potential for the dependent variable, political instability, are: United States economic and military aid and intervention, level of economic development, income inequality, and type of society. While it is widely accepted that these variables significantly affect political instability in Latin America, quantitative models which test the relative explanatory potential of major theories of political instability over time are rare. Overall, I expect to find that each of the theories represented in

the model is positively associated with political instability; however, the model selected is expected to be particularly useful in exploring critical linkages among significant variables over time, in testing the relative importance of major theories which have been advanced, and in suggesting fruitful areas for future research.

Further, I propose that there is a direct linear relationship between political instability and the major independent variable of interest, United States intervention, and other selected independent variables. The "pressure cooker effect" intrinsically describes an additive situation. The addition of each independent variable in the equation increases political tension; with the addition of each explanatory factor, tension reaches a higher level. The result of increased, or additional systemic pressure is political instability.

Theoretical Orientation

As a theoretical base for this dissertation, I will show that the concept of inequality is a consistent and continuing thread in theories of political instability. Valerie Bunce (1989), citing Goldstone (1980), suggests that the Polish crisis of 1980-1981 indicates "that we need to combine, rather than choose among first, second, and third generations of theory." Logical extension of this idea would allow for choice among relevant theories

regardless of generation, since most theories offer partial or incomplete explanations of the observed phenomena. Following the initial idea of Bunce and Goldstone, I will venture a synthetic treatment of Tilly's (1974, 1978) notion of the ends of collective violence as rational (goal-oriented) means of alleviating injustice and acquiring resources for which groups feel a sense of entitlement, with Marx's theory of revolution of the proletariat, and with ideas taken from contemporary theories of deprivation, particularly Gurr (1968, 1970). The purpose of combining ideas from several theories allows for a broader and more comprehensive analysis through utilization of the strengths of each perspective and avoidance of the more severe problems of analysis inherent in psychological theories of deprivation conducted at the individual level of analysis, and Marxist determinism in which revolution of the proletariat is viewed as the inevitable outcome of oppression of the proletariat.

Following Tilly, I argue that collective protest activity is a rational (goal oriented) means of alleviating perceived injustices, in which individuals participate from a sense of group solidarity in the pursuit of common objectives which are not necessarily tied to narrow individual self-interests. In contrast, "collective action theories," particularly those

associated with Olson (1965) and his followers, are utilitarian, or instrumental in proposing that it is non-rational for individuals to engage in collective action unless they receive special incentives. Without special incentives, collective action theories view protest behavior as deviant behavior. Tilly's emphasis on the rationality of collective protest behavior and his explicitly political orientation toward group conflict parallels my earlier definition of political instability as a rational challenge to state authority.

Marx's analysis of the revolutionary potential of the proletariat is also critical in establishing the theoretical framework of this dissertation because of his stress on the development of class-consciousness which leads to class polarization. Class polarization is by definition a separation of society into opposing groups, alleviating the need to specify exactly why individuals join groups. Class polarization leads to increase in demands on the political system as a result of an increased level of awareness of the gulf between "haves" and "have nots" within society. Awareness of unequal life-situations, or quality of life, between masses and elites provides the necessary incentive for collective protest behavior without resorting to theories of individual self-interest (interests not shared in common with the group).

Although Marx erred in his analysis of the historical inevitability of proletarian revolution, his development of the class-consciousness/class-polarization concept reinforces the inequality thesis. While it is acknowledged that strong cleavages other than class exist, deprivation of life, liberty and property cross-cuts and embraces these cleavages. The class distinction takes priority because the elements of inequality are basic needs necessary for survival and it is precisely the lower strata of these groups which are deprived.

Gurr (1973) adds to the inequality debate the concept of "relative" deprivation which involves explicit comparison of life-states. Marx implied, but did not specifically state (as did Gurr) that awareness of the differences in the life-state of elites and masses occurred as a result of comparison between life-states. While Marx viewed revolution in most countries as the inevitable result of oppression of the proletariat, Gurr expanded Marx's initial idea of mitigating factors which diffused political tension.[1] Empirically, both seem to

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[1] Marx noted that two exceptions to his revolutionary thesis were the United States and possibly Holland, because of elections. Although Marx did not use the phrase "mitigating circumstances," he clearly stated that the potential for violent revolution was limited in the U.S. and Holland because of the responsiveness of the political system to the demands of workers through the electoral process. Revolution would come about in these countries,

be correct assessments of different situations, one in which mediating factors frequently emerge, and one in which they are absent or limited. Thus the theories are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive.

In the absence of mitigating factors, political unrest of various types and degrees, including revolution, may be unavoidable, or inevitable. Gurr's expansion of mitigating factors into Marx's essentially deterministic formula represents an advance in theories of civil violence. Gurr (as did collective action theorists) worked at the individual level of analysis, a level which suffered from the inherent problems discussed below. However, combining Gurr's notion of relative, or comparative inequalities (and the utilization of actual, rather than "perceived" deprivation) with the idea of mitigating factors which diffuse tension, Tilly's stress on collective protest behavior as political (and non-deviant) "rationality," and Marx's class-consciousness/class-polarization which mobilizes the proletariat, provides the necessary theoretical elements for understanding political instability.

Critics of psychological theories of deprivation have pointed out the difficulty of demonstrating empirically (1) how individual aggression translates into

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"not through the bullet, but by ballots in free and fair elections" (Ball and Dagger, 1991, 139).

collective aggression, and (2) how presumed psychological states and observed behavior are linked. As Rule (1988, 210-11) notes, it is obvious that most political demands are the result of perceived or actual deprivation, but this observation does little to increase explanatory power or predictability. This problem can be eliminated by recognition that the concept of inequality is intrinsic to deprivation theory. It is the comparison of (measurable) inequalities which generates the psychological phenomenon of deprivation. Although Gurr acknowledged the role of actual deprivation, the perception of deprivation was also critical in understanding instability. However, substitution of the concept of actual inequality for that of perceived deprivation alleviates the problem of measurement of a non-empirical psychological state, while retaining the power and integrity of deprivation theory. The fact of deprivation will be an assumption of this dissertation; predictability should be enhanced by specifying the types and severity of inequalities which produce specific forms of protest behavior.

Marx's concept of "class consciousness" overcomes the objections noted by Rule. All that is necessary is to demonstrate empirically that members of one stratum of society are poor, excluded, and dominated, while others exist who are wealthy, included, and dominant--and that

subsequent collective behavior designed to alleviate this condition occurs systematically. This behavior is also rational (Tilly 1970). Thus no demonstration of an individual psychological state is necessary. There are several ways in which class-consciousness could be expected to develop. Alexis de Toqueville (1985) suggested one such way:

> the upper classes...drew attention to the monstrous vices of the institutions which pressed most heavily on the common people and indulged in highly colored descriptions of the living conditions of the working class and the starvation wages it received. And by thus championing the cause of the underprivileged they made them acutely aware of their wrongs. The people of whom I am speaking...were not our literary men but members of the government, high officials, the privileged few.

The Catholic Church since Vatican II has also been instrumental in demonstrating to the popular sector that their condition is not preordained; that conditions can be changed at the grass-roots level through self-help programs (Mainwaring, 1984; Levine, 1986; Casper, forthcoming). While this study does not specifically focus on the growth in communications technology, the technology explosion in the twentieth century has brought ideas and ideologies of different cultures to remote villagers and indigenous peoples who may have previously been insulated from knowledge of their life-situation in comparison to others, including awareness of inequality. Thus they may, as class-consciousness emerges, aspire to

change.

Deprivation theory (as opposed to the concept of inequality inherent in deprivation theory) succeeded in rekindling interest in proximate causes of political violence, rather than less measurable (and less salient) remote causes.[2] Synthesized, these theories suggest that over time, in the absence of mediating factors, severe economic and political inequality (grave economic inequalities and deprivation of personal liberties including the right of maintenance of the physical integrity of the person) leads to political violence as a rational form of dissent. Where there are mediating factors, political tensions may be diffused.

In addition to the four primary objectives of this dissertation (testing the hypothesis that U.S intervention in Latin America exacerbates political instability over the long term, developing a composite model which tests contending theories, analyzing elite strategies which may diffuse tension, and evaluating alternate methods of achieving policy objectives), an additional objective of this dissertation is to examine whether U.S. intervention prevents or inhibits the emergence of mitigating factors. By supporting the

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[2] Less "salient" as used here refers to structural or systemic factors producing instability, as opposed to proximate causes or causes which are closer in time.

ambitions of a dominant authoritarian minority in order to achieve the elusive policy objective of political stability, it is possible to inadvertently create conditions over time which threaten U.S. economic interests and lessen the potential for a stable authentic democracy.

Theoretical and Empirical Models

Modification and integration of these theories results in a theoretical perspective in which severe and ongoing political and economic inequality leads to class polarization. Emerging class-consciousness involving comparisons of life-states among elites and masses results in increases in demands upon the political system which are potentially destabilizing. If demands are not met, protest activities increase in number and severity, resulting in riots, strikes, demonstrations, political assassinations, coups and attempted coups, insurgencies, civil war or revolutions. If demands are met by "protest absorption" techniques which may include, but are not limited to elite accommodation or cooptation, (mitigating factors) political tension is diffused (Bunce, 1989). United States aid to repressive regimes would then ensure that Latin American political elites have little incentive to respond positively to societal demands (Russett and Starr, 1992). Repressive regimes, with the help of U.S. aid, acquire increased capacity for

repression.

Therefore, a comprehensive and coherent analysis of political instability demands a synthetic treatment; Marx (1933) is critical to the theoretical framework of this dissertation for his "natural polarization" thesis of group formation, and Tilly (1970) for his insistence on rationality of such groups. Gurr (1973) is essential for his work on comparison of life-states as a basis for action. Gurr's emphasis on comparison of life-states may be perceived as somewhat analogous to Marx's development of the emergence of class-consciousness. Figure 1 illustrates these relationships, and distinguishes between the theoretical syntheses drawn from the literature (shown by broken arrows) with the empirical model (shown by unbroken arrows) which I have developed to depict my hypothesis regarding the role of the United States in facilitating political unrest.

While synthesizing theoretical perspectives serves as a necessary point of departure in explaining Latin American political instability; I will further argue that there is a direct link between inequality and democracy, and that this link is to be found in the role and status of the individual in an authentic democratic society. In an organic state, communal or national values take priority over individual values and individual opportunity; inequality becomes institutionalized. I

Figure 1. Theoretical and Empirical Model of Political Instability 1958-1988



argue that U.S. intervention, in the form of aid to repressive authoritarian regimes, contributes significantly to long-term political instability, inhibits the emergence of mitigating factors, and aids in the institutionalization of inequality.

Demands for democratic government, in which the popular sector effectively participates and articulates demands for equality in the decision-making process threaten not only elite prerogatives in these areas, but also increase the potential for mass disruption of order which affects the survival of the state. As Huntington (1968) notes, participation by the popular sector in the political process of politically underdeveloped countries before institutionalization of the democratic process, may lead to instability if these demands are not met. Under these conditions, elites may allow demands for particular forms of social justice to be at least partially realized, or elect to use the coercive apparatus of the state to repress demands. Repression may become a more viable option for elites where aid from external sources is readily available.

Additionally, the prospect of democratic government in which individuals have the right and equal opportunity to change their political and economic status creates a fundamental and powerful conflict in which the basic political philosophy of civil and military elites is

challenged.

Elements of inequality which may lead to collective protest activity can be found in Locke (1980, chap IX), and set forth in the French "Declaration of the Rights of Man"--life, liberty, and property. In turn, there is a connection between democracy and political instability. While inequality in life-states, political liberty, and ownership of property does occur in Western democracies, the gap between the wealthy and poor in society is more sharply delineated in Latin America.

Extreme class polarization does not occur on as large a scale in Western democracies because of the potential for upward mobility of the lower classes, and the existence of various avenues for redress of individual grievances. The renowned anti-socialist "Iron Chancellor" of Germany in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Otto von Bismarck, argued that the welfare state was the best means of opposing socialism (Ball and Dagger 1991, 78). Lipset (1983) also argued that "the more readily working-class organizations were accepted into the economic and political order, the less radical their initial and subsequent ideologies." These mitigating factors in democratic political systems act to diffuse political tension and promote stability by offering lower income groups and excluded groups an alternative to insurgency or revolution. Therefore, an

integral part of the proposed research necessarily analyzes differences in democracy in Western and Latin American societies.

Definition of Democracy

As there is no consensus in the literature regarding an acceptable definition of democracy, I propose a definition which taps both the substantive and procedural dimensions of the concept (Needler 1968, 893). Procedural democracy is concerned with form: whether a particular government follows the rules, i.e., open and fair elections, separation of powers, and autonomous social groups. Substantive democracy refers to the actual impact of procedures on society: whether or not citizens are empowered to hold a government accountable for its actions. Without the substantive element of accountability, there can be no viable democracy. As Sklar (1982) has observed, the "vital force of democracy is the accountability of rulers to their subjects. Democracy stirs and wakens from the deepest slumber whenever the principle of accountability is asserted by members of a community or conceded by those who rule." Where the military systematically practices atrocities against its own people, where the government is helpless to bring the perpetrators to justice, where civilian rule is contingent upon acquiescence to military approval and demands, whatever name may be attached to that

government, the society cannot be characterized as a democracy.

Substantive democracy has often been associated with Marxist or Socialist arguments that economic equality is as necessary to a free society as political democracy; thus many non-Marxist scholars have focused on the existence or non-existence of democratic procedures rather than substance. There has been a strong assumption by Western scholars that a government which has the same structure or organization as an established democracy must itself be democratic (Gastil, 1990).[3] I contend that it is possible to define and measure both conceptual dimensions adequately, using a single measure, without falling into the controversy associated with the economic equality argument or the trap of ethnocentrism. I propose, however, that it is not possible to define democracy without attention to the political status of the individual under authoritarian regimes; no definition of democracy is acceptable which neglects popular control of government (accountability), or which fails to include the degree of respect for individual human rights.

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[3]Raymond D. Gastil is the author of the annual Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties (1978-1989). Gastil's rankings of nations as free, partially free, and unfree, are well-known in the discipline of political science. He recently has reevaluated his classification system, noting that the mere existence of procedural democracy in a nation is "probably a fundamentally wrong" method of classification.

Democracy, as used in this study, refers to a kind of society, not a form of government (Macpherson 1973).

Noted democratic theorist C.B. Macpherson has written: "any adequate twentieth-century democratic theory...must treat democracy as a kind of society...rather than a system of government" (Macpherson 1973, 51). But what kind of society? A democratic society values human rights and is one in which the individual is free to oppose policies of government. In a society as a whole, if violation of human rights is systematic and widespread, that society is antidemocratic regardless of the form of government. Here we speak not of a wide range of arguable human rights, but of the minimal right to maintenance of the physical integrity of the person--the right to life--to freely oppose government policy in safety.

Democracy, then, is a holistic standard, not a form of government. We now have a criterion for measuring "democraticness" of nations as a whole, easily (if not precisely) measurable, and which is also empirical. Using the minimal standard of right to life, the question becomes--how many individuals are being deprived of life because of opposition to government? Let us then enlarge the standard to include the right to liberty. The question is then, is this society one in which the individual has both the de jure and de facto right to

freely oppose government policy in safety, and to freely speak, associate, and publish in defense of his position? This definition encompasses both the procedural and substantive dimensions of democracy (excluding the controversial issue of economic democracy), which constitutes necessary and sufficient standards of evaluation.

We are freed from the onerous task of deciding whether elections are fraudulent, open, or competitive, and of the task of evaluating "democraticness" on the basis of the content of formal constitutions or government rhetoric.

We also escape from the ethnocentricity of defining democracy in strictly Western terms of parliamentary or legal procedures. If the standard of democracy is whether in any given society there are widespread and systematic violations of the basic human right to life and liberty, and whether citizens can in fact, as well as theory, hold governmental actors accountable for their behavior, it can then be determined whether democracy exists, to what degree, and when democracy perishes.

This conceptualization of democracy can be applied across societies or regions to encompass situations where there may exist no formal procedures or legislatures, and no formal competition among organized groups (tribal societies). It can also be applied across parties and

survive projection backward and forward through time. In short, individual human rights may be secured by different forms of government or procedures, but they must be evidenced in the society if that society is to be assessed an authentic democracy.

Finally, this definition of democracy does not require economic equality; no right to property, natural or otherwise is argued. What is argued is that property may be necessary for political stability in societies where ownership of some portion of land is necessary for human subsistence. Where property ownership is equivalent to survival of the masses, stability may prove an elusive objective.

Measurement Of Variables

Since political instability is the dependent variable, the first step in analysis is to construct a definition and develop a measure which reflects the several dimensions of the concept. I argue that Claude Ake's classic definition of political stability, in which he defines the concept as the "regularity of the flow of political exchanges" and proposes several criteria for determining an adequate definition (Ake 1975, 277), is inherently flawed. According to Ake, the "regularity" of political exchanges refers to exchanges which do not violate the legal norms and customs of a particular political structure. He argues that (1) definitions of

political stability confuse lack of change with stability, (2) that forms of behavior stabilizing to one political structure may be destabilizing to another (elections may be destabilizing to a political structure if succession is traditionally accomplished by inheritance), and that (3) one must take into account the totality of political exchanges. The third requirement, that one must consider *all* political exchanges within a society, places an insurmountable constraint on the data collection stage of the research process, and leads to ambiguity resulting from diverse definitions of what constitutes a "political" exchange.

In regard to the third criterion, Ake notes that several questions are raised by the usual method of measuring political stability by examining the incidence of certain kinds of political acts such as coups d'etat, political violence, constitutional crises, corruption in high office, assassination of political leaders, and civil disobedience. First, these phenomena are treated as if they were inherently destabilizing for all political structures. A second difficulty is justifying why certain phenomena are chosen and not others. Third, phenomena which are selected are usually associated with elite behavior, while Ake stresses the totality of political exchanges (Ake 1975, 272). Ake measures the degree of political stability at a given point in time as

the number of political actors (persons) violating the system of political exchanges divided by the total political population (Ake 1975, 279). Further, Ake recommends measurement at as many different points in time as possible (Ake 1975, 275).

The third requirement (incorporated into his measure) is more problematic. How can one discern either the total number of political actors violating the system of exchanges or the number of persons constituting the total political population at any given point in time? Ake also does not differentiate between theft of an automobile, and political assassination (the author's examples), because what is critical is only the number of incidences which occur. Although he acknowledges that political assassination is likely to be more disruptive to the political structure than is automobile theft, both are weighted equally as violations of the system of political exchanges (Ake 1975, 282).

Accordingly, I have developed an alternate definition of political instability which takes into account the objections noted above, and a different measure of political instability is devised which is not dependent on knowing the total number of violators or the total political population.

Political instability is defined as the extent to which social order is disrupted and state authority is

challenged by rational protest behavior. This definition includes three key elements (1) the extent to which social order is disrupted, (2) the fact that such protest is rational, and (3) the requirement that protest activities must be limited to those which challenge state authority. The concept is measured as the escalation in number and severity of challenges to state authority over time, and includes, but is not limited to, those protest activities (political assassinations, riots, strikes, demonstrations, coups d'etat and attempted coups, insurgencies, civil wars, revolutions, and acts of terrorism, whether the state is the initiator or target of such actions) which are destabilizing to any political structure. This definition emphasizes the buildup of political tension in a political system over time--the "pressure cooker" effect. It also adds the requirement that protest activity must be rationally directed at state authority, i.e., the definition is frankly political.

Although Ake (1975, 277) considered the number of incidents to be most significant in explaining political instability, I argue additionally that some events are inherently more destabilizing than others. Certainly widespread insurrection or civil war should be expected to have a greater impact on the stability of a political system than peaceful demonstrations or isolated or

limited instances of civil disorder. Therefore the measure for political instability incorporates both the number and the severity of destabilizing events. Accordingly these events are ranked in order of increasing severity and weighted by multiples of ten. This score will be added to the score for the total number of protest activities of each type (rather than the total number participating) for each year. This measure is expected to yield a comprehensive score for each year, or the level of political instability (the buildup of tension) for that point in time. Intensity of commitment to protest activity is an assumption of this dissertation, since intensity is obviously sufficient to compel individuals or groups to engage in the protest activity which is observed. This method has further utility for ranking nations according to level of political instability, i.e., the higher the score, the greater the potential for regime collapse. Note that the proposed definition does not associate all change with instability. Additionally, the forms of protest behavior chosen are those in which both mass and elite political actors can and do participate.

The Independent Variables

The first independent variable, United States intervention, is defined as total announced military aid or economic support for sample countries. It would be

useful to have data regarding actual disbursements of U.S. aid, in contrast to announced aid, but unfortunately the United States government does not publish data on disbursements (SALA, 1990). However, in the particular historical context of the years covered by this data, there is reason to believe that these countries received *more* than the announced aid. Historical events that intensified American interest and willingness to spend generously for containing Communism in Central and South America include McCarthyism, the Cold War, the Cuban revolution, the Cuban missile crisis, the launching of Sputnik, George Kennan's "X" article, strong belief in the "domino effect" and Reagan's perception of the "evil empire." Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" policy encouraged spending in Latin America, for friendship and development. Further, covert aid is known to have been received to repel or eliminate Soviet influence by several countries in the sample, but there is no data published for such aid. Therefore, even though more money was probably spent during this time period than was announced, the data on announced aid is sufficient for the purposes of this research for two reasons: (1) the total aid received was probably greater than announced for reasons given above, and (2) announced aid is a valid indicator of United States political intent toward these states.

Each type of intervention will be tested separately in the model in order to determine its independent impact on political stability; in addition, the total impact of all forms of intervention will be tested. Intervention will be measured in terms of total expenditure for each year for each type of intervention from 1958-1988. In addition, the expenditure over time for all types will be aggregated in order to evaluate the comprehensive effect of U.S. intervention on political instability in Latin America. Aggregating the categories of the dependent variable is theoretically necessary in order to test for the "pressure cooker effect," the theoretical core of the research. It is the buildup over time of systemic pressure from all categories of political instability which is hypothesized to create this explosive effect. However, disaggregation of the dependent variable will allow analysis of the particular form or category of instability which is associated with a specific country. Therefore the dependent variable, political instability, will be tested as an aggregated and as a disaggregated variable. Weighting the dependent variable allows differentiation regarding the severity of different categories of instability; it is obvious that a revolution or a civil war is more destabilizing than a protest or demonstration. Tests will therefore be conducted on the dependent variable in its aggregated and

disaggregated form, using both weighted and raw scores.

The level of economic development is measured as commercial energy consumption per capita in gigajoules (a measure of individual rather than national levels of commercial energy consumption). This measure adequately facilitates differentiation among developed and underdeveloped national states. For example, the mean commercial energy consumption per capita for Argentina from 1970-1989 was 50.76747 gigajoules per capita; for Brazil, 19.80345; for Chile, 29.80062. In contrast, the mean for commercial energy consumption per capita in the United States for the same period was 303.5458; for the United Kingdom, 143.7327; for Sweden, 155.5862. To some extent, this measure also reflects population, in that larger populations use more energh per capita. However, it is also an essential element for determining a state's approximate level of development; an underdeveloped national state does not have the same capacity for producing commercial energy as a highly developed state.

The income variable is operationalized as RGDP per capita. Not only is income a major theoretical variable, the impact of income remains a topic of scholarly debate. I argue that income captures the effect of landlessness quite satisfactorily. As Todaro (1989) notes, about 70% of poverty groups in Latin America are located in rural areas. Additionally urban centers are heavily

overpopulated by thousands of landless rural poor who migrated to cities in hope of gaining employment. These poverty-stricken urban masses, destitute and unemployed, have little or no income because of the what I call the "*condition* of landlessness." Therefore, real gross domestic product per capita (income), reflects not only the condition of landlessness in rural sectors, but the same condition in large *urban* centers. For justification of this strategy see de Janvry (1986) and Todaro (1989). These authors specifically note that land concentration patterns in Latin America have not undergone significant changes since colonial times; that the same agrarian structure still dominates Latin America today. Additionally, I make four general observations regarding the condition of landlessness in Latin America: (1) increase over time in the percentage of total arable land held in smallholdings, where the actual size of the holdings does not decrease, indicates success in land reform, (2) where the percentage of total arable land held in smallholdings decreases over time, or remains the same, land reform has not been successful, (3) where the actual number of smallholdings increases, but the total area held remains the same, land reform has not been successful; existing small farms have simply become fragmented, and (4) where the total area held in smallholdings decreases, with or without accompanying

decreases in actual size of holdings, (as in migration of former owners of small plots to urban areas) land reform has failed. Even though technically owners of land, individuals in categories two, three, and four, suffer (as do the urban poor) from the condition of landlessness, which results in low income. Income then, is a fairly accurate indicator of "winners" and "losers" in the zero-sum politics of land ownership and mass poverty in urban centers.

Type of Society

Type of society will also be analyzed. This analysis will treat type of society as dichotomous and will be coded 1 if democratic, and 0 if nondemocratic. A society will be coded nondemocratic if any one of the following three conditions are met: (1) if human rights violations are systematic and widespread in any given year, or (2) if plainclothes death squads or paramilitary units are operational against a civilian society in any given year, or (3) if amnesty for human rights violations committed by military regimes is a condition of transfer of political power to a civilian government. Any one of these conditions, if present within a society, repudiates the fundamental identifying characteristic of democratic government, that of accountability of government through popular control by citizens. Such a society is not free.

The treatment of "democracy" as a discrete, or

binary variable, rather than a continuous variable is controversial and has been severely criticized by Bollen and Jackman (1989, 612). These authors are concerned with the recent "resurgence" of the "previously abandoned convention" of dichotomizing the concept of democracy. What Bollen and Jackman (1989) propose is that even in countries with widespread and systematic violations of individual rights, and military dominance over civilian government, where some democratic practices such as elections still exist, these countries must be classified as "less democratic" instead of "nondemocratic." This confusion is directly related to the practice of focusing on procedural democracy, without sufficient analysis of societal consequences. One well-known student of political instability has recently reexamined his previous work on political freedom in the world and concluded that the substantive issues of civil rights are "the more important of the two kinds of democratic freedom" for classifying nations as free or unfree (Gastil, 1990). He notes that "it is easy, and probably fundamentally wrong, to assume that the most important characteristics of democracy are the political rights that the word 'democracy' most clearly implies." Gastil's statement clearly represents an explicit change in his conceptualization of democratic freedom, and an admission that much of the previous work in social

science in devising classification systems is fundamentally flawed. Gastil also notes that it is "unfortunate" that most historical treatments of democracy tend to emphasize the existence of electoral and legislative mechanisms (procedural democracy). As an example of the result of this emphasis on procedure rather than substance, Gastil says:

> From the political-rights viewpoint it can be argued that Iran is now ruled by an elected democratic government, a government more democratic than most in the Third World. But its oppression of individuals or groups that lie beyond the boundaries of tribal morality or acceptance has been persistent...Despite the panoply of Western political institutions in Iran, it remains outside the democratic world that requires a commitment to civil liberties as well as political rights.

It was to address the specific problem of incorrect classification of political systems that I have formulated an alternate strategy based on Macpherson's emphasis on the type of society rather than the formal procedures of government.

My definition offers a minimum standard for evaluation which is clear, effective, and does not confound democracy with stability. This discrete standard was well-known to early political commentators--*demos* + *kratia* (democracy) meant rule by the people. Authentic democracy demands accountability; government and military officials must be subject to limitation on power and behavior, via the people, or suffer removal

from office. For the reasons presented above, I will treat democracy as a discrete binary variable in this dissertation, while shifting the emphasis from procedure (rules of government) to substance (consequences for society).

Hypotheses to be Tested

Hypotheses to be tested are: (1) The greater the extent of U.S. intervention, the higher the level of political instability over time, (2) The lower the level of economic development, the higher the level of political instability (Lipset), and (3) The greater the degree of income inequality, the higher the level of political instability (Huntington, Midlarsky, Muller, and Prosterman).

These hypotheses represent a composite model of various theories of instability which I believe to be most convincing in explaining Latin American political instability. Previous work has neglected to address the specific elements of inequality in a quantitative study. Human rights violations have not previously been used quantitatively to assess the "democraticness" of a society over time, rather than a government.

The composite model can be formulated as follows: Political Instability = U.S. intervention + level of economic development + income inequality. Type of society will also be analyzed. These variables, as well

as the error terms are assumed to be independent; if multicolinearity and autocorrelation are found, appropriate steps will taken to alleviate the condition.[4] A linear relationship is formulated in which:

$$Y_t = a + b_1 X_1t + b_2 X_2t + b_3 X_3t + e_t$$

where Y_t = political instability over time, defined and discussed above,

e_t is the error term, and a and b are parameter estimates.

Independent variables are:

X_1t = United States intervention

X_2t = economic development (Energy consumption per capita)

X_3t = income inequality (Real gross domestic product)

I do not hypothesize that intervention per se is counterproductive to U.S. national economic, political and strategic interests; but rather that it is the type of intervention that intensifies and prolongs the Latin American crisis. Both past and current U.S. foreign policy in Latin America may have facilitated creation of a highly militarized and potentially dangerous regional entity which could in time severely threaten U.S.

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[4]It has been argued that Soviet intervention has been a primary cause of political instability in Latin America (Fauriol, 1985, 6). However, because there is no consensus in the literature regarding the degree of Soviet influence on instability, or data available to test this variable, it is expected that this influence will be captured in the error term.

national security with weapons, technology and training which the United States has provided.

Although these variables have been examined extensively, for the most part research on political instability has not been highly coordinated. The trend in comparative political analysis has been toward independent research in specialized areas or topics of interest. Because most of the variables of interest in political analysis have been described as "essentially contested concepts"[5] (Ball and Dagger 1991, 23), scholars have been compelled to resort to idiosyncratic definitions and diverse methods and measurements. Analyses of the same research problem have also been conducted over widely varying time spans, regions, and countries. Consequently many crucial questions remain clouded or left unanswered. Is there a relationship between national economic development and political democracy? If so, how is each related to political instability? How does inequality relate to political democracy, economic development, and instability? Does United States intervention influence or adversely change the relationships among these variables? Can these questions be explored in the context of a linear model?

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[5] Ball and Dagger (1991) define an "essentially contested concept" as a concept which remains open to various interpretations, for which there is no widely accepted meaning.

I will explore these and other significant but unresolved questions in the following chapters.

Methodology

The study which I am proposing will employ regression techniques to analyze data collected from the period 1958-1988. The countries selected for analysis include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru in South America, and Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica in Central America. The four South American states were chosen on the basis of prior histories of civil discontent and repressiveness of military regimes; Nicaragua and El Salvador were selected on the basis of widespread criticism for and the high visibility of U.S. involvement in insurgent activity. Honduras and Costa Rica were chosen for their relative freedom from widespread revolutionary violence, and represent states in which the potential for violent ideological confrontation appears to have been partially diffused, or mitigated. These nations should provide a broad basis for comparison of the effects of U.S. intervention on political conflict in Latin America.

Summary

This dissertation consists of multiple regression analysis which tests the primary hypothesis that U.S. intervention in the political and economic affairs of Latin America plays a significant role in the creation of

the political disorder and perceived threat from the Left which interventionist policy was intended to reduce or eliminate, and that this can be quantitatively demonstrated. Primary and secondary research objectives are explicitly stated and a theoretical overview of previous research directions is presented. In addition, major theories are represented in the model. The variables chosen for their explanatory power with regard to the dependent variable, political instability are: U.S. intervention, level of economic development, and income inequality. Type of society will be analyzed in a separate section.

The theoretical orientation of this dissertation which involves synthesis of works of major theorists (Tilly, Marx, Gurr), is discussed. Complementarity of theories, rather than mutual exclusiveness, is emphasized. A theoretical model is developed in which widespread inequality leads to class polarization. Comparison of life-states results in emerging class-consciousness and demands for social justice; if these demands are met by elite strategies of protest absorption (mitigating factors), systemic political tension is reduced. If demands are denied through systematic political repression, there is a "pressure-cooker" effect in which political tension builds to the critical stage, leading to insurgencies, civil wars and revolutions.

Other less explosive, but essentially destabilizing events are mass riots, demonstrations, protests, coups, attempted coups, political assassinations, and acts of terrorism.

I also propose an alternate definition of democracy which emphasizes substantive dimensions of the concept (excluding a right to ownership of property). Democracy is defined as a type of society rather than a form of government, and must be evidenced in the society if a state is to be classified as democratic.

The measurement of dependent and independent variables is addressed. The dependent variable, political instability is measured by summing the number of destabilizing events for each country for each year from 1958-1988 and weighting these events by their level of severity. Income inequality is operationalized by real gross domestic product per capita. The level of economic development is measured by commercial energy consumption per capita. United States intervention is measured separately as economic aid, military aid and total aid, in order to determine which (if any) type of intervention contributes to political instability.

Various hypotheses, representing major interdisciplinary theories of instability will be tested. Special emphasis is placed on the fact that this dissertation is essentially (1) comparative, (2)

interdisciplinary, and (3) quantitative and (4) organized around the concept of buildup of political tension over time, i.e., the *pressure cooker effect*.

Chapter One of this study introduces the reader to the severity of the problems which Latin Americans and U.S. policy-makers and scholars will continue to face in the twenty-first century. Relevant variables are chosen, and the research problem and methodology are explained. Measurement of critical variables is discussed, and various hypotheses are presented for testing in the model.

Chapter Two presents an overview of the classical origins of many of the ideas and concepts with which contemporary political scientists are working, and demonstrates the continuity of the theme of inequality in the literature. Modern and contemporary theories of political instability are assessed for their explanatory potential.

Chapter Three focuses on United States foreign policy in Latin America, its failures and inconsistencies, and the implementation, reinterpretations and expansion of the Monroe Doctrine through various administrations. The foreign policy decision-making process is analyzed, and suggestions offered to offset the dangers of group-think.

Chapter Four consists of a quantitative analysis of

political instability in the eight selected countries of Latin America. Analysis is done by individual country, region, type of society and total of all cases.

Chapter Five concludes with an analysis of the findings, discussion of policy issues for the 1990s, alternative policy options for protecting U.S. vital interests in Latin America, and ways of utilizing various mediating strategies for the promotion of democracy .

CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Political Instability: Theory and Status of Current Research

The systematic empirical investigation of causal factors contributing to political instability has a long and distinguished intellectual history. Political stability, often called the Hobbesian problem or the problem of political order, has received extensive treatment by scholars of all ages. From the "grand" theorists whose works encompassed all major social, economic and political institutions of their time to present day theorists concerned with validation or refutation of specific hypotheses, the problem of political order has provided a rich and constant area for scholarly inquiry. The search for causes of political disorder has also resulted in immense frustration for students engaged in research in this area.

There are several major issues and problems which must be confronted early in the research process in attempting to build a viable theoretical model; (1) avoiding the problem of oversimplification or overdetermination of the model, (2) assessing the reliability of data, and (3) managing those variables which do not easily lend themselves to quantification.

The initial problem to be faced is that of

oversimplification or overdetermination. First, most of the variables which are widely accepted today in the social sciences as associated with political instability were isolated and identified by the ancient Greeks, particularly Plato and Aristotle, reacting to disorder in the Greek city-states resulting from internecine warfare. Contemporary scholars engaged in research on political disorder have found an overabundance of candidates for "causality." Consequently, in attempting to narrow the field of competition, too often explanations which are overly simplistic or overly determined have been advanced. Neither strategy serves the objectives of social science. Thus a major problem for social analysts is to avoid the Scylla of oversimplification and the Charybdis of overdetermination in developing a theoretical model of political instability.

A second primary problem which must be resolved in order to retain the integrity of the model is that of data collection and source reliability. In addition to those problems of definition and measurement inherent in all quantitative methodology, one must have access to accurate data. Political instability is a problem most often associated with Third World nations, and it is precisely these nations for which data collection is most problematic. The scholar attempting to research these

geopolitical areas is too often faced with the spectre of missing data, highly unreliable data, incomplete or missing data, or no available data regarding critical variables.

Within the discipline of Political Science, insights from the fields of political theory, international relations, comparative politics and public administration/public policy have been utilized. The explicitly interdisciplinary approach of this dissertation requires consideration of ideas and concepts drawn from sociology, history, biology, and psychology as well as political science.

Of these problems of empirical research, quantification of critical variables is often the most difficult. Building a theoretical model begins with (1) going "back to the basics," the classics, and (2) incorporating classical, modern and contemporary findings in a quantitative research model. Rule (1988, 4), addresses the need for integration of classical and contemporary thinking and places the problem for social science in proper perspective:

> One cannot fully grasp the present state of knowledge in these disciplines...without coming to terms with their *classic texts*...Somehow the intellectual structures of social science do not so fully encapsulate the insights of their pasts as in the natural sciences.

The result for social science research, as Rule notes,

has been that "we are uncertain as to what we know and how we know it." In turn, "we are often divided as to the significance of new findings" (Rule, 1988, 4). This basic impasse has led us to discard or ignore much of the work of early theorists because of positivistic aversion to "grand theory" or utopian schemes.

Much of the antipathy is justified; however we certainly cannot afford to lose sight of the objective, building a theoretical foundation for research. Recognition of this problem appears to have generated a trend toward combining theories in an integrative framework. The classicists worked with overarching concepts which have been considered difficult, if not impossible to quantify; measurement problems abound as individual researchers are forced to work with weak or untenable idiosyncratic conceptions of broader concepts. A tentative solution to this dilemma is proposed later in this chapter.

Regression analysis is particularly appropriate for a study of this nature because of its unique structure; one assumption of regression is that any critical independent variable excluded from the model will be captured in the error term. Analysis of the error term in regression models is extremely important in locating potential problem areas. An overinflated error term may indicate that a further search of the literature is necessary to

create a viable model.[6] Assuming primary problems are manageable, if not entirely surmountable, research on political instability must begin with the literature. What are the major variables associated with political instability and which of these have the greatest impact on political instability? How have others in the field studied the concept of political disorder? What problems have been encountered and what strategies employed to resolve the difficulties intrinsic to quantitative empirical research? Are the causal factors which have been identified generalizable--that is, applicable to all cases at all time periods, or only one or several countries at a single historical moment? Is it possible to define and measure political instability in such a manner that predictability is enhanced, that one could reliably predict when, where and why internal instability is most likely to occur? What questions have been posed, what hypotheses advanced and what conclusions have been drawn from previous studies of instability? Most critically, what are the working assumptions accepted by theorists as a point of departure?

Much work may be rejected on the basis of untenable

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[6] Other problems may also be indicated by overinflation of the error term such as a misspecified model, a curvilinear relationship among variables, and error associated with the regression itself.

prior assumptions regardless of sophistication of methodology or brilliance of analysis. For example, Hobbes' assumption of the insatiability of human desire and Maslow's assumption that mankind moves progressively upward from primarily economic to primarily aesthetic concerns suffers from theoretical inadequacies which render theories built upon these assumptions highly questionable. In like manner, early dependency theorists assumed external intervention to be the major causal factor in underdevelopment, neglecting internal strains which may have contributed to both underdevelopment and to political instability. Further, the assumption by some adherents of the dependency school of a historical conspiracy on the part of developed nations to keep underdeveloped nations in a state of perpetual dependency to satisfy their own economic or political requirements remains unfalsifiable and therefore theoretically unacceptable.

It appears that the current state of knowledge regarding political instability and its causes and consequences can best be described as unsettled and undetermined. What emerges from the literature is that the study of political instability requires a firm foundation; a firm foundation requires close attention to a priori assumptions of both classical and modern theorists as well as to methodology, measurements and

conclusions.

Not all theorists who have addressed the problem of political disorder are represented here, notwithstanding critical insights which their work may have produced. Of those who are represented, the selection criteria has been that of identifying those theories which appear to be applicable across a greater number of cases, theories which represent seminal work and originality, and theories incorporating variables which have endured as viable explanations of stability/instability.

Classic Studies on Instability: Plato, Aristotle, and Marx

The subject of political order and the disintegration of society was of intense interest to early Greek philosophers as they witnessed the breakdown of order in the Greek city-states and the Persian empire. The *Republic* of Plato is unique in its treatment of political disorder, in that it deals with the desirability, possibility and feasibility of establishing, or constructing a society in which the problem of disorder will no longer be an issue, through systematic social engineering of all major social, political, economic and cultural institutions.

Plato explicitly notes that his prescription for a stable order is applicable only when a society is initially founded; for older established societies, the

problem of order must be resolved in a fundamentally different way. Only in the initial engineering of a new political unit could Plato choose his variables without confronting established practices which contributed to what he perceived as social "illness."

According to the early organicists, the state was a living entity; illness in one part of the system, if untreated, inevitably resulted in the breakdown of the central organism, the state. Continuing echoes of this concept may be found in modern and contemporary thought (Easton, 1953; Thomas, 1974; Russett and Starr, 1992). David Easton (1953) introduced the concept of the "political system" into political science and cautiously approached the concept of an entity, a political system which followed and approximated organic theory without supporting its claim of representing a "living" system. As late as the 1970s, the renowned biologist and super-organicist Lewis Thomas, (1974) in his classic work, *The Lives of a Cell*, advocated the "dusting off" of this "huge idea" of organicism which "has never successfully been refuted." Russett and Starr (1992) in an adaptation of Rosenau's six levels of analysis, argue that change in any level of analysis will precipitate reciprocal change in any other level; certainly the concept of reciprocal change in systems is a major component of organicism.

Plato's organic theory of the state, in which every

part of the system affected and was affected by every other part of the system, led him to inquire into the nature of the "illness" that afflicted the social order; consequently the sheer scope and magnitude of his endeavor led him to attempt to isolate and identify every major variable which he judged to be associated with the breakdown of the state. The degree of success of his endeavor can perhaps be judged by the fact that most of the variables identified by Plato over 2500 years ago are viable as causal factors in contemporary research.

Plato observed the disintegration of the Greek world and attempted a systematic analysis of the "pathology" of aggression. His socially engineered society was one in which conflict was consciously eradicated through manipulation and control of those variables perceived as causal. As morphogenesis (regeneration of an organic entity) was addressed through the mechanism of colonization, so entropy (systemic degeneration over time) would be prevented through preservation of cultural continuity and homogeneity.

Plato's insistence that politics and ethics are inextricably interwoven has found little favor in today's Machiavellian society with its emphasis on philosophical realism; nevertheless, the study of leadership attributes constitutes an important area of concentration in political science today (Holsti, 1982; Janis, 1982;

Russett and Starr, 1992). Few would deny that dishonesty and corruption in public office is a problem as serious and critical as it was in Plato's time. Nor can it be denied that dishonesty and corruption in public office has serious consequences for the state. Thus Plato chose as a major variable associated with social and political disorder, personal attributes or characteristics of political leaders.

The link between Plato's attribute variables and political instability is in the authority relations between the rulers and the ruled; the role of the leader as the primary source of authority conferred the obligation to oversee the rules of distribution of resources within a society, i.e., to reduce inequality through more equitable distribution. In turn, equitable distribution of resources would act as a deterrent to political disorder.

In its initial establishment, equality of resources (land and income) in a political, social, economic and cultural unit would be not only desirable, but possible and feasible; the new *Republic* was to be inhabited by those who had already reached positive consensus on this issue. It would not be necessary to attempt radical change in an established polity where inequality had been institutionalized. In founding a new society, the *Republic*, Plato argued that it would be possible to

structure that society so that there would be neither poverty nor great wealth. Plato explicitly argued that this would be far less difficult at the initial founding, because land could be divided in a more equitable fashion without the controversy in an older established order engendered by "meddling with fundamentals." (Plato *Laws* 3.684c). Inequality in land distribution was viewed as a contributing factor to social unrest. Not only would the amount of land be equal, but distribution would be made in accordance with soil fertility.

Income distribution was also considered as a major variable in explaining political and social disorder. In the *Republic*, Plato does not allow political leaders to profit from public office; indeed he expressly prohibited these "Guardians of the public trust" from ownership of private wealth or property "other than the indispensable" (Plato *Republic* 3.416e). As Plato said:

> ...and what is more, they serve for board wages and do not even receive pay in addition to their food as others do...we are not isolating a small class in it and making them happy, but that of the city as a whole (Plato *Republic* 4.420, 420e).

However, an individual living in extreme poverty could only become an unproductive drain on the state, conspire against the state, and breed revolution (*Republic* 8.555d). As Plato noted:

> And there they sit...within the city,...some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others

> both hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution.

Plato also addressed the potential for stability and the consequences of regime repression, arguing that "the improper intensification of autocracy" and "excessive curtailment of the liberty of the commons" resulting from desire for self-aggrandizement, would cause leaders to "hate and be hated with intense and unrelenting animosity" (*Laws* 3.697d,e). Under these initial conditions, political stability would become as elusive in the Greek world as it appears to be today.

In his discussion on the consequences of repressiveness, Plato implicitly regarded regime legitimacy as crucial to political stability; Plato observed (*Laws* 3.697d,e) that one of the consequences of "curtailment of the liberty of the commons" and "the improper intensification of autocracy" was the loss of national feeling and public spirit of the people. In turn, authorities no longer exhibited "concern...for their subjects, the commonality, but for their own position." Leaders then "give over loyal cities and peoples to fire and desolation whenever they think it of the slightest advantage to themselves." Subsequently the regime "hates and is hated with savage and unrelenting intensity."

What then was Plato's political formula for

prevention of social disorder and the concomitant dissolution of the state? What were the conditions which would intensify and exacerbate political instability? Had Plato been a student of modern political science, his model of the stable society might have been formulated in the following manner:

> Political stability = positive leadership attributes + high level of civic education + high level of economic development + land equality + income equality + civil and political liberties + population size + physical setting + social welfare + cultural homogeneity + political structure + control of external influences.

The opposite or negative aspects of these variables would account for the phenomenon of political instability. In tracing the origins of the variables used to explain political instability, critics may argue that the Platonic model did not manage to escape the Charybdis of overdetermination. This is accurate if, and only if, political culture is treated as a variable, rather than a concept. As a variable, political culture is often treated as one additional amorphous factor to be appended somewhere at the end of the model or captured in the error term of a regression model. Contemporary practitioners in general, and practitioners of regression

methodology in specific, have perceived political culture in precisely this manner. Yet Plato appeared to view the concept of political culture from a fundamentally different perspective; each variable which he identified as critical for maintenance of political order was not a thing separate from political culture, but an essential component of the concept. Each variable served as a single indicator of political culture.

This point cannot be overemphasized; it clarifies and simplifies two disturbing problems endemic to social science research, (1) providing a workable definition of political culture, and (2) measurement of the concept.

There are important implications of Plato's cultural variables for current research. When several of these cultural variables are incorporated into a regression model, one might have greater confidence in the results. Since these aggregated variables actually constitute and are indicators of the concept of political culture, a certain degree of uneasiness regarding exclusion of a potentially important variable from the model because of its "fuzziness" is avoided.

Plato's major contribution to the study of political stability/instability was in the identification and the in depth analysis of the variables which were embraced by the concept of political culture. Political culture becomes a manageable tool for empirical research because

of Plato's work.

Aristotle followed Plato and considered variations on many of the same themes. The continuity of the theme of inequality as the basis for political instability is also evidenced in Aristotle's *Politics*. The research question posed by this most practical of political philosophers (Book 5, Chapter 1) was:

> What things bring about revolutions in regimes and how many and of what sort...what are the sources of destruction for each sort of regime...further, what are the sources of preservation both [for regimes] in common and for each sort of regime separately; and further, by what things each sort of regime might most particularly be preserved...

In contrast to Plato, Aristotle begins his analysis with those things which tend to destabilize a regime, and then discusses those things which preserve regimes in general, and in specific cases.

Inequality is addressed, first as a perception of citizens equal or unequal overall. Thus it is the perception of inequality which leads to factional conflict, or instability. This view parallels Gurr's (1973) introduction of the concept of relative deprivation as a determining factor in political instability. Aristotle's treatment of factional conflict as the result of perceptions of inequality represents the initial psychological model of instability which was more fully developed in contemporary social science by Gurr (1973).

As a psychological model, Aristotle's "perception of inequality" thesis is subject to the same criticisms later attached to Gurr's relative deprivation model. Aristotle did not address himself solely to psychological arguments as motivation for revolutionary action, however. He explicitly states that property inequities disrupt social harmony (*Politics*, Book 4, Chapter 13, 5).

> For the poor are willing to remain tranquil even when they have no share in the prerogatives, provided no one acts arrogantly toward them nor deprives them of any of their property.

With this statement, Aristotle takes a position which may have significant implications for social science research on political instability. He proposes that the poor are willing to remain acquiescent even in the absence of rights of political participation provided their property remains under their control.

The theoretical and policy implications are enormous. For theory, the implication is that research on political instability need not consider lack of participatory rights significant where the poor are not deprived of property in the form of land or income. For policy, the implication is that political power vested in the hands of the few is not a critical factor in political destabilization; exclusionary politics becomes significant only when this practice is linked with exclusion from economic benefits of government.

Aristotle noted that revolutions occur in two ways; they may be precipitated by (1) those who want to change the system, and (2) those who "intend that the system remain the same," but want to place control of the system in their own hands (Aristotle, *Politics* Book 5, Chapter 1, 10-20). He argues further that the regime made up of "the middling elements" is the most stable of regimes. Again Aristotle returns to the theme of inequality by proposing a large middle class; a society in which citizens are neither wealthy nor poor. The argument here is that a large middle class will act as a buffer, weakening and separating those factions which would generally engage in violent opposition. Aristotle also argues that every difference causes factional conflict which arise not *over* but *from* small things.

Implicit to this argument is the idea that while small things do not in themselves cause instability, an aggregation of small grievances is potentially explosive. Also implied is the buildup of tension in a political system when societal demands are not met (*Politics*, Book 5, Chapter 4, 15-30). Aristotle notes that the effects of these small differences are first felt among the oligarchy, which splits into opposing sides, but also within the city as a whole. As a result of rivalry within the oligarchy, the opportunity arises for one of the opposing sides to mobilize the masses on their

behalf.

Thus Aristotle identified another major source of instability which was neglected by Plato (the first being a large middle class), the rise of a popular leader who mobilizes the people against "the notables, making them yield up their properties for redivision, or their revenues..."(*Politics*, Book 5, Chapter 5, 5).

In his critique of Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle observed that inequality is also based on property other than land. It was Aristotle who introduced the idea that neither income levels alone, or land distribution patterns alone is adequate for explanations of political instability--both are necessary, although not sufficient. The position that land inequality must be linked with income inequality in order to adequately explain political violence has been the subject of intensive research in the twentieth century (see Muller, Seligson and Fu, 1989).

Aristotelian structuralism would allow a small wealthy economic sector at the top and a similarly small number of economically deprived citizens at the bottom. Political and economic power would be lodged with the middle class. Neither of these ideal-type models represent the historical or current political and economic structure observed in Latin America. What is evident is the widening gap between the wealthy oligarchy

and the masses who exist in poverty, and a growing but relatively modest middle-class which zealously guards its prerogatives and status, often emulating the values and behavior of the wealthy upper sector. Consequently, the later works of Karl Marx paralleled the classic formulations of Plato and Aristotle, and shifted the theoretical emphasis to investigation of class conflict and the specific conditions under which revolution was historically determined, i.e., the inevitability of revolution (LaFeber, 1984).

Marx believed that he had discovered a scientific method for developing a theory of political violence. For Marx (Marx and Engels 1964, 79), all of social history was viewed as "the history of class struggles," the history of the "oppressor and the oppressed." Marx argued that it was a historical fact that society was divided into two classes which existed in perpetual opposition based on the division of labor into minders of machines and masters of machines.

Reminiscent of Plato's observation of the decline of nationalism where great poverty existed, Marx viewed class conflict as the inevitable result of the emergence of industrialization which "created a revolutionary class" across nations, sharing the same interests--a world class in which "nationality is already dead" (Turner and Beeghley, 1986). Membership in one or the

other of the great classes presupposed divergent past experiences and interests. Opposing interests generated conflict. This struggle, Marx observed, was sometimes hidden, sometimes open, but always continuous. Thus two great classes which directly confront each other, "Bourgeoisie and Proletariat," were locked in natural conflict in which the end result could be only revolution, or "common ruin of the contending classes."

In contrast to Plato and Aristotle, Marx did not view social engineering as the primary mode of effecting change in the direction of stability. Revolution was the natural and predetermined means of ending the dominance of the bourgeois class; the proletariat would themselves become the new masters. Instability was inherent in the very fabric of a social existence in which the interests of master and slave could never be reconciled.

In the distinctly Hegelian tradition, Marx believed that humans could be distinguished from animals because they possessed the ability to effect significant change in their environment in order to improve their quality of life. As Turner and Beeghley (1986, 138) noted, this uniquely human ability to "manipulate and alter the environment" in order to satisfy needs implies self-reflective consciousness. They are "capable of assessing their positions in society and acting in terms of their own interests." In Hegelian terms, rationality enabled

the slave, through work, to become the master; for Marx, rationality, in most cases, required revolution in order to reverse the social structure.

Competition resulted from division of labor based on private property, according to Marx. Conflict was the consequence of competition. Since competition was the cornerstone of capitalism, it was capitalism which carried within it the seeds of revolution. Although Marx, as social theorist, was extraordinarily ingenious in forging causal relationships, certainly in some consequential areas his logic was historically and spatially limited. He simply could not predict the resilience of capitalist economies.

Nevertheless, Marx's contribution to social theory endures. His powerful analysis of and insight into capitalism and the etiology of class conflict provides a necessary ingredient in a theoretical formulation of the causal factors involved in political instability. While it is acknowledged that class conflict is one among several motivations for group mobilization, (religion, ethnic heterogeneity, and nationalism) division along class lines according to distinct class interests fulfills one fundamental criterion for inclusion as part of an integrative theoretical process. Class division across the economic fault as a source for revolutionary mobilization appears to apply to more cases across time

in the Third World than other explanations of group participation in political conflict. Further, it relieves the empirical researcher from the burden of the "psychological trap" noted by Rule (1988).

Marxian analysis of class conflict based on economic motivation appears to be a viable explanation of instability in developing or less developed areas. It is particularly appropriate for current research into Latin American political conflicts. Supported by, and supporting classic theories (Plato and Aristotle) of the destabilizing effects of great wealth and great poverty extant in society, Marx's class analysis also avoids the major problems inherent in psychological theories of conflict and the necessity of demonstrating the precise linkage between individual cognitive processes and group action.

Modern Theories of Stability and Instability

Seymour Martin Lipset (1963), in his seminal study on prerequisites for achieving a democratic society, triggered a vigorous debate on political stability and political democracy which has yet to be resolved. In *Political Man,* Lipset attempted to discover the "social bases of democracy," and was widely criticized for having identified those variables which appear to be more closely associated with stability. Although democracy and stability are closely related, they are not

interchangeable; democracies are stable, but stability can be achieved through repressive and exclusionary regime policies. Consequently a major criticism of Lipset's methodology was focused on the inadvisability of treating "democratic stability" as a single concept (Bollen, 1980, 375).

Lipset, who identifies his position as that of "apolitical sociological Marxism," did not neglect, as he has been charged, the issue of timing. He explicitly states (Lipset, 1985, 71):

> In modern times, three major issues have emerged in Western nations: first, the place of the church and/or various religions within the nation; second, the admission of the lower strata, particularly the workers, to full political and economic "citizenship" through universal suffrage and the right to bargain collectively; and third, the continuing struggle over the distribution of the national income.
> The significant question here is: Were these issues dealt with one by one, with each more or less solved before the next arose;...? Resolving tensions one at a time contributes to a stable political system; carrying over issues from one historical period to another makes for a political atmosphere characterized by bitterness and frustration rather than tolerance and compromise.

Lipset further notes that political stability is greatly determined by the way in which the major cleavages dividing society have been resolved, or left unresolved over time. Democracies have resolved these issues earlier, one by one, at a slower pace, which prevented the buildup of political tension. Third World nations attempt to deal with these issues simultaneously,

creating a situation of unremitting crisis. One factor, not included in this enumeration of issues to be resolved, is that of the role of the military in political society.

Democracies at the outset relegated the military to a permanent and abiding subordinate position in a society dominated by civilian leaders. This factor may be most crucial in determining stability. Contrary to the findings of those who followed him, Lipset did not suggest that political participation was destabilizing--in democracies. The value of the contribution of Lipset to research on stability (or democracy) can be assessed by the fact that no debate on these issues begins without investigation into the potential and possibilities of *Political Man*.

In Lipset's (1981, 475) revised and expanded edition of Political Man, Lipset answers Rustow's (1970) challenge to his central thesis that economic development is crucial for democracy. Rustow points to historical evidence that democracies existed in the United States in 1820, France in 1870, and Sweden in 1890 at relatively low levels of economic development. Lipset's response was that these democracies had the historical advantage of (1) political institutions (democratic) formed prior to establishment of a worldwide communications system, (2) institutionalization before the emergence of mass

popular movements, and (3) time--the absence of overlapping political crises. Development of a worldwide communications system would make it apparent that other countries were much wealthier than they; mass popular movements would make demands for a more equal distribution of worldly goods as their level of expectations increased. Lipset notes that a condition for a stable polity requires that the level of popular expectations be appropriate to the economic level of the society. There were also no overlapping political crises in these early Western democracies in the 19th century such as those faced by contemporary developing states.

In an attempt to shore up a failing thesis, Lipset appears to retreat from his earlier confidence in the relationship between socio-economic development and democracy. What implications can be drawn from the revised explanation? Lipset appears to be saying that democracy can be established prior to economic development, but only in the absence of a world-wide communications system, mass popular demands for greater equity in distribution, and ongoing, or simultaneous political crises. If democracy is established under these conditions and in conjunction with overlapping political crises, the result is an inherently unstable political system.

The single most important implication to be drawn

from Lipset's reanalysis, in contrast to his previously stated "political formula" for democratization, is that economically developing countries existing today which are not democratic and stable probably cannot expect to become so in the future. Lipset's "special conditions" for early stable democracies existed at one and only one historical moment, making duplication of this experience impossible for late-comers to the development process. Because the advance of communications technology, which is irreversible, created the equally irreversible mass society, the masses now expect more than their national economic bases can provide; inability or unwillingness to meet these demands leads to tightening of control and centralization of power by political elites and to the failure of representative institutions "in one developing nation after another" (Huntington, 1965; Lipset, 1981, 475). Thus the prospects for both democracy and political stability in the latter part of the 20th century are apparently negligible, if one accepts the validity of the foregoing analysis.

Marxist scholars had long been disillusioned with the bourgeois explanations for development and underdevelopment (Baran, 1968; Gunder Frank, 1969), but the most articulate spokesman for the dependency school was Guillermo O'Donnell, in his theoretical account of the emergence of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes in

much of Latin America. O'Donnell (1979, 2-3) argued in *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* that "Occidental political science and sociology was permeated by the basic perception that most of the more affluent countries of the modern world are 'political democracies.'"

In reacting against the modernization paradigm, O'Donnell called the discipline to task for its "ahistorical perspectives" which he charged were responsible for unrealistic expectations regarding the relationship between socio-economic development and political democracy--the wealthier and more developed a country became, the more likely it was to become a political democracy. Bureaucratic-authoritarianism became the focus of mainstream and dependency scholars, with emphasis on transitions from this state to "democracy" and from democracy to bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

Samuel Huntington has been widely cited for his mobilization-institutionalization thesis. The political future of developing states was also evaluated by Huntington (1984). His assessment of the democratic potential in developing countries was decidedly negative--an assessment not in the prevailing trend of the political rhetoric or wishful thinking of policymakers who found it expedient to herald the return of democracy

to Latin America.

Huntington (1965) introduced the corollary concept to political development into the working lexicon of comparative politics. Political degeneration, or decay, was the epicenter for analysis of Huntington's primary thesis on political instability. Huntington was concerned that most modernizing countries were purchasing modernization at the price of political degeneration; developmental models were "hopeful" but only partially relevant to countries to which they were applied. Huntington noted that models of corrupt or degenerating societies (decaying societies) were more relevant to modernizing societies, but that the process of decay had been neglected in the literature of development.

Huntington (1965, 415) argued that perhaps the most relevant ideas were the most ancient ones, a point of departure emphasized in this dissertation. Going "back to the basics," Huntington noted that Plato had developed a "highly explicit theory of political degeneration," analogous to today's corrupt society which lacks law, authority, cohesion, discipline and consensus. States in the process of decay are those in which private interests dominate public interests and political institutions are weak, while social forces are strong.

The problem, as Huntington described it, was the lack of strong effective political institutions to curb

excessive personal and parochial desires of rulers. The top positions of leadership represent the "inner core" of a political system; developed political systems have mechanisms which restrict, or filter and moderate impact of newly mobilized groups by slowing down the entry process in order to allow for socialization into the "rules of the game." Without these mechanisms, Huntington noted that the core of the political system could be easily penetrated--the process of assimilation would be circumvented. The price of low levels of institutionalization would be internal and external vulnerability to stronger social forces. His example of a state that was subject to political degeneration was Argentina, at that time considered by Huntington to be a corrupt polity and a feeble state surrounded by massive social forces. Huntington argued that this type of state could not be considered politically developed "no matter how urbane, educated, or prosperous its citizens may be" (Huntington, 1965, 409). Institutional decay is a common phenomenon of modernizing countries; coups and military interventions in politics are one index of low levels of political institutionalization and occur where political institutions lack autonomy and coherence.

Another factor leading to political instability, according to Huntington, is rapid economic growth stimulating aspirations "which may be only partially

satisfied, if at all." In this event, excessive social mobilization, prior to the establishment of democratic political institutions would result in instability. The decline of party organizations leads to the rise of charismatic leaders and personalization of power, further weakening political institutions. Particularistic groups reassert themselves and undermine the coherence and authority of institutions.

Huntington constructed four ideal-types of polities: civic polities in which there occurred both a high level of social mobilization and political institutionalization, primitive polities with low levels of mobilization and institutionalization, contained polities with low levels of mobilization combined with high levels of institutionalization, and corrupt polities with high levels of mobilization in conjunction with low levels of institutionalization. It was the final category, corrupt polities, which was Huntington's model for political instability; a model which embraced the Platonic principle of political decay and applied to many Third World nations.

Charles Tilly challenged Huntington's analysis of the fruits of modernization. Defining modernization as "industrialization, or demographic expansion," Tilly (1973) challenged Huntington's conclusions regarding the effects of modernization on political instability, asking

the question, "does modernization breed revolution?" Tilly concludes that "there is no reliable and regular sense in which modernization breeds revolution."

Tilly contends that Huntington's "lead-lag" model, in which social mobilization leads political institutionalization is tautological and subject to circularity. According to Tilly, it is one thing to assert that the discrepancy between social mobilization and political institutionalization is responsible for instability, but quite another to specify the extent of the discrepancy necessary to produce instability or revolution. Using Huntington's model, Tilly argues, would force one to look at the fact of instability or revolution in order to determine that the lag between social mobilization/political institutionalization was great enough to cause that which was observed. Further, Tilly noted that there was no way to determine, a priori, the expansive capability of a political system; if a political system was observed to be unstable, it must be because its institutions were underdeveloped.

This "global strategy" of Huntington's, as Tilly perceived it, was not so much inaccurate as it was incomplete. Specifications were required which would (1) clearly distinguish among different forms of conflict, (2) disaggregate revolution into its component parts, (3) investigate the precise ways urbanization or political

centralization affect mobilization or demobilization of different segments of the population, and (4) specify and trace the relations of each segment to the changing structure of power.

Tilly clearly approved several of Huntington's major arguments; Huntington insisted that instability and political violence stemmed from the central political process, and that attention to specific claims and counterclaims would be more productive than the satisfaction or discontent of groups. Both Huntington and Tilly's work represented a distinct departure from social and psychological analyses, and converged on the issue of the inherently political nature of instability. Again, however, definitions of major concepts were derived idiosyncratically, ensuring that neither of these major contributors to the instability debate were observing the identical phenomenon.

The disagreement, which may not have been as severe as Tilly supposed, is further aggravated by failure to recognize the fact that each worked at a different level of analysis, Huntington, macro, and Tilly at the micro-level. Tilly implicitly acknowledged this problem in noting that Huntington's strategy was "global," and by his insistence that the linkages be specified.

Adding to the dispute based primarily on definitional idiosyncracy and use of different levels of

analysis, was the probability that revolutionary potential increased as the disaffection of either elites or masses increased. In analyzing the sources of instability or revolution, Tilly holds that the Marxian account of conditions necessary for revolutions remains the most powerful, although Marx's analysis was flawed by failure to expand his theory to take into consideration non-class based contenders for power, or to note the counterrevolutionary forces unleashed when established positions are threatened.

Tilly offers three necessary conditions and a fourth "strongly facilitating" condition for revolution; the emergence of contenders or coalitions of contenders, exclusively alternative claims to government control, commitment to those claims, and a government unable or unwilling to suppress the committed alternative contenders or coalitions. Finally, Tilly stresses that a condition which facilitates revolution occurs when disaffected elites form a coalition with the contenders for power. In contrast to Huntington, Tilly noted that revolution was more likely to materialize as a result of elite disaffection than as a result of mobilization of newcomers to the political game.

Tilly's work, which spanned over twenty years, brought to the discipline the impetus to theoretical progress. Not since the demise of theories of collective

behavior in the late 1960s and 1970s, with emphasis on political violence as a result of deviation from social norms had studies of stability/instability rested upon so firm a theoretical foundation. It was possible to acknowledge what the ancients had always assumed; stability and instability were inextricably linked to the political process. Political action was based on the rational acts of rational men, well aware of their self-interests, yet capable of embracing a cause or course of action in furtherance of common interests. The target of rational protest was the state, which alone possessed the capability of promoting change. Thus Tilly (1974, 1978) advanced the notion of the ends of collective violence as a rational (goal-oriented) means of alleviating injustice and of acquiring resources for which groups feel a sense of entitlement.

Ted Gurr and the concept of relative deprivation resulted in further theoretical progress. Critics of psychological theories of deprivation have pointed out the difficulty of demonstrating empirically (1) how individual aggression translates into collective aggression, and (2) how presumed psychological states and observed behavior are linked (Rule, 1988). As Rule notes, it is obvious that most political demands are the result of perceived or actual deprivation, but this observation does little to increase explanatory power or

predictability.

The work of one of the major proponents of deprivation theory, James C. Davies, may be taken as an example of the difficulties of empirical and quantitative deprivation research. Davies (1962, 6) hypothesized that political violence was the result of a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratification, followed by a short period of sharp reversal. Rule's objections are well-taken. How is one to determine whether (or when) individuals are experiencing rising expectations, or when individuals perceive that gratification has occurred? How does one aggregate these individual expectations/gratifications into a collective unit capable of violent actions? For theoretical credibility, it is necessary to demonstrate a linkage between perceptions and behavior, and to devise an explanation for aggregate behavior.

Although relative deprivation theories suffered from major inadequacies, noted by Rule (1988), Gurr (1973, 1974, 1978) fostered theoretical refinement through introduction of the idea that mass demands on the political system involved a comparison of one's own situation to that of others. Gurr's addition to the inequality debate the concept of "relative deprivation" involved explicit comparison of life-states. Marx implied, and Gurr explicitly stated that awareness of the

differences in the life-state of elites and masses occurred as a result of comparison. Comparison of relative life-states could result in aggression if demands were not met. For Marx, the inevitability of proletariat revolution was apparent, yet Gurr succeeded in advancing the theory toward a logical and empirical conclusion (Rule, 1988). Mitigating factors (which Gurr called "mediating factors") could defuse or increase political tension in the system. Gurr proposed that incidences of collective violence were dependent on several mediating factors--normative, utilitarian and structural. "Normative justifications" for violence included (1) traditions of violent conflict, or (2) ideological commitment or belief concerning regime legitimacy. Additionally required for the onset of conflict was the "utilitarian justification" for violence--the belief in violence as the most effective means of obtaining political goals, and "structural factors" which take into consideration the balance of coercive forces between dissidents and the state (Gurr, 1970, 47-53). Overall, Gurr's earlier model explained sixty-five percent of variation in political conflict, but his deprivation variables accounted for much less of the variation in civil strife than did his mediating variables. Thus Gurr's introduction of mediating factors assume greater significance, explaining almost fifty

percent of the total variance in political violence (Gurr, 1968; Rule, 1988).

Accordingly, in the absence of traditions of violent conflict, and in combination with belief in regime legitimacy, violence is unlikely; a history of violent conflict, ideological belief that the regime lacks legitimacy and commitment to that belief, in the presence of resource capability with which to challenge the regime, makes violence highly probable.

Gurr's analysis thus far is quite susceptible to a charge of ethnocentrism--it is impossible to change the fact that one nation has a history of violent conflict, therefore those states which can expect future stability are those with past traditions of stability, i.e., Western democracies. However, it is not Gurr's precise specification of mediating factors which is central to the idea of theoretical progression. Greater flexibility and refinement of the concept of mediating factors into Marx's more deterministic formula makes Gurr's work essential for this study. Revolution is not inevitable--certain factors properly specified may diffuse or reduce tensions in the political system, thereby eliminating the revolutionary potential.

Bunce (1989, 172-173) also utilizes the concept of mitigating circumstances, which Staniszkis (1984) has called "protest absorption." Broad protest absorption

strategies tend to reduce systemic pressure in the direction of collective violence. Among those strategies, which "East European regimes have been concerned with since the mid-1950s," are social compacts, quick response to worker unrest or to elite instability by expanding worker benefits and or by employing coercion, reducing the political economic presence of the party through political reforms, and assuring that economic reforms would not harm worker's interests. Here also the issue is not whether or not one accepts these particular "mitigating factors" as necessary or sufficient in circumvention of violent confrontation, but of recognition that systemic violence can be alleviated by rational strategies. Recognition of the potential for employing "broad strategies of protest absorption," and the implied capability for manipulation of "mitigating factors" represents a further breakthrough in theoretical refinement. The introduction of this concept had broad policy implications; the discipline could hypothetically move toward the elusive goals of predictability, and ultimately, control of potentially destabilizing situations.

Land and Income Inequality and Mass Political Violence

Midlarsky (1988a, 492; 1988b, 587) proposed "patterned inequality" as an explanation for "the later appearance of mass political violence in regions with a

relatively recent history of conquest and settlement." Peasants, according to Midlarsky, were impoverished as a result of patterns of subdivisions of agricultural landholdings occurring as a result of "long-term processes that had begun centuries earlier." Midlarsky noted that "the peasant, as keen observer and interpreter of the environment," was in a particularly unique position from which to observe these long-term patterns which resulted in diminishing his own landholdings, while land distribution patterns at the upper levels (large landholders) did not undergo these subdivision. Where there is a fixed supply of land, "high birth rates and absence of primogeniture among peasants," will lead to increasing subdivisions of small farms, while large farms remain intact. Thus, the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer. Examinations of these patterns over time increases ability to predict political violence. Inequality in land distribution, for Midlarsky, was viewed as a major cause of mass political violence. Explicit in Midlarsky's analysis was the notion that peasants rationally assess their own interests, recognize and act upon their common class interests.

Prosterman and Riedinger (1987) had argued earlier that it was "landlessness, rather than inequality in the distribution of land which was the most important factor in peasant unrest." Large-scale violence in agrarian

societies was associated with the percentage of landless peasants in the population. Prosterman and Riedinger used as examples of the positive relationship between landlessness and mass political violence the state of Mexico prior to 1911, Russia prior to 1917, Spain before 1936, China before 1941, Bolivia prior to 1952, Cuba before 1959, and South Vietnam before 1961. In cross-national tests of the land inequality thesis, the standard operational definition of land inequality was the Gini land concentration ratio, however studies had consistently failed to find a strong correlation between land distribution patterns and political violence.

While Prosterman and Riedinger, along with Midlarsky, attribute the low correlation to flaws in the Gini index, Muller, Seligson and Hung-der Fu (1989, 586) argue that the reason for lack of association between the Gini ratio and mass political violence is that land distribution is only important when linked to income inequality. Therefore no significant correlation would be found.

Partial support for Muller, Seligson and Hung-der Fu is found by Goldfrank (1989, 194-197). Using Wallerstein's (1979) World-System theory as a theoretical framework, Goldfrank also finds that income inequality is a cause of agrarian unrest. He also notes that the Chilean poor suffer a nutritional deficit resulting "far

more from a highly skewed income distribution than from devoting prime lands to fruit production for export." Although Goldfrank viewed income inequality as a source of unrest by small landholders, he did not believe that Chile would undergo a social revolution as a consequence; fruit workers were more likely to seek unionization than the revolutionary path. Further, Goldfrank observed that there was no currently active or visible opposition movement capable of challenging the power of the military, regardless of regime type (civilian or military).

Booth and Seligson (1978, 1979) challenge conventional wisdom which has perceived peasants as non-activists in the political process. The authors found that for some forms of participation, peasants are more active and sophisticated than was previously thought. Booth and Seligson expand Verba and Nie's definition of political participation to include those political activities which occur outside the system. They conclude that land ownership increases certain kinds of peasant participation such as communal projects, attendance at local organizational meetings, and interaction with local government. Landed peasants participate within acceptable legitimate boundaries. The situation is quite different for landless peasants, according to the authors; landless peasants are more inclined to

participate in strike activism or other "outside the system" behavior.

Booth and Seligson attribute these findings to the notion that landed peasants perceive that they have a greater stake in their society, thus they act within the system. In their sample of 510 peasants, 74% of all strikes were engaged in by landless peasants. Supporting Prosterman and Riedinger (1987), this study concludes that landlessness, rather than unequal distribution of land is closely associated with peasant activism outside the system.

At this point, it might be interesting to note that Seligson, working with Muller (1987) and Muller and Hung-der Fu (1989) found land distribution important only when linked to income inequality. Yet Seligson, with Booth (1979) found that landlessness (a distribution category) led to protest behavior, without further consideration of income. Certainly this ambiguity typifies the lack of consensus within comparative politics in regard to research on the association between land ownership, landlessness, and income distribution. Midlarsky (1989, 594) called into question the "important, but as yet poorly understood, role of income inequality as a progenitor of societal discontent."

The possibility of reconciliation among theories and findings appears to be a formidable if not impossible

task; nevertheless efforts in that direction must be rigorous if the discipline is to advance further.

Continuing the theme of inequality in the Third World, Kohli (1984, 283) attempts to assess the relative importance of three competing theories of inequality--developmental, neo-Marxist, and statist explanations. Using cross-sectional and short-term longitudinal data, Kohli argues that the cross-sectional analysis suggests that over the long run, economic development and dependence on foreign investment generates increased income inequalities. The short-term longitudinal analysis supports neither of these hypotheses; short-run changes in income inequalities are best explained by the nature and policies of the type of regime. Authoritarian states tend to worsen inequalities, while democratic states stabilize them. Kohli reconciles these disparate findings by noting that this is what one should expect to find "given that development and dependency theories are not about what happens in the short run, but about what happens over long spans of time. Therefore development and dependency theories of inequality are found to be inappropriate in explaining short-term fluctuations in inequality. Politics and policy are most important for changes in inequality.

Walter LaFeber and his neodependency thesis was called by Alfred Stepan, "the best historical synthesis

in the last century," and by a former American ambassador to El Salvador, Murat Williams, "the best book on Central America in over 100 years.." LaFeber (1984, 12-13) offers a challenging, though controversial historical account of the role of the United States in Central America in which his central thesis is that "the U.S. fear of revolution and...the U.S. system ironically helped cause revolutions..." which the United States presence in Central America was designed to eliminate.

Encompassing most of the prominent instability hypotheses, LaFeber's analysis adds one further dimension which forms the core of this dissertation: external systemic pressure increases internal systemic pressure. Short-run stability is won at the cost of long-term instability; over time, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, repression of major social forces generates greater potential for social disruption. As Marx has suggested, escalation of repressive measures may constrain opposing forces, yet hidden they remain powerful, eventually resulting in overt confrontations with other dominant social forces.

As the title of his major work suggests, LaFeber views the American presence in Central America as a primary cause of the region's "inevitable revolutions." On one issue, this study departs from a position implicit in LaFeber's analysis. This inquiry deliberately rejects

any form of conspiracy interpretation; while past United States policies are hypothesized to have created many of the problems it was designed to resolve, the nature of the American political system precludes the conspiracy thesis. Regular and frequent change of policymaking leadership, in conjunction with extreme ideological differences, effectively dispels the notion of a coordinated and cohesive plan to exercise absolute control in any of LaFeber's three dimensions: political, economic and military.

Russett and Starr (1992, 420-423) reach much the same conclusion regarding the consequences of repression in their analysis of the Third World "spiral of protest" and coercion. The authors note the variation in response to civil conflict between democratic and repressive regimes to protest behavior. In a democracy, social unrest may lead to strikes, demonstrations and riots, yet democratic regimes do not immediately respond with repression. They try to "defuse the situation" through meeting reasonable demands of the most powerful opposing forces.

In authoritarian, or repressive regimes, the response to increasing criticism of government is repression, which generates counterforce in the system. Thus repression and coercion reinforce each other, creating a conflict spiral. Conservative forces,

landowners, business leaders, the army, and even the middle class "may demand strong action." Under these circumstances, military intervention becomes more acceptable; a military takeover is more likely to occur. State terrorism is common and may greatly exceed private terrorism.

Central to the focus of this study, United States support of military regimes or repressive civilian authorities adds to repressive capacity of such regimes. Under these circumstances, repressive regimes are unlikely to introduce strategies of diffusion, or mitigating factors. As Russett and Starr (1992, 422) note:

> The condition of peripheral countries in the world economy is quite different from that experienced a century or so ago by Europe and North America, or even by Japan...political authorities lacked the instruments of effective repression that are now common--sophisticated surveillance technology for the police, powerful modern armed forces--and foreign sources from which these instruments of repression can be obtained.
>
> Thus, even though most European countries experienced periods in their industrialization when income and wealthwere unequally distributed,most of them ultimately were obliged to make concessions and come to some peaceful terms with their peasants and working classes. Those who waited too long...lost everything...Now, however, many repressive states may not have to make concessions.

This account of the consequences of internal pressure combined with extraneous sources for maintenance of repressive measures provides support for LaFeber's historical description of the Central American

experience, albeit without the additional and unfalsifiable element of perceived U.S. historical duplicity. Therefore the emphasis of this dissertation must, of empirical necessity, rest on the consequences of United States policy in Latin America.

The inescapable conclusion of Russett and Starr's (and LaFeber's) account of peripheral conditions is that repressive states have little incentive to make concessions to peasants and working classes. They are able to institutionalize inequality in income, land and power, as earlier European counterparts could not, often aided by democratic regimes pursuing national security policies which emphasized regional stability.

In one of the relatively few quantitative studies which have investigated the relationship between aid dependence on the United States (military and economic) and the stability of democratic regimes, Muller (1985) finds a "quite strong inverse time-lagged association." Muller also investigated the impact of international influences (U.S.) on peripheral economies as a possible source of political instability.

Muller's article pointed out that in the past, U.S. foreign aid to Latin America was widely justified as harbingers of democracy, peace and order, especially during the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress. Once Johnson took office, however, there was a

reversion to the Cold War approach; the objective of promoting democracy was virtually abandoned. The United States no longer attempted to hold military regimes accountable for overthrowing democratic regimes. The emphasis was on national security, protection of American economic interests, nonintervention, and economic growth.

Muller contrasted two outcomes of policy change. During the Kennedy Alliance for Progress movement, the military junta of Peru was held strictly accountable for the demise of democracy. The United States suspended diplomatic relations, cut off military and economic aid, and made it known that the United States was anxious for a return to constitutional government. Democracy was restored less than a year later.

The situation in Brazil under Johnson's Cold War reversion policies had quite a different outcome. The civilian reformist president, Joao Goulart, was disliked by the army because of ties to labor. Highest level officers favored a coup. Washington encouraged the action and "offered war material in case the coup led to civil war." Muller argued that the U.S. Army and the CIA, though not directing the coup, nevertheless took partial credit for its success. Muller then offered his alternative "geopolitical dependency hypothesis."

Breakdowns in developing democracies in many instances were the result of interaction between (1)

external financial aid for the armed forces, (2) leftist forces in developing countries militarily dependent on the United States, and (3) aggressive pursuit by the United States of the Cold War doctrine. In Muller's words, "democratic breakdowns in the Third World often are a by-product of super-power competition for political-military advantage in the bipolar post World-War II interstate system."

Muller's study covered 17 states; eight states that maintained stable democracies during 1964-1973, and nine states that experienced a transition from democracy to authoritarianism. Bollen's (1980) political democracy index was used as a measure of the extent of the "democraticness" of political institutions; instability was not directly measured. According to Muller, his findings that military and economic aid to countries considered to be of strategic importance to the United States promoted political instability was to be expected, given that fear of a "second Cuba and obsessive Communism," would perceive any leftist dissent as justification for imposition of military rule. Thus, the idea that United States intervention, military and economic, promotes instability, is shared by many students of Third World Politics. However, my explicitly quantitative approach, built on a comprehensive interdisciplinary theoretical foundation, using an

alternative measure and definition of democracy, and utilizing a more direct measure of the dependent variable, political instability, should provide additional insight and information vital to future policy objectives.

Summary

From Lipset's (1981) and Lerner's (1959) seminal modernization studies, a veritable kaleidoscope of research activities was generated. As the quantity and direction of development/democracy/stability research proliferated, treatment of the concept became increasingly oversimplified or overdetermined. As escalation progressed, individual scholars were forced to define concepts idiosyncratically; no consensus emerged on usage or meaning of major concepts. There was no consensus within the discipline on which of the multiple indicators held the most promising explanatory potential.

The same variables (modernity, development, participation, rate or level of economic development, communications, education, deprivation and even democracy) were said to be both stabilizing and destabilizing by isolated researchers using different definitions, indicators and measures. Numerous indices were constructed to capture the concepts of democracy and stability, yet all were criticized for inadequacies and were vulnerable to the charge that they obscured more

than they revealed (Coleman, 1960; Cutright, 1963; Neubauer, 1967; Cutright and Wiley, 1969; Smith, 1969; Adelman and Morris, 1971; Jackman, 1973; Johnson, 1977; Bollen, 1980).

While mainstream political science retreated from democracy/stability/development research into the "transitions" phase, the dependency school of Marxian analysis took up the challenge of developmental studies. Redemocratization research accelerated. Development, stability and democracy studies had not disappeared, but were on the whole subsumed and rechanneled into the more trendy and profitable "transitional" and "militarization" literature. Other scholars continued with the development theme, but focused more exclusively on precise specifications of deprivation, particularly inequality and its causes and consequences in the Third World.

Today, comparative political studies on stability, dependency, development, transitions and democracy must recognize that previous works have suffered from ambiguousness and inconclusiveness; the hopeful expectations of the past have not been realized. If we can accept this assessment, we may yet achieve the objectives for which we have labored.

The problems we face are tremendous; only rigorous honesty, uncontaminated by prior ideological commitment,

will suffice for the 1990s. We cannot and must not prematurely judge policymakers for the paths they have followed, in light of our own inability to provide unambiguous theoretical guidance. Chapter Three provides an overview of foreign policy inconsistencies and contradictions in Central and South America for which we must accept partial responsibility.

CHAPTER III

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

American Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century: Continuity and Contradiction

This chapter focuses on foreign policy assumptions and objectives. American foreign policy in Latin America since 1945 has been characterized by assumptions of mutual exclusiveness between the idealistic and realistic approaches to policy implementation (Wiarda 1990). It is the perceived dichotomy between these views which has given rise to both continuity and contradiction in international relations. Robinson (1990) notes that general policy objectives of the United States have remained essentially unchanged; protection of U.S. national interests, support for democratization, and economic development within the region.

Wiarda (1990, 118) specifically sets out four "bedrocks of national policy" since the Monroe doctrine and its "more modern and updated version" which was shaped more than one hundred years ago with the emergence of American globalism. These specific interests are (1) to keep out hostile powers, (2) to maintain stability, (3) to maintain listening posts within Central America and the Carribean Islands, and (4) to maintain access to markets, raw materials, and labor supplies, keep open sea lanes, and protect the Panama Canal and access routes.

Debate has focused primarily on priorities and instruments through which to achieve these objectives. Rhetoric and action have often diverged, leading to loss of credibility with Latin America for stated United States policy objectives.

I will argue that the United States has too often attempted military and economic solutions based on unrealistic and often inaccurate assumptions in dealing with social unrest in Latin America. United States policymakers have perceived Central and South America as a monolithic entity; the result has been to forge broad policy (based on the European model and the exigencies of the Cold War) to fit the entire region. This perception has prevented the United States from taking into consideration the needs, complexities and differences within individual states.

Further, international events have directly influenced the policy agenda of the United States in Latin America. The loss of Cuba to Castro's revolutionary regime and the Cuban missile crisis precipitated a strong reaction by the United States to problems of instability. Any change in the status quo of Latin states was perceived as directed by the Soviet Union and therefore inimical to American national security. This perception of all change as Soviet-directed subsequently led to confusion in Washington

between nationalism and communism by national policymakers (LaFeber 1985, 171). This confusion was apparently limited to presidents and close advisors. Evidence suggests that as late as 1984, at the zenith of the Reagan administration's campaign against the "evil empire," many American leaders were not convinced that revolutions in the Third World could be attributed to Soviet influence. Russett and Starr (1992, 205), using data from the national leadership study by Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, report that 65% of Republican leaders, 83% of Democratic leaders, and 77% of State Department leaders believed that Third World revolutionary forces were nationalistic, rather than controlled by the Soviet Union or China.

Foreign policy does not emerge from a vaccuum; neither does policy always result from rational choices of national actors. Rather, American foreign policy is constrained by the social, political and economic environment of domestic and international politics as this environment is perceived by national leaders. The facts of international politics have not historically determined the foreign policy agendas of nation-states. The particular interpretation of those facts by principal actors and the interaction between political and economic necessities of domestic politics, world events, the political realities of the Cold War, leadership

attributes, and political ideologies of divergent political systems within specific historical contexts have contributed to the most spectacular failures of American foreign policy in Latin America since 1945.

To enhance understanding of U.S. foreign policy of military and economic intervention in Latin America, it is imperative to look first at the historical origins of interventionism which have resulted in significant consequences for United States and Latin American relations. The history and development of American foreign policy in Latin America has not been that of a unique formulation of policy objectives specifically designed for Latin American states by expert decision-makers overly concerned with the area and its monumental problems; rather U.S policy for this region is the result of "spillover" or historical transference of and interrelatedness between pre and post-WWII ideas, perceptions, attitudes, and behavior stemming from geopolitical factors in Europe.

Attention to the history of foreign policy facilitates understanding of contemporary policy problems by: (1) tracing the emergence of ideas and perceptions which translate into policy, (2) discovering underlying patterns of behavior among nation-states which can only be discerned over time, (3) identifying and isolating continuities and changes in ideas, perceptions, and

behavior among principal actors, (4) exploring the viability of various instruments of policy used to achieve objectives, (5) tracing the consequences of specific policy applications in the world-system, and (6) comprehending the causes of policy failures.

U.S. foreign policy has been grounded and nurtured in a climate of fear, mistrust, and political and ideological expediency; it is the continuity of fear which has resulted in the contradictions of policy, particularly fear of the intentions underlying the actions of national leaders of the (former) Soviet Union and the United States. Many historians divide United States foreign policy into three separate eras based upon the type of policy being pursued: isolationism, containment or interventionism. However, in each era all three policies were pursued simultaneously, providing a basis for the claim of continuity.

Policy Transitions

Conventional treatment of the three policy "eras" suggested that prior to the development of U.S.-Soviet tensions, the United States pursued a policy of isolationism as an outgrowth of fear of becoming embroiled in European wars. Art (1985, 117) noted that isolationism, the policy of nonentanglement (political and military) with other great powers, had a powerful influence over Americans before 1941.

He further observed that the grip of isolationism was not unlike a religion with Americans, because of the admonitions of the founding fathers and the fact that isolationism was successful. Isolationism was intended to insulate America from the European struggle for power; it was most clearly and formally articulated in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which stated that Europeans were to cease meddling in the affairs of the New World (U.S. and Latin America). There was to be no further colonization in this region by European powers. The United States would not be drawn into entanglements in the form of wars or promises of military assistance. Experience had shown that European wars had inexorably drawn in the colonies, which were used as pawns of the great powers; this was never to happen again.

The Monroe doctrine, which was directed toward Europe, contained the seed of the idea that was later to find continuity in the policy of containment: Latin America was to be the exclusive sphere of influence of the United States; the Soviet Union was to be prevented at all costs from establishing a beachhead in Latin America after World War II.

Isolationism was to enter a phase of transition from passive isolationism to "active neutrality" after World War I. Even after WW I, the prevalent belief among Americans was that all nations had a common interest in

world peace; World War I was "an aberration resulting from the acts of evil or psychotic men" (Ambrose 1988, xii). Because Americans viewed World War I in this fashion, as the situation in Europe continued to deteriorate prior to World War II, Americans embraced isolationism with a kind of "frenzy" (Art 1988, 120).

Following World War II, most scholars emphasize the revolutionary change in American foreign policy from isolationism to globalism. The "revolutionary" nature of this change appears to have been somewhat overstated. For Americans who viewed isolationism as almost a religion, and embraced it with a frenzy, this change to globalism indeed appears dramatic and abrupt. Historically, however, isolationism was somewhat a myth. If American citizens clung to the illusion of isolationism, it was because of Roosevelt's promise that American boys "are not going to be sent into any foreign wars" (Roosevelt's campaign speech in Boston on October 30, 1940). Permanent alliances which would lead to military entanglements were to be avoided at all costs; this was the wisdom and legacy of the founding fathers espoused in Washington's Farewell Address and in Jefferson's First Inaugural address (Patterson, Clifford, and Hagan, 1983).

Isolationist policy meant only that the United States would act unilaterally in its own interests.

Economically, politically, and militarily, the United States was never strictly isolationist in the sense of remaining aloof, disinterested, or even disentangled from world affairs, and clearly not isolationist in regard to Latin America. The capitalist system was foremost a global system; where policymakers perceived a threat to national interest, isolationism was never an issue.

The origin of the policy of containment must also be understood in order to comprehend the complexity of American-Soviet relationships in the twentieth century. Industrialization vastly increased productivity in the United States, creating a demand for new markets. Americans "swept across a continent while sending out tentacles of trade that quickly seized upon Asia as the great potential market for their magnificently productive farms and factories" (LaFeber 1985, 2). Secretary of War, William Taft, as early as 1905 was concerned for the China market and America's opening to "one of the greatest commercial prizes of the world" (Marks 1979, 57). LaFeber (1985, 1-2) noted that the earliest accounts of suspicion and hostility between Russia and the United States emerged from the process of economic expansion, competition for markets in China and Manchuria, and the American sense of "manifest destiny." President Theodore Roosevelt's assessment of Russian character was that Russians were "utterly insincere and

treacherous; they have no conception of the truth...and no regard for others" (Harbrough 1961, 277). From this account, it is evident that Cold War perceptions of an "evil empire" had deep historical roots, which provided the framework and foundation for continuity in policy.

Russia had been expanding for five centuries and now controlled a vast empire. The United States attempted to contain this expansion (by supporting Japan) from the 1890s until the first world war (LaFeber 1985, 2-3). Politically, the United States entered into treaties and agreements with other nations from the onset of American independence. The United States also frequently intervened militarily in the affairs of other states, even at the height of isolationism. After Lenin's Bolsheviks overthrew the Czar, President Woodrow Wilson sent more than 10,000 American soldiers between 1918 and 1920 in an attempt to overthrow Lenin by force. LaFeber further noted that the ever expanding Czarist empire now had the added impetus of Marxist ideology "supposedly dedicated to world revolution." American intervention in Russian affairs resulted in opposite and unintended consequences; many Russians fled to join Lenin. This pattern of allowing no other alternative to the Leftist solution, through miscalculation of national interest and subsequent support of repressive regimes and military intervention, was to be inexorably and inevitably

repeated in many Third World states, particularly in Latin America.

That these interventions occurred prior to the emergence of Superpower rivalry and the bipolarization of the world into spheres of interest is evidence of the historical continuity of American military, economic, and political foreign policy-- regardless of the nomenclature and periodizations of historians and other students of the international scene. Isolationist policy has been virtually synonomous with interventionist policy through the filter of the idea later called containment. This "containment filter" operated to remove or to dilute the influence of different nations in areas perceived as critical to United States national interests in different times and in different historical contexts. Therefore the idea of containment did not originate in conjunction with the perceived threat of the "grand strategy" of Communist states following World War II. Rather, it was built upon earlier fear and mistrust of Russian intent and moral character by U.S. policymakers as the Russian empire expanded and closed markets to Americans in the era of so-called isolationism.

Containment was a policy designed to prevent expansion of various nation-states according to the perception of what constituted American national interests at particular historical intervals. The

application of containment policy almost exclusively to the Soviet Union during the Cold War was the result of an intricate pattern of action and reaction based on the historical continuity of ideas and assumptions articulated before World War I, and crystallized in the aftermath of World War II. Elite attitudes of fear and mistrust of the Soviet "grand design" for Europe following World War II had much to do with American policy-makers' unquestioning acceptance of the need for containment of the Soviet's "grand design" for Latin America. Evidence of a strategy of world domination on the part of the Soviet Union following the 1917 October Revolution has never been conclusively demonstrated (Nathan and Oliver 1989; Ambrose 1988; Calvocoressi 1987; Barnett 1983).

With the advent of the Soviet brand of communism into the international arena in 1917, institutionalism of the revolution and recognition by the international community appears to have been the major concern of the Soviets. Following WWII, Stalin's attention was apparently riveted on establishment of buffer states, particularly control of Poland, in order to provide national security. Poland had often been used as the route for attack on Russia. As Ambrose (1988, 57) notes, Stalin subsequently declared at Yalta in February, 1945:

For the Russian people, the question of Poland is

> not only a question of honor but also a question of security. Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia. Twice in the last thirty years our enemies, the Germans, have passed through this corridor...Poland is not only a question of honor, but of life and death for the Soviet Union.

East Europe succumbed to Hitler in 1941; his armies then penetrated deep into Russia. German passage through the Polish corridor into Russia represented the security issue. The honor of which Stalin spoke referred to the fact that having driven the Germans from Russia, and having then occupied East Europe as a member of the Alliance, Stalin considered the Polish question to be one on which there could be no compromise. The West had no part in driving the Germans from East Europe, now occupied by Russia; nevertheless Americans did not wish to accept Russian domination of the area. Americans realized Stalin's position on the Polish question was valid. It was significant that "almost every important American leader acknowledged that East Europe could no longer maintain an anti-Soviet position, but at the same time the Allies wished to promote democracy, freedom of religion and speech, and free enterprise" (Ambrose 1988, 55).

These contradictory and polarizing views became the primary factor in the origin of the Cold War. Stalin believed that the Western "capitalist encirclement" (the placement of American and Allied bases strategically

around the Soviet Union) and the sending of B-29 Bombers--known to be the planes that delivered the death blow to Nagasaki and Hiroshima--was a pretense for a future invasion of Russia (Ambrose 1988, 101).

The Americans, British and French believed that the Red Army was not demobilized because of possible future Russian plans for marching into Western Europe. Stalin would not demobilize the Red Army because of the Manhattan Project's timely deliverance of the atom bomb into the United States military and political arsenal. In a "Catch 22" situation, the Red Army would not demobilize as long as the The United States refused to share the technology of the bomb; the United States would not share technology as long as the Red Army was not demobilized. Even then, Russians were not to be allowed to develop the bomb on their own under the plan instigated by the United States, which Stalin refused to consider. Americans formulated the NATO Pact; the Russians responded with the Warsaw Pact. The Cold War was in full swing.

Containment was an impossible goal from its inception. It did not work; the means to ensure its viability was beyond the economic, military, and political capabilities of the United States in all historical "moments." Further, containment was a reactive, rather than a proactive policy. The core of

the policy of containment is reaction by the United States to situations which have already occurred, but which must extend no further. Containment was not a policy of foresight, but of hindsight, its goal to prevent further occurrences of events or situations perceived by policymakers as inimical to United States national interests.

The development and application of the policy of containment of the Soviet Union in Latin America is without doubt one of the most complex and disturbing phenomena of the twentieth century. LaFeber (1985) has argued that many of the tragedies of the post-WWII period can be attributed directly to this policy.

The particular chronology, or sequence of events immediately following the end of World War II leads uneasily to the question of who or what was to blame for the Cold War, and further, to the question of whether the Cold War was avoidable. It is a question which some scholars perhaps would find redundant, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union into a Commonwealth. I suggest that it is also counterproductive to attempt to attribute blame to particular individuals. It is necessary, however, to explore the origins of fear and determinants of misperceptions among national leaders in order to prevent the reactivation of the Cold War mentality with its concommitant tragedies. This approach

would prevent the policy myopia which narrowed the parameters of strategies perceived as viable to United States policy leaders.

Interventionist policy in Latin America has long provided a source for disagreement among American policy-makers. LaFeber (1985), in his analysis of the consequences of U.S. policy in Central America has noted that the political, economic and military presence of the United States in Central America has set the stage for "inevitable revolutions." Tracing the North American presence in Central America through successive administrations, LaFeber makes a strong argument that the current situation in Central America is the direct result of U.S. policies which created a system of political, economic and military domination of the region which he has called "neodependency." According to LaFeber, neodependency refers to the use of military intervention to consolidate political and economic control of Central America (LaFeber 1985, 16-18).

LaFeber's account of the historical development of the "system" is intrinsically critical of United States policy, and interpretive. Rosati (1993, 21) categorizes this account as a "revisionist" rather than as an opposing perspective. However, numerous alternative historical and ideological treatments of the problems in Central America exist; Orme (1989, 213) proposes that

reformist intervention in Latin America, though "flawed, paradoxical, and often frustrating, supplemented by prudent efforts to promote human rights and political solutions, remains the least unsatisfactory alternative" between policies of non-intervention, and the "middle option." He characterizes the middle option as the intermediate position between hands-off and undescriminating support of any anti-communist regime. Orme (1989, 7) also notes that if reformist intervention is to succeed, the United States "must either convince the existing leadership to undertake reform, or, failing that, bring someone to power someone who will...considerable [US] interference may be necessary if resistance to the reform is to be overcome."

Because LaFeber's analysis incorporates the identical variables suggested by modern and contemporary students of Latin America (land and income inequality, deprivation, the effect of economic dependency through U.S. direct investment, economic aid, military intervention, hierarchical class structure, and instability), his work forms the foundation for this dissertation. Although he incorporates the same variables identified by most researchers investigating causes of Latin American instability, conclusions among researchers vary widely. Therefore, I will seek to determine whether LaFeber's conclusions on Central

American instability are (1) supported by the evidence in a quantitative analysis, and (2) generalizable to South America. The model will simultaneously test the findings of other major theorists (see Chapter Two) who have offered competing explanations for political instability in Latin America.

Ethnocentrism in American foreign policy has been addressed by students of Latin America. Skidmore and Smith (1990) observe that Latin America seems to alternate between democracy and dictatorship. Why so many military interventions? Wiarda (1990:134) in his discussion on North American ethnocentrism strongly implies that the sentiment of many Americans has changed from "What is wrong in Latin America," to "What is wrong with Latin Americans." He notes that this perception of Latin America is based on comparison with the Asian "tigers" or the "four dragons" (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea) which have succeeded in growing at "miracle rates of 8, 9, 10% and sometimes more" using the same institutions of multinational corporations and U.S. markets that Latin Americans blame for their failures. It follows from this ethnocentric, or cultural argument that Latin Americans themselves are the cause of instability and failure to develop economically and politically; it must be the "national character" of violence responsible for excessive military

interventions.

Wiarda (1990, 134) emphasizes the role of prevailing Western attitudes in contributing to the present dilemma in U.S. relations with the Third World. He argues that the image of Latin America is growing worse. The general American public views all of Latin America as corrupt, backward, violent and disorderly, murderous, and infested with drug dealers who corrupt our young people. They engage in "stupid wars" and "bloody conflicts" into which they manage to drag the United States. Consequently, he argues, it is our own misperceptions which contribute to the problem.

LaFeber (1984, 1985) attributes failure in these areas to the historically close and continuing relationship between the U.S. and the "military-oligarchy" in Latin America based on the need for political stability provided by Central American repressive regimes used as surrogate warriors to ensure continuing American military, political and economic control, and to the fact that neither Roosevelt or Truman were able to resolve the political and economic contradictions of American foreign policy.

One of the major contradictions of U.S. policy was that American policymakers feared that economic disaster on the order of the Great Depression could be averted only through the global expansion of capitalism which

required free access to raw materials. At the same time, policymakers sincerely believed that all nations should be free to choose their own form of government and set their own political and economic policies without interference or fear; this applied to all nations, both large and small.

Economic prosperity required pressure on other states to eliminate protectionist barriers to trade. State Department economic advisor Will Clayton made this quite clear: "Nations which act as enemies in the marketplace cannot long be friends at the council table." [7] The emergence of the U.S. "system" in Central America was described by LaFeber (1984 10-15). He credits the "system" of control, regardless of the desires of Central American states, to U.S. support for traditional elites with vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Revolutions are therefore inevitable because the political, economic and social conditions which serve as "tinder for revolutionary fires" have remained unchanged over time, along with the fundamental contradictions in U.S. policy which were applied to Central America. The United States first "accepted and soon welcomed" dictatorships within the system; as long as these

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[7] This statement by Will Clayton is quoted in Gardner, L., 1970, *Architects of Illusion*. Chicago:

dictators kept order and protected private property they were acceptable. Washington officials had opted for short-term "capping" of the pressure building up in the system until "the societies blow apart with even greater force" (LaFeber 1984, 16). The United States therefore bears "considerable responsibility for the conditions that burst into revolution" because adherence to principles which made the United States a superpower, when applied to Central America, led to "massive revolutionary outbreak."

LaFeber explicitly states that this system (neodependency) in Central America was not the result of accident; it was designed carefully with "well-considered policies" which grew slowly in the nineteenth century and reached maturity in the mid-twentieth century. The four principles which brought the U.S. into the international system as a global superpower, yet met with dismal failure in Central America were (1) extraordinary faith in capitalism, (2) willingness to use military force, (3) a fear of foreign influence, and (4) a dread of revolutionary instability.

This assertion that the "system" was a well-thought out set of policies designed purposefully to create and then maintain U.S. dominance in Latin America is problematic. Skidmore and Smith's (1989) analysis of the origins of authoritarianism and military power in Spanish

and Portuguese America clearly shows that the United States did not create the system of inequality in political and economic power in Latin America, although it may have used the system which was already in place.

I have noted previously that United States foreign policy in Central America was the result of particular perceptions and interpretations of political leaders and their advisors, influenced primarily by exigencies of the international and domestic political environment as well as personal characteristics of principal players. I now suggest that the conditions and fears that led to United States hegemony in Central America may have created a de facto system, but the system appears to have been more the result of ill-advised incremental policy decisions than by any preconceived "grand strategy." Regardless of the debate over grand strategy versus (perhaps bumbling) incrementalism, the central question remains unchanged: did the U.S. err in support of repressive regimes which over the short-term successfully delivered the order and stability accepted by policymakers as critical to the United States' national interest?

Whether or not Wiarda's damning assessment of general public opinion is accurate, American policy leaders, particularly presidents and secretaries of state, have offered revealing evidence that at the national level attitudes toward the region have been less

than flattering.

Continuity in leadership patterns has also emerged. Statements by national policy leaders appear to support Wiarda's argument. Jefferson, elaborating on the expansion of U.S. power in Spanish America, and the potential for acquisition of that territory, expressed the opinion that our people could "gain it from them piece by piece." John Adams, Secretary of State under James Monroe was inclined to view the character of Latin Americans in a particularly negative manner:

> I wished well to their cause; but I had seen and yet see no prospect that they would establish free or liberal institutions of government. They have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions. Civil dissention was infused into all their seminal principles. War and mutual destruction was in every member of their organization, moral, political and physical.[8]

Calling Latin Americans "Dagoes" because they were unable to govern themselves or prevent instability, President Theodore Roosevelt continued the tradition of ethnocentrism noted by Wiarda (Beale 1962, 43).

Secretary of State under Teddy Roosevelt (1905-1909), Elihu Root, observed that "Latins find happiness in the existing conditions of life...they have less of

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[8] John Quincy Adams' assessment of Latin America is from *The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*. Charles F. Adams, ed. Philadelphia:

the inventive faculty which strives continually to increase the productive power of men." He also noted that North and South were compatible because "where we accumulate, they spend". Even as late as 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt remarked, "They think they are as good as we are, and many of them are" (LaFeber 1984, 36, 90).

Negative, if not hostile attitudes of American policymakers toward Latin America and the Soviet Union were firmly established before World War I. Elite perceptions of the character, intent and cabilities of these nations were to merge into policies which were inconsistent and ineffective in Central America following World War II.

Another contradiction in American policy emerged after the second World War; while Central America served the United States as buffer states, U.S. leaders could not seem to accept Stalin's desire for the creation of buffer states in Eastern Europe. Nowhere were the contradictions, ambiguities and inconsistencies more evident than in the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Monroe Doctrine

Tracing American foreign policy from the original Monroe Doctrine through its various corollaries and reinterpretations, elite attitudes in the United States and in Latin America exhibit continuity. Exacerbated by various crises in the national and international system,

policy patterns become comprehensible, if untenable. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine warned outsiders against interference in the American sphere; every subsequent administration provided a different interpretation of who were considered to be "outsiders," and what constituted "interference."

In the 1880s, Washington officials had concluded that Central American internal dissension threatened United States interests in the region, and while use of military force was acceptable, James G.Blaine, Secretary of State under the Garfield administration, wanted to find a nonmilitary solution to the problem of instability. Latin American markets and raw materials were essential for capitalist expansion. As Blaine carefully explained, the policy of the United States in the South was simple; political peace and profitable trade. Political peace was necessary in order to maintain profitable trade. Although the United States must expand, this expansion did not apply to annexation of territory, but annexation of trade. This distinction was used to justify United States intervention when Mexico threatened Guatemala with invasion. Blaine's response was predictable and less innocuous than previously supposed. He warned Mexico to stay out of Guatemala, using the questionable logic that "the now established policy of the...United States to refrain from

territorial acquisition gives it the right to use its friendly offices in discouragement of any movement on the part of neighboring states which may tend to disturb the balance of power between them." Since it was not the policy of the United States to acquire territory, only engage in peaceful trade, this high moral standard conferred the right of intervention (LaFeber 1984, 33-34).

In extending the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt stated in 1905 that not only would America not tolerate foreign interests in Latin America, but from now on the United States would act as the policeman to maintain order in the hemisphere.[9]

The Wilson interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine has consquences for United States policy. Woodrow Wilson in 1914 insisted that foreign capital cease to be a dominant interest in Central America. In a newspaper interview Wilson suggested that "material interests in Central America are to be set aside entirely..."Who commonly seeks the intervention of the United States in Latin American troubles?...Always the foreign interests, bondholders or concessionaires. They are the germs of revolution and the cause of instability" (LaFeber 1984,

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[9] This statement is from James D. Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*. Vol. 16, pp. 7375-76. New York:

51). However it appeared that American capital was not to be considered foreign. Wilson therefore explicitly excluded European financial, as well as military and political intervention, greatly extending the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1928, the Clark Memorandum to the Monroe Doctrine was written (and publicized two years later) by Reuben Clark, a State Department official who argued that the Monroe Doctrine had been misunderstood; that it had been perceived as a "cloak" for U.S. intervention and acts of "imperialism" by Latin Americans. The new basis for intervention would be based on the possible need for North American interests to be preserved against any threats, internal or external (LaFeber 1984, 80). From this reading of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States would henceforth be responsible for threats to U.S. national security that arose as a consequence of Latin American internal dissension.

Assistant Secretary of State, Edward Miller added a further provision (the Miller Doctrine), in 1950. The Miller Doctrine provided for American collective intervention to protect against "outside influence" just as the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of 1968 provided the basis for collective socialist intervention in the interest of national security. Miller interpreted collective intervention through the Organization of American States

(OAS) not only as non-intervention, but an alternative to intervention.

LaFeber (1984:94-95) summarized the Miller Doctrine as an attempt by the U.S. to avoid antagonizing all of Central America by unilateral intervention, and to avoid the restraints of the Charter of the United Nations which prohibited such intervention. Collective intervention through the provisions of the Rio Pact and the OAS would serve this objective admirably, while retaining the right to intervene unilaterally if majority control of the OAS failed.

Militarization of Latin America

In Nicaragua and El Salvador, the United States learned to use "surrogate" warriors to maintain order; American soldiers would not have to fight. Somoza's Guardia Nacional and other local forces could maintain internal order with equipment and training. The militarization of Latin America was underway. The Military Defense Act of 1951 (MDA) had as its objective the buildup of Latin American armies under United States control. These security forces "were to be used for internal security, not for global or even regional operations." In late 1951, Congress appropriated $38.5 million for this purpose, to be "supplemented with the training of Latin American officers in U.S. methods and equipment at the Panama Canal Zone's School of the

Americas...which increasingly focused in the 1950s on counterinsurgency warfare" (LaFeber 1984, 108-109).

What the United States never completely understood, however, was that by encouraging Latin American dictators to eliminate serious opposition from the Left, (Sandino in Nicaragua, Marti in El Salvador, Che Guevara of Argentina and later Cuba) martyrs were created, heroes of the people were born, anti-Americanism escalated, and the spectre of Fascism emerged.

Future reformist revolutionary movements often took the name of these martyred leaders and were given added incentive to resist the deplorable conditions under which the masses lived; the capabilities of revolutionary groups to attract the masses was vastly increased. Severe deprivation of the means to sustain life often attracted the masses to the left. The politics of starvation outweighed ideological concerns. Communists and Socialists were known to attempt to feed and educate the masses, and to undertake programs of land reform (Cuba, 1959; China, 1949; Nicaragua, 1979). For starving peasants, politically unsophisticated, eventual Communist domination of everyday affairs and economic inefficiency were not matters of vital concern. Immediate problems such as land, food, and inclusion in the political system were primary agenda items. Morgenthau (1974) noted that:

With unfailing consistency, we have since the end of

> the Second World War intervened on behalf of conservative and fascist repression against revolution and radical reform. In an age when societies are in a revolutionary or prerevolutionary stage, we have become the foremost counter-revolutionary status quo power on earth. Such a policy can only lead to moral and political disaster.

American policymakers vastly underestimated the appeal of Communism to those who had nothing left to lose. With the United States supporting the oligarchs and military, the Church in Latin America historically conservative, and subsidized by the government, revolutionary leaders were often pressured to seek support from the remaining superpower, the Soviet Union. Left with no viable alternative, this is exactly what occurred; American policymakers immediately interpreted the situation as part of the Soviet "grand strategy" of world domination. There appeared to be among national leaders, a singular blindness to the fact that where socialism emerged as the result of elections, the regime was often moderate and committed to nonalignment with either the Soviet Union or the United States.

In mid-1948 as riots and revolutions spread throughout Latin America, LaFeber (1984, 98) noted that the State Department Policy Planning Staff told Secretary of State Marshall that it "believed it understood the causes of unrest;" the State Department observed that:

> Communism in the Americas is a potential danger, but...with a few possible exceptions it is not

> Communists...There is poverty that is so widespread that it means a bare subsistence level for large masses of people...anti-Communist forces as the Roman Catholic Church, the military, and large landowners were so reactionary that they not only created support for Communism, but even resembled Communism in their support of "totalitarian policy state methods."

Although the Department of State correctly identified the most serious problems, it is apparent that no connection was made between structural causality, and United States support of the structure which served to make the Left more attractive to the masses.

The Cold War: An Overview

The election of Harry S. Truman to the U.S. presidency in 1945 represented the dominance of hard-liners over those officials who would approach the Cold War in a more realistic and moderate tone. When Stalin refused to hold free elections in Poland as promised, the West was "outraged." Ambrose (1988, 58) stated that although "time and time again--at Yalta and later--Stalin emphasized Russia's security problem, her need to protect herself from Germany and the West by controlling the nations on her border, Americans dismissed his statements as lies and denounced him as a paranoid whose aim was world conquest." George Kennan, a leading anticommunist in the Foreign Service had expressed the opinion that "Stalin had no intention of marching further west," and that "it was idle for us to hope that we could have any

that "it was idle for us to hope that we could have any influence on the course of events in the area to which Russian hegemony had already been effectively extended" (Ambrose 1988, 59).

Truman chose instead to listen to the advice of Ambassador Averill Harriman who convinced him that any evidence of "generosity" or "cooperation" on the part of the United States toward Stalin's requests would only be interpreted as an indication of weakness which would allow the Soviets to "do as they pleased" without fear of retaliation from the United States. Truman's response was that he did not fear the Soviets and would indeed stand firm against Stalin. The results of "softness," Harriman warned Truman, would be a "barbarian invasion of Europe" (Ambrose 1988, 59-60).

Yet another policy contradiction became apparent. While the Soviets recognized that free elections in the border states would install anti-Communist governments, it was also true that free elections in Latin America would result in governments unfriendly to the United States (Ambrose 1988). The contradiction was apparent to Stalin and others; while preaching the benefits of peace through the United Nations open to all democratic nations, the United States maintained control over Central and South American nations through use of repressive dictators to protect American interests. By

1947, the United States had massively demobilized. Americans apparently believed that possession of the atomic bomb justified drastic cuts in military personnel. As military forces were decreased, Washington began to fear "the scope and nature of the Soviet threat." Truman and his advisors, in particular Secretary of State Stimson and Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, believed the Soviet threat was worldwide and should be met wherever it existed. They advised Truman to "get tough;" a policy which could not be implemented without domestic support. Two conditions must exist: (1) the public would have to be convinced of the need to become involved, and (2) the public would have to be convinced that the sacrifice of involvement would be worth the price to be exacted (Ambrose 1988, 78). In short, the American public would have to be convinced that the Soviet "grand strategy" represented an immediate and widespread threat to the American way of life.

Truman and the American Response

Truman decided that his best strategy was to "scare hell out of the American people," and he did. The plan was far more successful than Truman realized at the time, and carried with it unintended consequences which would affect the lives of Americans for many years.

George Kennan (1947) using the pseudonym, "X," published an article in *Foreign Affairs* which greatly

influenced subsequent American foreign policy. Kennan argued that (1) "there was an innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism," (2) the Kremlin believed itself to be "infallible," and (3) the goal of the Soviet Union was world conquest." Further, Kennan, in an often quoted passage from this article, concluded that an "adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manuevers of Soviet policy" was needed in order to contain Soviet expansion (Ambrose 1988, 97-98). This statement implied that the Soviet will to world domination would create "crisis after crisis" around the world, as the "Soviet-masterminded conspiracy" sought to extend its power into "every nook and cranny." However, Kennan did not believe that there was a timetable, or that the threat was serious, because of the Soviet belief that inherent contradictions in capitalism would lead inevitably to its downfall. Kennan also saw the Soviet threat as political and economic, which called for "long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment." Although Kennan made many qualifications to the article, he was later to complain that the article had been misinterpreted (Ambrose 1988, 97-98).

Therefore U.S officials and the American public expected that Communism would rear its ugly head

worldwide, and that the United States must be prepared to meet the challenge politically, economically, and militarily. Truman had indeed "scared hell out of the American people" and simultaneously resurrected and expanded the Roosevelt corollary; the United States was to act as policeman to the world.

Americans shared the assumption that if Poland (and later China) were "lost" to American influence, it was because of mistakes, not because America was unable to control every area in the world with positive outcomes. The problem then was internal; the Truman administration must be staffed with subversives; how else could East Europe and China fall to the Communists? Joseph McCarthy, junior Senator from Washington, announced that "I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals [in the State Department] who would appear to be either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are helping to shape our foreign policy." America was being destroyed by internal subversives (Ambrose 1988, 109-110).

The Truman administration, which had successfully scared the American people, including the Congress, became one of the first victims of McCarthy's charges of subversion, even though no concrete evidence was ever produced. American officials had to defend themselves from charges of subversion or treason. Democratic

officials in the State Department who had taken part in pressing the issue of the worldwide threat of communism, now found themselves implicated in so-called Communist conspiracies. Americans, for the first time in history, were watching each other for signs of subversion.

Was Communism in the Third World a threat? Certainly. Was the threat as immediate and widespread as proclaimed to the American people? The evidence is unclear.

Following World War II, with the Red Army still mobilized and occupying Eastern Europe, Stalin announced that "whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system" (Ambrose 1988, 33). The fact of early Russian expansionism, the obvious strength and strategic placement of the Red Army, refusal to demobilize, and mutual exclusiveness of ideological perspectives, combined with Stalin's statement, most certainly indicated to American policymakers that Russian expansionism would continue; Soviet capability now included the possibility of military as well as economic expansion. Russett and Starr (1992, 210) in assessing realist theories of national or strategic interest, note that the fact of Soviet committment to communist ideology was less important to American policymakers than the fact of Soviet power. The existence of power would have constituted a threat, regardless of who held the reins of

government. The clear implication of the realist perspective is (1) that the Cold War was necessary whether or not the Soviets had a "grand design," since such tremendous power in itself represented a significant threat, and (2) no specific national leader could have been held responsible for the Cold War.

Other scholars contend that the Soviet threat in Europe was only "theoretical." The Red Army, by 1949, had not "marched beyond the position it held in May, 1945, not even into Czechoslovakia." Stalin's statement could have thus been interpreted as the intention to impose the Soviet social system only in those states which were vital to Soviet national security (buffer states). Further, even as early as 1947, George Kennan did not believe that the Soviet Union "posed any serious military threat nor that they wanted war." According to Kennan, the Soviets had no timetable for world conquest because of their belief in the historical inevitability of the fall of capitalism (Ambrose 1988, 97).

LaFeber (1985, 9, 16) sees the failure of Roosevelt and Truman to resolve American policy contradictions as a major factor in the Cold War. Truman, he notes, was a "highly insecure man," prone to rapid decision-making, and determined to avoid the charge of "appeasement." His advisors, Harriman, Leahy, and Forrestal also pressured him to take a hard line with the Soviet Union,

disregarding Secretary of War Henry Stimson's advice not to threaten peace over the issue of Poland. Further, LaFeber (1985, 20-21) refutes charges that Stalin was paranoid in regard to his foreign policy. According to LaFeber, Stalin's suspicions of the motivations of the West were realistic:

> The West had poured thousands of troops into Russia between 1917 and 1920, refused to cooperate with the Soviets during the 1930s, tried to turn Hitler against Stalin in 1938, reneged on promises about the second front, and in 1945 tried to penetrate areas Stalin deemed crucial to Soviet security.

LaFeber (1985, 21) explicitly states that Stalin's priority for foreign Communist parties was security and personal power, not world revolution.

Was the Cold War necessary? Reputable scholars have defended both positions; neither position can be either wholly supported or discredited logically or empirically. Any concrete answer to the question may be considered speculative at best. What is important is the fact that the realist perspective of "clear and present danger," or the belief in the reality of the immediate Soviet threat that has dominated American foreign policy for decades has been challenged by such scholars as the historian Walter LaFeber (1984, 1985) and political scientist Stephan Ambrose (1988).

Continuity, Contradiction and Incoherence

Continuity in American foreign policy is evident in

several ways. First, current negative attitudes toward Latin America reflect similar attitudes expressed by American leaders prior to World War I. Second, initial fear of Russian economic expansion and market competition was easily translated into fear of Communism and ideological expansion after World War II. It would require little psychological adjustment to accept without question the threat of a Communist "grand strategy." Fear of Russia, or the (former) Soviet Union has been an unbroken thread in the tapestry of the American political environment. Third, containment of the Russian empire has been an ongoing problem for American policy-makers. Economic containment was eventually replaced with ideological containment during the Cold War; even the target of containment did not change. Fourth, even the contradictions of American policy have historical continuity; the basic contradictions between American values and the requirements of realpolitik have never been successfully resolved (Kissinger 1977). Finally, intervention has historically been a component of American foreign policy whenever decision-makers have perceived a threat to national security interests. The fact of intervention is continuous; only the objectives for intervention have altered. The U.S. has traditionally intervened for economic reasons, to contain Soviet influence, for humanitarian reasons, and to

prevent global instability.

Foreign policy in the Cold War was guided by the assumption that there was a "grand strategy" of Communism, that the Soviets represented a "clear and present danger" which required eternal vigilance. Communist leaders intended to spread their ideology into every corner of the world, and that this ideological expansion had already begun. Under this assumption, certain conclusions were inevitable. I have developed the following policy scenario from the Cold War logic.

> It was clear Latin America would provide fertile ground for such ideological expansion according to its grand strategy. Communism is known as a revolutionary ideology which creates agitation and instability. Latin America is characterized by its instability. If Latin America revolutionaries seek to overthrow governments, it follows that communists are acting in accordance with their grand strategy.
>
> Since instability is caused by Communism in Latin America, and represents a threat to national security, the United States must prevent Communist takeovers. However this is costly--economically and in terms of lives of Americans which would be lost, because political conflict is a fact of life in Latin America.
>
> Latin American governments and military institutions also fear Communism. Therefore it would be in the mutual interest of the United States and Latin American states to eliminate the threat. Authoritarian regimes are known to be able to provide order. Therefore we should support authoritarian regimes through military and economic aid. This will serve national security interests, and prevent Americans from having to fight in the region. Supporting regimes which have the capacity of maintaining social order will provide economic as well as political stability. It would be better if Latin America embraced democracy wholeheartedly, but that is unrealistic.
>
> Therefore the best policy option is for the United States to support those authoritarian regimes

> who are committed to the war against Communists. The U.S. can support authoritarian regimes for these reasons; however there can be no support for totalitarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes have the best potential for change; it is possible for them to move toward democracy, or at least liberalization. Totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, are highly unlikely to change.

This scenario flows from one assumption. All that follows is accurate if, and only if the initial assumption is accurate. The question of interest is not the accuracy of the scenario; the question which is critical for the future of foreign policy in Latin America is how the assumption came to be accepted as fact by policy-makers. How was the decision made that this scenario represented the reality of the political environment? What are the determining factors in the national decision-making process which led to specific policy decisions.

The Decision-Making Process

Most of us like to assume that decision-making at the national level is always rational, the consequence of setting a specific goal, gathering information and evidence, identifying alternatives, comparing the possible outcomes of each alternative, and selecting the best alternative which will achieve the specified goal. This is the ideal; reality requires that some decisions be made quickly and decisively on the basis of imperfect information and without being able to predict the

consequences of actions.

The rational actor model of decision-making is a model of how we would like to make decisions, given the time and the necessary information. Other decision-making models are worth noting. In contrast to the rational actor model, Lindblom (1959) has described the reality of decision-making as the act of "muddling through," a process which involves making only small changes to past decisions rather than working from a holistic or comprehensive view of the problem (incrementalism).

Simon (1959) argued that decision-makers will generally choose the first acceptable alternative that meets minimal requirements (satisficing), rather than devoting an inordinate amount of time to identifying all possible alternatives.

Graham Allison (1971), in his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, notes that the rational actor model is incomplete; it does not describe other methods of real world decision-making, particularly governmental politics and the organizational process models. These models may diverge from the ideal of total rationality, but they appear to describe alternatives that are imperfect but legitimate, and therefore acceptable to most scholars; other decision-making models which have been introduced and which have a special relevance for foreign policy

decisions cannot be characterized as either legitimate or acceptable. Foreign policy decisions are particularly susceptible to the nonrationality of certain forms of decision-making because of the inherent secrecy of national security decisions and the small number of actors involved.

Individuals and small groups play a major role in the decision-making process through what is called "screening" and "groupthink." In foreign policy decision-making, the individual is bombarded with vast amounts of information, relevant and irrelevant. The process by which individuals organize and render coherent this information is called "screening," which may be responsible for what is perceived and defined as a problem, and which allows the individual to discard information perceived as nonessential to the solution of the problem. Screening may occur at the individual (psychological) level and the group (organizational) level. As a result of psychological or organizational screening, individuals hold particular images of the world which influence decision-making. Therefore, what is "out there" becomes less important than what the individual believes is out there (Russett and Starr, 1990).

Obviously, in a nuclear age, what national policy-makers perceive as out there; the image of reality held

by the policy-makers, is critical to global survival. Foreign policy decisions, even where the stakes do not include the possibility of global war, are vital; they impact quality of life, or may determine life or death for thousands of people worldwide. For this reason, the quality of decisions made at the national level have been the subject of intensive interdisciplinary research.

In addition to those imperfect (although legitimate) methods of decision-making described above, Janis (1982, 1989) argues that a particular form of decision-making, "groupthink," best explains critical policy decisions made by specific national actors in the past. Russett and Starr (1992) note that "social processes tend to dominate general foreign policy decision situations." Groupthink is a social process involving small group dynamics in which individual perceptions may be affected, and strong pressure toward individual conformity with group views is generated.

Conventional wisdom on the advantages of small group decisions over individual decisions, states that small groups offer a wider range of information and alternatives. Janis (1990) challenges the assumptions of conventional wisdom and suggests that small group interaction may have negative and dangerous consequences for for the quality of decisionmaking at the highest levels. Janis's working hypothesis is that the closer

and friendlier small group members are, and the higher the "esprit de corps" among in-group policy-makers, "the greater the danger that individual critical thinking will be replaced with groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups," and the more likely this process is to generate symptoms of defective decision-making (Russett and Starr 1992).

Janis notes several characteristic and problematic aspects of groupthink: (1) an illusion of invulnerability, (2) belief in its own morality, and (3) a stereotypical image of the group's opponents (internal and external) as too "evil" or too mentally deficient to be capable of good-faith negotiations. The danger of the invulnerability illusion is that perceptions of the group's capability are heightened, encouraging more excessive risk-taking than any individual, acting separately would be willing to consider. Small group processes also generate an attitude of moral superiority, which will tend to downplay ethical or moral consequences of their decisions. The decisions of the group will be rationalized or justified because of the feeling of moral superiority, without the necessity of engaging in negotiations with evil or stupid opponents.

Groupthink pressures individuals to conform, producing self-censorship of individual disagreement and

uncertainty. Groupthink derives from group cohesiveness which occurs as a result of isolation from outside views and the screening out of negative information which could alter or modify the preferred decision. From the interaction process of small groups, a charismatic group leader may emerge who expresses a preference for one alternative; others will conform because of shared values, personal charisma, or the fact that the group leader may control promotions.[10]

The concept of groupthink was applied to process of foreign policy decision-making in Latin America during the Cold War. The psychology of small group decision-making is not open to empirical investigation and refutation, relying as it does on internal mental processes of individuals. However, the characteristics and consequences of groupthink, as specified by Janis, may be investigated empirically in the context of specific foreign policy decisions, such as the decision by members of the Reagan administration to trade arms for hostages in Iran, and divert part of the proceeds of the arms sale to fund the Nicaraguan Contras.

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[10] The discussion on groupthink is taken in part from Janis (1982, 1989), the excellent overview in Russett and Starr (1992), and Rosati (1993). See also David M. Barnett for an opposing view of the characterization of Lyndon B. Johnson's decision-making process as the result of "groupthink."

In the following scenario, the role of President Reagan is unclear; there is no evidence of presidential involvement. Therefore any action or psychological process attributed directly to Reagan is speculative, and used as an illustration of the impact that psychological screening and groupthink may have on the making of foreign policy decisions. The select small group could have excluded Ronald Reagan; yet the fact of the existence of the group and its power at the national level are accurate. With this caveat in mind, Janis's description of the consequences of groupthink and its applicability to the Iran-Contra scandal appear to be valid.

First, Reagan's war against the "evil empire" appears to correspond to the process of psychological screening, through an ideological position which allows the individual to simplify information overload from the environment. The result is to view the world in extremes of black and white, good and evil; a distortion of reality occurs such that what the policy-maker believes to be real is more important than what is "out there."

From this point, information is processed according to this simplified and distorted version of reality. Believing that the evil empire is attempting to establish a beachhead in Central America as part of a grand design, activity of the Sandinista rebels in attempting to

overthrow the Nicaraguan government of Somoza would find almost perfect correspondence with the ideological perspective derived from the screening process. It would follow logically that expansion of the "evil empire" must be stopped, whatever the cost.

Opposition from Secretary of State, George Shultz, and Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, initially members of the group of decision-makers, was ignored. Rosati (1993) notes that groupthink results in failure because the policymaking group is closed to new or negative information from which alternate policy options might be considered. However, the remaining members of the group, Robert McFarlane (NSC advisor), and John Poindexter, who replaced McFarlane, along with William Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, strongly supported Reagan's Iran initiative. The group was then closed; only the supporters of Reagan were included. It was this small close-knit group that implemented the policy. Dissenters (such as Congress, other officials of the administration, and many members of the American public) were ignored; the implementation was carried out in secrecy.

The Iran-Contra decision of the Reagan administration would serve as an illustration of Janis's charismatic leader (Reagan) who expresses a single policy preference. Regardless of the involvement of Reagan

himself, the decision to divert arms to the Contras was made by a small select group. Charisma, shared values, or control of promotions by Reagan may have led to self-censorship of uncertainties by other group members, and the illusion of unaminity. The feeling of invulnerability of the group, and moral superiority, would explain the direct violation of the Congressional mandate to end support to the Contras. Finally, it was most certainly a small select group decision closed to outside views and influence.

The decision to continue supporting the Contras covertly cannot be characterized as Graham Allison's rational actor model, the governmental politics model, or the organizational process model. Neither Lindblom's incremental model of "muddling through" or Simon's "satisficing" fit the observed behavior of these policymakers. No alternatives were considered. The only question was how best to implement the preferred solution. It is known that Lt. Colonel Oliver North was a member of the group (in the loop), was intensely ideological, and diverted money from the Iran arms sale to the Contras, and that he and others "in the loop" were aware of the decision of the Congress to discontinue aid to the Contras in view of widespread opposition by the public. It is assumed that Colonel North sincerely believed in the morality and necessity of his mission, as

did others who were involved.[11]

Summary

Groupthink has grave implications for future foreign policy decisions. Another of the inherent contradictions in American politics is the fact that the President and members of Congress are often elected on the basis of strong ideological beliefs. Yet sincere ideological committment to a cause can be detrimental to rational decision-making and result in secret decisions which may be extremely harmful to foreign policy and the democratic process.

Group closure, a sense of invulnerability, attitudes of moral superiority, the stereotyping of opponents as "outgroups" who are evil or stupid, and the distortion of reality through discarding negative information may work together to produce critical decisions at the highest levels of decision-making which are inherently flawed and potentially dangerous. The decision-making process is a matter of great concern, given the continuities and contradictions (and ultimately incoherence) in foreign policy.

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[11] For other applications of "groupthink" in foreign policy, including the Iran-Contra controversy of the Reagan presidency, see Jerel A. Rosati (1993), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, pp. 252-254. The groupthink decision-making method is applied to Lyndon B. Johnson's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam, to the Iran-Contra crisis, and to the Bush administration's decision to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf.

Janis's analysis of groupthink has been applied to such critical foreign policy decisions as Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate the Vietnam War, the Reagan administration's Iran-Contra decisions, and Bush's decision to intervene in the Persian Gulf (Rosati 1993); therefore decision-makers must be alerted to the dangers inherent in groupthink. Steps must be taken to educate the public, Congress and decision-makers to problems of groupthink, and to eliminate the risk at the highest levels.

Russett and Starr (1992, 266) suggest possible methods of reducing the risks of groupthink. The authors note that the Kennedy decisions in the Cuban missile crisis were less vulnerable to risks from groupthink because Kennedy deliberately removed himself from group deliberations so that the group could consider the broadest number of options and views. Each member of the group was instructed to challenge the views of others in an atmosphere of informality. Other suggestions which have been made to counteract groupthink are "devil's advocacy," and multiple advocacy. Devil's advocacy involves the selection on one group member to challenge all assumptions and alternatives. Multiple advocacy requires chief executives to ensure that all views are represented, and that the individual supporting a particular view act as its advocate.

I would add the legal requirement that any decision reached by a small group which may significantly affect foreign policy outcomes be presented to the relevant Congressional committee and key Congressional leaders of both parties for approval prior to implementation. If actions are taken which become controversial, a full-fledged open investigation should be launched into the method by which the decision to take such action was reached. If found to violate the legal responsibility to report the decision, appropriate penalties should be prescribed, regardless of status of group members. Strict adherence to these methods of control should eliminate much of the potential for groupthink and secret circumvention of Congressional mandates, or laws, and dramatically improve the quality of high-level foreign policy decisions.

Chapter Four will examine the consequences of high-level decisions to intervene in Latin American affairs.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVIDENCE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Political Instability: Results of Analyses

United States interventionist policy in Latin America has been based on the premise that support of repressive military and civilian authoritarian regimes can be justified by the fact that it is only these forces which can provide the essential stability necessary for future transitions to democracy and economic growth and development. Policymakers argue that the consequences of aid to repressive regimes is a *known* quality--stability, and that stability (political order) is the prerequisite to political and economic development. On the other hand, the results of withholding aid from the incumbent regime, or providing aid to rebels cannot be known in advance, and could lead to the replacement of the repressive regime (which provides political order) by a leftist government inimical to the United States. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the hypotheses through analysis of the effects of United States military aid and economic assistance to these regimes, in conjunction with evaluation of income and level of development as additional causal factors of instability.

This dissertation focuses on long-term effects of U.S. intervention in Latin America. The empirical model of the effects of U.S. Intervention is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Empirical Model of Political Instability



Political instability (WS) is regressed on U.S. intervention (MA), income (DP), and level of development (PC). For the eight countries in the sample, it is expected that U.S. intervention will initially bring about stability as policymakers suggest. The linear model is expected to provide support for this argument. Military aid, economic aid and total aid are predicted to be positive and significant. Multicollinearity is not expected to pose a problem; each type of aid will be tested separately. However, the linear model may not be sufficient as a method of analysis in other cases. Therefore both the linear and parabolic models will be estimated. I predict that although U.S. intervention initially decreases instability (i.e., increases stability), this decrease in instability will eventually be followed by a long-term increase in instability; U.S. intervention in the form of military, economic, or total aid is expected to be initially negative and significant, but positive and significant over the long term. This suggests a curvilinear relationship. Therefore a second-degree polynomial equation is specified by adding the square of United States intervention (operationalized as total aid, military aid, or economic aid) to the equation as an independent variable. For the parabolic model, the same initial conditions apply to income and level of development variables; both income and level of

development should have an initial significant and negative impact on political instability and a subsequent significant and positive effect on the dependent variable if these variables are associated with instability over the long-term. This specification is consistent with the argument for the "pressure cooker effect" described earlier, where the initial condition of low level of income, low level of development, and U.S. aid leads first, to a decrease in political instability through elite (military and landed oligarchy) repression of the masses. Low income and low level of development leads to increased pressure on the political system over time, and an eventual explosion of violence, as differences in life-states between elites and masses are compared and political systems remain unresponsive to rational demands for change. Thus the initial decrease in instability due to income or low levels of national development will be followed by a significant increase in instability. The squares of the income variable and the level of development variable were therefore added to the second-degree polynomial equation. It is expected in both the linear and parabolic models, U.S. intervention will show a positive and significant impact on political instability in sample nations.

There are in any study, special problems associated with model-building. When income and level of

development are included in the equation simultaneously, the result is a high level of collinearity between these two variables. Collinearity is indicated by a low tolerance level and a high VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) statistic. Since none of the conventional methods of dealing with collinearity or multicollinearity are practical or desirable (indexing, dropping a variable, coding all independent variables to stabilize the variance, or choosing another measure) and ridge regression is not recommended as a method of correction (Greene 1993, 271), a decision was made to estimate two separate models, one for income, and one for level of development. In the first equation, political instability was regressed on U.S. intervention and income; in the second, the regressors were U.S. intervention and level of development. The separate impact of each variable was assessed by comparing the change in the adjusted R^2. Collinearity between these two variables was not unexpected; macroeconomic developmental variables often exhibit this characteristic (Greene, 1993).

Autocorrelation was found to be a problem in this research; this is a common problem of longitudinal studies. Three methods were used to correct for autocorrelation, PW (Praise-Winsten) ML (maximum likelihood) and GLS/Arma. Multicollinearity, however,

was not a problem.

Berry and Feldman (1985, 41) note that concern for multicollinearity depends on "the purpose for which regression coefficients are being estimated." In some special situations, these authors argue, there is no need to separate out the independent effects of the correlated variables. In an exploratory study of this nature, I argue that there is no need to separate out the independent effects of U.S. intervention through total aid (TA) and its square (TA^2), military aid (MA) and its square (MA^2), or economic aid (EA) and its square (EA^2), the variables of interest. In this special case, my research interest is focused solely on whether military aid or total aid is positively and significantly, or negatively and significantly associated with political instability. It is the timing (initial and long-term effect) and direction (positive or negative) which is critical. Further, the condition index for these variables of interest is well under the cut-off point of 30 recommended by Kennedy (1993, 183). Kennedy also recommends that the VIF (variance inflation factor) should not exceed 10. These conditions are met for all samples, except for one or two cases which are noted and discussed in the text.

Another problem encountered in this research was that of a curvilinear relationship between political

instability and the independent variables. The log of the dependent variable was taken in order to linearize these relationships. Taking the log of the dependent variable was problematic in that it resulted in cases where the result of the transformation was less than or equal to zero; where this occurred, the case is treated as having a system-missing value, and several cases are lost. Since the N for each individual country is 31, loss of a significant number of cases greatly magnifies the chances of violation of the regression normality assumption.

Another difficulty encountered was use of the pooled time series technique for assessing the overall impact (N=248 with 8 cross-sections) of United States intervention in both Central and South America. The available data for energy consumption per capita (PC), the operationalization of level of development, covered only the years 1970-1988. Two options were available: (1) using only those cases in which there was no missing data, reducing the N from 31 to 19 (less if the log of the dependent variable was taken), or (2) "filling in the blanks" by use of mean substitution, which because of the nature of the data, would introduce severe distortions into the analysis. Therefore I made the decision to extrapolate the data for the missing years from the natural configuration of the data for the available

years.[12]

Also problematic in the pooled time series analysis was the fact that the log of the dependent variable could not be used, because of loss of cases treated as missing data. Pooled time series requires that there be no missing data. Therefore from the outset, the pooled regression analysis was severely handicapped. Nevertheless, the technique was used in order to get an indication, however slight, of whether the LaFeber thesis could be extended to South, as well as Central America, and to examine regional differences in United States intervention. If the pooled time series supported the regional findings, more confidence could be placed in the results.

For the variable income (real gross domestic product per capita), data was missing for the years 1986-1988. In this case, mean substitution was judged to be appropriate--however, only the mean for the previous five years was used. This data also showed a trend, slow but

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[12]The data for energy consumption per capita showed a slow but steady incremental increase over time. Thus, mean substitution was not an acceptable method of dealing with the problem because of the unique configuration of the data. These data were derived by using the range of the second ten-year period to extrapolate the probable range of the first (missing) ten-year period under the following constraints: (1) all data points from 1959-1969 had to be less than the data for 1970 for this variable, (2) each data point had to be progressively, though not significantly larger than the previous year, and (3) the data had to fall within the prescribed range, to give the starting point or upper limit.

also progressively upward; use of the variable mean for the years 1958 to 1985 would have allowed too much influence from the lowest and highest values, and would have not fit comfortably into the general trend. Introduction of data from another source would have compounded the error.

While these methods will introduce some error, they will introduce less error than (1) alternate treatments, or (2) no treatment, because they are consistent with the existing data configuration.

For greater ease in interpreting the findings, the following shorthand symbols are used: TA (total announced economic and military aid), MA (total announced military aid), EA (total announced economic aid); DP, (income), real gross domestic product per capita in 1980 international prices, PC (energy consumption per capita in gigajoules; operationalization of level of development), TOS (type of society; democratic or non-democratic), and the dependent variable, WS (weighted political instability score), or IN (unweighted values of political instability). For the parabolic models, MA^2, TA^2, PC^2, and DP^2 represent the squares of the corresponding variables above.

There are also problems which arise when determining how to weight the dependent variable. Destabilizing events were placed into 12 initial categories, and

weighted in the following manner. Riots, protests, and demonstrations were given the instability score of 10. Strikes were scored as 20; bombings, 30; kidnappings, assassinations, and military attacks on civilians or guerrilla attacks, 40; coups and attempted coups, 50; insurgencies, 60; civil war, 70; and revolution was given a score of 80. The use of multiples of ten is not intended to suggest that one form of instability is ten or twenty, etc. times as great as another. Although the scoring system is admittedly arbitrary, it serves its purpose well as a crude measure which distinguishes among the levels of *severity* of the different forms of instability encountered in the research. Thus, the total number of incidences for each category was multiplied by the numerical weight assigned to each category to give the weighted political instability score.

The category designated as MIL (military, paramilitary, or death squad activity directed against the civilian population), did not fit easily into one of the given categories, because these events were sometimes described in the New York Times Index as "a wave" or "series" of attacks by police, the military, or by guerrillas on the general population. In these cases, the wave or series of events was counted as only three incidents. Even though the frequency of these events

reached far greater proportions, they were counted as only "one more than two." This conservative method of reporting (or under-reporting) was followed consistently. Therefore the *reported* weighted instability score for all countries, regions, and the overall total is considerably lower than the *actual* instances of political instability.

In order to perform a full analysis on the data, I have used both the weighted and unweighted *values* of the dependent variable, political instability. I have also used the aggregated and disaggregated *categories* of the dependent variable in this analysis. This treatment is expected to provide cross-validation of results. Tables showing the results of analysis for each individual country, region, and combined regional results selected for analysis, are shown in Appendix B.

Findings: Dependent Variable Aggregated and Weighted

Instability and U.S. intervention in the case of Argentina were tested with the aggregated and weighted values of the dependent variable. As indicated previously, two separate linear models were estimated for Argentina in addition to a parabolic model. For Argentina, total aid, military aid, economic aid, income and level of development were regressors--the log of political instability, the dependent variable. For the first linear model, the effects of U.S. intervention and income were estimated using the log of political

instability. Both variables were found to be significant; income was significant at the .01 level, and U.S intervention (TA) was significant at the .05 level. The adjusted R^2 for the regression was .27. The intervention variable, economic aid (EA) was not significant, but income, used with economic aid was positive and significant at the .05 level. For the second linear regression, the effects of U.S. intervention and level of development on the log of political instability were estimated. Neither variable achieved significance. Neither military aid or economic aid was significant in the regressions.

Only economic aid was significant in the parabolic model. Economic aid is associated with a short-term non-significant increase in political instability in Argentina, followed by a significant (.05) decrease in instability. Therefore for the case of Argentina, U.S. intervention, with the exception of economic aid, is a causal factor in exacerbating political instability from the beginning. The findings for Argentina support the thesis that United States intervention in this country, in conjunction with income, significantly contributes to political instability. Comparison of standardized betas indicates that income is the more significant of the two variables in explaining political instability in Argentina. However, U.S. intervention is positive and

significant (t-score 2.08). Therefore there is no evidence supporting the argument often used by policymakers for intervention or for support of repressive authoritarian regimes in Argentina. U.S. intervention (TA) to Argentina has not increased political stability. Rather, the evidence from the linear model supports the thesis that U.S. intervention has contributed to political instability. No variable other than economic aid was significant in the parabolic model.

In the case of Brazil, Cockroft (1989) has noted that the role of the United States in the 1964 coup which began Brazil's "long, dark night of state-sponsored terror" under the "iron heel of dictatorship," was documented from the libraries and presidential archives of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Researchers discovered that the CIA, the Pentagon, and the State Department "coordinated a 'destabilization' campaign and preparation of a civilian/military base for the coup." Cockroft also states that the United States government knew about and condoned high-tech torture by the Brazilian military. Victims of torture who survived testified to the presence of U.S. civilian and military advisors at torture sessions. Additionally, during the first eight years of the dictatorship, the U.S. government and "U.S.-dominated lending agencies extended

almost $5 billion in aid to Brazil." According to Cockroft, Brazil became the enforcer of pro-U.S interests in all of Latin America.[13]

Because many of these activities were covert, it was expected that there would be no significant results for Brazil. Although the product moment correlation between U.S. intervention (MA) and the log of political instability (LOGWS) showed a moderate positive correlation (.21), neither the linear model or the parabolic model fit the case of Brazil. When the log of income (DP) was used as a dependent variable, the preliminary results for both MA and MA2 (military aid and the square of military aid) were significant at the .005 level. However, autocorrelation was severe. Therefore the results for Brazil must be considered inconclusive, since only the linear and parabolic models were considered. An alternate model specification would perhaps be better suited for this country; further, it is possible that United States intervention in Brazil has been achieved primarily through use of more covert activities, activities for which interval level data is unavailable. Thus, the fact that this particular quantitative analysis (aggregated and weighted) fails to

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[13]An example of the role of Brazil as "enforcer" for U.S. interests, according to the author, was the case of "the U.S.-led but Brazil-commanded 'peacekeeping force' sent to the Dominican Republic in 1965.

support the thesis may well be an artifact of (1) the nature of the data which excludes covert intervention, (2) the fact that the model may be misspecified, or (3) the data for this case was aggregated for this analysis.

Chile is also a state in which the interventionist role of the United States has been widely debated, both before and after the election of the Socialist candidate, Dr. Salvador Allende, in September of 1973. The CIA financed over half the campaign for the opposing candidate, Eduardo Frei. When Allende won the election in 1970, the United States backed a military-led coup (Cockroft 1989). Since much U.S. intervention in Chile has been of a covert nature, it was expected that, like Brazil, neither the linear nor the parabolic model would produce significant results. This was not the case. Although the linear model did not show significant results, the results for the parabolic model, after the maximum likelihood correction for autocorrelation, proved to be significant for TA (.05 level), and TA^2 (.05 level); total aid and the square of total aid, the intervention variables in this model, when used with either income level or level of development, shows that United States intervention is associated with an initial decrease in political instability, followed by an increase in instability. Economic aid and its square were also significant (at the .01 level) when used with

either income or level of development in the parabolic model. EA was negative and significant; EA^2 positive and significant, indicating a short-term decrease in political instability, followed by a logn-term increase in instability in Chile. On the basis of this analysis, the evidence for overt total aid and economic aid to Chile clearly supports the thesis of the "pressure-cooker effect," an initial decrease in instability, probably due to increased repression, followed by an increase in political instability over time. When the intervention variables were lagged for one, two and three years, the results remained insignificant. No other variable achieved significance. Chile is clearly a case in which United States intervention has had a profound impact.

In Costa Rica, neither the linear nor the parabolic models describe this small state widely acknowledged to be the most stable and most democratic of all Latin American countries. This result was expected. The United States maintains a very limited physical presence, due to Costa Rican neutrality, both through the military, and a large enclave of American civilians.

Costa Rica, unlike other Central and South American countries, instituted large-scale liberal social and economic reforms *before* the Cold War reached the level of intensity which provoked such negative visceral reactions in Washington and among Costa Rican elites to most

demands for social equity.

In 1940, Dr. Rafael Angel Calderon was elected President. He was not initially viewed as a social reformist.[14] Nevertheless, in 1943, with Church and Communist support, Calderon created an extensive social welfare system, including social security, national health care, and the implementation of a labor code as a response to the Depression and the impact of World War II. LaFeber (1993, 101-102) notes that Dr. Calderon was devastated when he was charged by his political opposition with being dominated by the Communists. Calderon believed the Communists were ineffective and bankrupt politically, since he had stolen much of their program in the early 1940s.

By the late 1970s, direct state intervention had met at least the basic needs of the popular sector. The state directly provided aid for education, health, child welfare, housing and retirement pensions (Vunderink, 1993). Costa Rica had one of the highest literacy rates in Latin America and one of the most extensive social

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[14]LaFeber (1993, 101-102) states that Dr. Calderon's alliance with the Vanguardia Popular, the Communist Party bloc of workers and peasants, became problematic for the U.S. Department of State. Calderon had been charged by his political opposition of domination by the Communists. The Costa Rican middle class and a number of peasants believed it. The pro-Calderon American ambassador was replaced in November, 1947 by Nathaniel P. Davis. Davis had no Latin American experience, but was an expert on communism.

welfare systems.

Costa Rica represents a case in which social reform took place within a capitalist system, i.e., a case in which mitigating factors were deliberately introduced into a political system with minimal interference from either the oligarchy or the United States. The oligarchy, which resisted social reforms, was weakened by the fact that Costa Rica had no military through which to enforce this resistance, the civil war, and economic weakness after the depression.

Although Costa Rica represents an exception to the findings in other Latin American states, this case also supports the theory (see Figure 1, page 20) that mitigating factors may emerge which facilitate political stability in the absence of United States intervention, and that they may do so within the context of a capitalist economic system. Where social reform is undertaken from the top down, revolutionary movements find little support. Thus the lesson of Costa Rica should not be ignored. An alternate method of achieving stability through government intervention on behalf of the poor, perhaps should be less feared by ruling elites than emulated. It is possible that sharing the benefits of economic growth represents an *avenue to power* rather than a *loss of power*. For the United States, the course which led to Costa Rican stability illustrates the fact

that the military solution is at best a method of achieving only temporary stability.

El Salvador, along with Nicaragua, is a classic textbook case of Cold War ideology applied to Latin America, highly visible, highly controversial. In no other country in Latin America, with the exception of Nicaragua, did the working out of political ideology so polarize American institutions, setting Congress against the President for the duration of the conflict. American money flowed freely to the military government in El Salvador during this country's civil war against leftist insurgents. As LaFeber (1993, 312) notes, by the mid-1980s, the military government of El Salvador was receiving two million dollars a day. In spite of documented gross violations of civil rights by the military, the activation of death squads against the civilian population, students, the press, and nuns and priests, the United States continued to support the repressive regime, refusing to lend its support for a negotiated settlement rather than the preferred military solution.

Therefore, it was expected that United States intervention through overt aid to El Salvador would be positively and significantly associated with political instability in this country if the intervention thesis proposed in this study was correct. This was indeed the

case. The log of the weighted instability score (LOGWS) was used as the dependent variable; independent variables were MA (military aid) as well as DP and PC (income and level of development, which were tested in separate models). In this case, the linear and parabolic models fit the data. The results for the parabolic model were significant at the .05 level for military aid (MA) when used in conjunction with income. MA was positive and significant; MA^2 was negative and significant. An initial increase in political instability was followed by a non-significant decrease in instability. Total aid (TA) and economic aid (EA) were nonsignificant as intervention variables. In the linear model, military aid (MA) was also positive and significant at the .05 level when used with level of development. Evidence shows that United States intervention in El Salvador through military aid is associated with an increase in political instability which did not significantly decrease over time, though countless millions have been spent for that purpose. No other variable was significant.

U.S. intervention in the case of Honduras provided interesting results. Honduras represents a non-typical case in Latin America, having been relatively free from political instability in comparison with other Latin American states. In Honduras, the United States has maintained a physical military presence during many

of the years for which intervention has been evaluated. It is this physical presence which partially accounts for the fact that Honduras did not experience the same degree of turmoil as did other Latin American States. Nevertheless, analysis of the parabolic model shows that United States intervention in the form of military aid (MA) is associated with political instability, when used with level of development in the equation. The direction of the variables of interest, MA and MA^2 is not consistent with the results observed in other countries. Military aid was positive and significant (at the .05 level), while the square of military aid was negative and non-significant; thus United States intervention through military aid shows an initial increase in political instability, followed by a nonsignificant decrease in instability. Although TA (total aid) and (EA) were not significant in the parabolic model, when used in the equation with PC (level of development), level of development was associated with a short-term increase in instability, followed by a long-term decrease in instability.

Because of the initial increase in instability, and the fact that there was no significant decrease and an extremely low adjusted R^2 (.04), it is possible that Honduras would be better represented by a loglinear model. The loglinear model, which is not estimated in

this study, represents an initial increase in political instability, followed by a levelling off, at a higher level, which corresponds to the situation in Honduras. The evidence does, however, support the thesis that U.S. intervention has increased political instability in Honduras, which then levels off without reaching the same degree of instability as other countries in the analysis.

In Nicaragua, United States intervention led to a situation in which the United States President was suspected of being involved in an illegal attempt to avoid a clear directive (the Boland Amendment) from Congress. U.S. intervention in Nicaragua during the Cold War years not only polarized American institutions, as in El Salvador, but also created a political scandal of immense proportions which could have brought down the Presidency. Support for the Contras in Nicaragua eventually culminated in the Iran-Contra scandal. The strategy here was to circumvent Congress and to avoid the restrictions of the Boland Amendment (which prohibited any further aid to the Contras) by the selling of arms to Iran, for the exchange of American hostages. The money raised from the arms sale was then diverted to the Contras. Regardless of who did or did not know, or who was or was not at fault, the issue for the purpose of this study is to evaluate the *effects* of United States intervention in Nicaragua through overt monetary support.

In separate models, the effects of income (DP) and level of development (PC) on the log of the weighted instability score were estimated, along with TA (total aid), (EA) economic aid, and military aid (MA). In the linear model, U.S. intervention in the form of military aid, when level of development is used in place of income as an independent variable, is negatively and significantly associated with long-term political instability in the case of Nicaragua for the years of 1958-1988. Military aid decreased political instability in Nicaragua in the short-term; however, in the parabolic model which estimates long-term effects, military aid (MA) and its square (MA^2) are negative and significant, and positive and significant respectively, when used with either income (PC) or level of development (DP) in the equation. The parabolic model clearly illustrates that military aid led to an initial decrease in political instability, followed by a significant long-term increase in instability in Nicaragua. Obviously, military aid in Nicaragua did not achieve its objective of stability.

U.S. intervention in Peru, in the form of military aid, in conjunction with income, is associated with political instability in the case of Peru. The adjusted R^2 for the parabolic model is .57. The effects of income, the square of income, military aid and the square

of military aid (lagged for a period of three years) on the log of political instability (LOGWS) were calculated. Some autocorrelation was detected; after correction, howev er, all four independent variables remained significant.

United States military aid initially decreased political instability, followed by an increase in instability in Peru. An analysis of tolerance and VIF showed the presence of multicollinearity, extremely high for income, much less so for military aid. In a polynomial equation, there is by definition a high degree of collinearity between a variable and its square. This occurs when linearizing a polynomial equation. This need not present a problem *and in special cases* may be safely ignored. Income (DP), is also associated with a short-term decrease in instability, followed by a long-term increase in instability when used with military aid (MA) in the equation. This finding indicates that low income levels may be tolerated in Peru for a short period of time. Long-term low income levels are associated with political instability. Therefore it is possible to state with confidence that United States military intervention through military aid is associated with political instability when income levels are also low.

Regional Analysis

The pooled data for South America (region 1) fit neither

the linear nor the parabolic model. No variable was significant for the region as a whole. This finding has important implications for generalization; however, it should not be construed as a negative result. Failure to find any variable significant, in this instance, is due to (1) the fact that no *single* model fits more than two countries; the data for one country does not fit either model, (2) the fact that a curvilinear relationship exists which could not be modelled with the pooled regression technique which requires that no data be missing, and (3) U.S. intervention in Region 1 was often accomplished by covert means. Therefore, the linear model (which may partially fit curvilinear data) was used. The dependent variable was WS (weighted instability). The result was predictable--the adjusted R^2 was extremely low and the variables non-significant. In South America, the data for Brazil did not fit either model; the data for Argentina fit only the linear model, and the data for Chile and Peru fit the parabolic model. Yet in Chile and Peru, U.S. intervention was significantly associated with an initial decrease in instability followed by an increase in instability. In Argentina, U.S. intervention was found to be positively and significantly associated with political instability. In the regional sample of four countries, therefore, in three out of the four countries analyzed I found that

U.S. intervention was associated with political instability. The findings represent successful application of the theory to Region 1 as a whole.

The pooled results for Central America (region 2) confirms the LaFeber thesis for this area--in three of the four sample cases, U.S. intervention is associated with political instability. In Nicaragua and Honduras the data fit the parabolic model, while in El Salvador both the linear and parabolic models were appropriate. In Costa Rica, the theory is also validated by the fact that elites could not successfully achieve their objective of dominating the political system through the use of military force. It was then possible for mitigating factors to emerge which defused political tension through extensive social reform within a democratic capitalist system.

In all four of the cases in Central America, the evidence strongly supports the assertion that United States military intervention tends to increase political instability over time. Again, if the primary goal is stability, then short-term stability is the only achievement. Short-term stability is achieved at great cost--the long-term effects are clearly inimical to declared U.S. policy objectives.

Overall Results

Central and South America were investigated by means

of a pooled time-series analysis for eight cross-sections with thirty-one time points, in order to test the theory over all countries in both regions. The total number of cases was 248. For the pooled series, the log of the dependent variable was not used because of values counted as missing when the statistical procedure was utilized. Instead, the weighted instability (WS) score was used for the dependent variable. Income and military aid were regressors. After the GLS/ARMA correction for autocorrelation in the linear model, only U.S. military intervention (MA) remained significant at the .05 level with a t-score of 2.48 when income was used as the independent variable. The adjusted R^2 for the equation was .03. This extremely low score for the overall equation results from the fact that the log of these variables in the equation could not be taken for the reason given previously. However, the fact that the results show military aid as positively and significantly and (linearly) associated with political instability when the appropriate model is graphed and is observed to be clearly *non-linear*, indicates the robustness of the variable[15]. This finding also indicates that even in a linear model which measures only partially the degree of

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[15]A linear equation can partially describe a non-linear relationship, excluding the curved portion itself, even where only a small portion of the data for the model fits the linear model.

political instability facilitated by United States intervention (MA), this variable is indeed significant. When level of development was used in the linear model in place of income level as an independent variable, level of development did not achieve significance. However, the intervention variable, military aid (MA) remained significant at the .05 level with an adjusted R^2 of .03.

In the parabolic model with total aid (TA), income (DP) was negatively associated with political instability; however, in the long-term, low levels of income are associated with an increase in instability in the overall analysis. The overall analysis also indicates that U.S. military intervention is associated with political instability in all sample countries except Costa Rica and Brazil. The case of Costa Rica supports the assertion that military aid to a *democratic* country is not a significant factor in exacerbating political instability. Similarly, United States military aid to non-democratic countries is associated with long-term political instability. Overall, only level of development was *not* significantly associated with political instability.

Type of Society

In addition to the regional and overall analysis, United States intervention was also analyzed for democratic and non-democratic societies. Societies were

classified as democratic (TOS1) or non-democratic (TOS0) for each year of the period from 1958-1988. Use of "type of society" as a dichotomous variable has been discussed in Chapter 3.

The first linear regression was done for those years in which states were classified as non-democratic; the number of cases was 150. U.S. intervention in the form of total aid (TA) and income (DP) were regressors. LOGWS was the dependent variable (log of the weighted and aggregated instability score). Total aid was not significant. Income was significant at the .001 level with a t-score of 3.69. However, after the ML (maximum likelihood) correction for severe autocorrelation, neither variable was significant.

The effects of military aid and level of development (PC) were estimated for LOGWS in the first regression. Both variables were significant at the .001 level. The t-score for military aid was 4.14; for level of development the t-score was 4.24. The adjusted R^2 for the regression was .17. Military aid (MA) and income (DP) were regressors for the log of weighted political instability. Both variables were positive and significant at the .001 level with a t-score of 4.63 and 4.52 respectively, and an adjusted R^2 of .18. After correction for autocorrelation, MA remained significant at the .001 level (t-score 3.42), and income was not

significant. In the linear model, income was positively and significantly associated with an increase in instability when used in the equation with economic aid (EA). Level of development was positively and significantly associated with an increase in political instability when used in the linear equation with total aid (TA), economic aid (EA) or military aid (MA). MA was positive and significant at the .001 level with a t-score of 3.33, and level of development was positive and significant at the .05 level with a t-score of 2.02. In the parabolic model military aid was positively and significantly associated with a short-term increase in political instability, followed by a non-significant decrease in instability. Apparently, violence does not decrease significantly over time in a non-democratic society. In a non-democratic society, United States military aid, income, and level of development are positively and significantly associated with political instability.

The next linear regression was run for United States intervention in a democratic society (TOS1). The data for U.S. intervention in a democratic society fit only the linear model. Total aid, military aid, economic aid, income and level of development were regressors. The log of the weighted political instability score (LOGWS) was the dependent variable. In no instance did any of the

U.S. intervention variables achieve significance in the linear model. Only level of development remained significant after correction for autocorrelation in the linear model. In the parabolic model, no variable achieved significance.

This finding is important in analyzing the role of U.S. intervention (through military aid) in promoting political instability in a type of society which is democratic. Evidence shows that neither U.S. economic aid, military aid, or total aid facilitated long-term political instability in societies where democratic results accompanied democratic form.

Therefore, it is apparently authentic democracy which promotes political stability, rather than misguided U.S. support for repressive regimes.

Several interesting results were obtained from the previous analyses. These results are shown below.

(1) Military aid to a non-democratic society is associated with long-term political instability in most of the sample cases.

(2) Military aid to a democratic society is not associated with long-term political instability in the sample cases.

(3) Income and level of development play only a minor role in facilitating political instability in the sample.

(4) U.S. intervention, particularly in the form of military aid is associated with long-term political instability in both Central and South America.

(5) Democracy is an aid to political stability; political repression produces instability over the long-term.

In a society where violence is institutionalized (See Figure 3), U.S. intervention through military aid to repressive regimes seems to exacerbate the violence.[16] Repressive regimes may remain unresponsive to societal demands where they can gain additional support for their military forces from other sources. U.S. support for Third World military forces or military regimes increases their capacity for violence prolongs the period of conflict, and inhibits the emergence of mitigating factors. With additional aid, there is no incentive for repressive regimes to take into consideration the demands of excluded sectors of society; therefore the dual objectives of promoting stability through military aid and encouraging democratic reform become mutually exclusive and counterproductive for United States interest in the region.

Findings: Disaggregated and Unweighted Categories of Political Instability

Four of the eight countries in the sample showed a positive and significant association with political instability when the data were analyzed without

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[16]The institutionalization of violence (Figure 3) is clearly shown by the symmetry of the distance between the highest peaks of destabilizing events. Institutionalized violence is by definition a recurring phenomenon, a regular pattern of violence over time.



Figure 3. Institutionalization of Violence 1958-1988

weighting, and when disaggregated into the component forms or categories of political instability. The first case to be analyzed by this method is Brazil.

An interesting finding of this analysis was the fact that in the sample countries, when political instability was broken down into categories, the particular *route* to destabilization appeared to be a function of income level and level of development. Exactly why this is so, is not clear. Perhaps more research in this area would be appropriate.

Both the linear and parabolic models were estimated for Brazil using unweighted and disaggregated data for analysis. The dependent variable is the log of bombings. Income and level of development were again used in separate equations.

First, the effects of level of development and total announced U.S. aid (TA) were calculated for the dependent variable (the log of bombings). In the linear mmodel, total aid was positive and significant at the .01 level with a t-score of 2.70. Level of development was not significant. The adjusted R^2 was .22. The Durbin-Watson score was 2.06, which fit well within the suggested upper and lower limits. No correction for autocorrelation was necessary, and there was no evidence of multicollinearity. Economic aid to Brazil was also associated with political instability in the form of

bombings in the linear equation when income was used. Economic aid was significant at the .01 level with a t-score of 2.90.

In the second linear model, the effects of total announced U.S. aid and income on the log of bombings were estimated. Total U.S. aid was again significant at the .01 level, with a t-score of 2.62. Economic aid was again significant at the .01 level, with a t-score of 3.20. The adjusted R^2 was .22, with a Durbin-Watson of 2.06. No correction for autocorrelation was necessary, and there was no evidence of multicollinearity. Both models had an F-score which was significant at the .01 level. TA (total aid) and economic aid (EA) are positively and significantly (.01 level) associated with bombings, when placed with either income or level of development in the linear equation. This analysis suggests that U.S. aid increases the capacity of repressive regimes to act against society, and in turn leads to retaliation by dissident social forces. This retaliation most often takes the form of bombings in Brazil. While U.S. intervention is not the primary cause of instability, it does increase regime capacity for repression. In the parabolic model for Brazil, only level of development is significant at the .01 level when used with total aid (TA), and at the .05 level, when economic aid (EA) is the intervention variable.

In the parabolic model for the case of El Salvador the dependent variable, political instability is disaggregated and unweighted. The effects of TA (Total Aid) and the square of TA, income, and the level of development, on the log of bombings was estimated. After correcting for autocorrelation, the square of TA was significant at the .05 level when used with income. TA was not significant. However, the signs were not in the expected direction. The square of TA was negative (-.000) with a t-score of -2.48, while TA was positive. When TA and its square was used with level of development as one of the regressors, no variable reached significance. This finding is interesting, in that it indicates that total U.S. aid is not associated with a significant increase in bombings in El Salvador in the short term. Over the long term, the square of TA (the intervention variable) is associated with a *statistically* significant *decrease* in political instability in the form of bombings. However, the coefficient of -.000 means that the square of TA, while statistically significant, is too small to be of practical interest. Over the long term, the square of TA may lead to a decrease in bombings, but that decrease is too small to be of consequence. In the linear model, both TA (total aid) and economic aid (EA) were negative and significant at the .05 level. This indicates that total aid and

economic aid were useful for short-term reduction in instability in the form of bombings, only. These findings should be of immense interest to taxpayers and policymakers in the future considering the intense political rhetoric and consequently the immense amount of money which flowed into the country of El Salvador from the United States during the time period under analysis.

The parabolic model also fits Honduras when the dependent variable is disaggregated and unweighted. In this case the dependent variable category is the log of military attacks on civilians. When TA, MA, and EA were used with the level of development, no variable achieved significance in either the linear or parabolic model. The results are quite different when MA (military aid) and MA^2 (square of military aid) were used in conjunction with DP (income level). All variables were significant. MA was negative and significant at the .01 level with a coefficient of -.167 and a t-score of -2.96; MA^2 was positive and significant at the .05 level with a t-score of 2.20 and a coefficient of .006. Total aid (TA) was negative and significant at the .01 level; the square of total aid (TA^2) was positive and significant at the .05 level. Total aid is initially associated with a decrease in instability, followed by a long-term significant increase in instability. The same result occurred when economic aid was used with income in the equation;

economic aid (EA), with income, leads to a significant decrease in instability in the short run, but is associated with a significant increase in instability over time. Income also shows a significant (.05 level) increase in instability over the short-term, followed by a significant decrease in instability over time when used in the parabolic equation with either total aid, economic aid, or military aid. Level of development in Honduras was positive and significantly (.05) associated with instability. This result indicates that U.S. intervention in Honduras in the form of total aid (TA), military aid (MA), and economic aid (EA) to Honduras is positively and significantly associated with military attacks on civilians by Honduran government forces over the long term when used with income in the equation, but level of development, when used in the equation with military aid is also associated with military attacks on civilians.

Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the sample. LaFeber (1993, 9) notes that Honduras has been the closest ally of the United States in the region and has traditionally been used as a base for revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries because of its unique geographical location. Honduras has boundaries on two of the three other Central American countries in the sample. Because of the extreme poverty, it was expected

that income (DP--real gross domestic product) and level of development (PC) would also play a major role in instability occurring in Honduras. Income, alone was the significant variable of the two in the parabolic model.

This finding is consistent with the theory that U.S. intervention in the form of military aid to Honduras increased the capacity of the military regime to control the instability initially associated with poverty, through repressiveness. No permanent mitigating factors emerged which would alleviate the distress of Honduran citizens. As LaFeber also notes (1993,9), adult life expectancy in Honduras is forty-nine years, and "more than 20,000 families live on the edge of starvation; and in rural areas families of ten to twelve children are not uncommon, although half die before the age of five." However, the permanent physical presence of the U.S. military in the state of Honduras was also an initial stabilizing factor, preventing the permanent emergence of mitigating factors. This explains the initial decrease, followed by an increase in instability over time. Demands were not met, the system was unresponsive, and violence in the form of military attacks on civilians escalated.

Nicaragua is a state which fits three models, the aggregated and weighted parabolic model, the disaggregated and unweighted parabolic model, and the

aggregated and unweighted parabolic model (see below). The disaggregated and unweighted dependent variable considered for this analysis is the log of military attacks on civilians (LOGMIL). The parabolic model fits Nicaragua. TA (total aid) and the square of total aid (TA^2) were the only significant variables when used with level of development. TA was positive and significant at the .05 level, with a t-score of 2.46. TA^2 was negative and significant at the .05 level with a t-score of -2.19.

This finding suggests that TA (total aid) to Nicaragua through the auspices of the Contras, was initially positively and significantly associated with military attacks on civilians, followed by a decrease in instability of this form over the long term. This is entirely consistent with the known facts about events as they unfolded in Nicaragua. Total aid was given to the Samoza government in the earlier stages of the revolution; with the Sandinista victory in 1979, aid to the Sandinista government was almost totally eliminated. Thus impact of the intervention variable, total aid, could be expected to be negative; the results showed this to be accurate. The former government became counterrevolutionaries (Contras) supported by U.S. military aid.

Findings: Dependent Variable Aggregated and Unweighted

Few cases achieved significance in this section.

Only in the cases of Nicaragua and Chile was the dependent variable significant when aggregated and unweighted. The dependent variable for the case of Nicaragua is the aggregated and unweighted score for the log of political instability (LOGIN). Both the parabolic and linear models fit Nicaragua. The effects of military aid (MA) and the square of military aid (MA^2), income (DP) and the square of income (DP^2), and level of development (PC) and the square of the level of development (PC^2) were the regressors. Using income and its square in the model, MA and MA^2 were significant. MA was negative and significant at the .001 level with a coefficient of -1.71 and a t-score of -3.74. MA^2 was positive and significant at the .01 level with a coefficient of .618 and a t-score of 3.06.

The results show clearly that U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in the form of military aid led first to a significant decrease in political instability, followed by a long-term significant increase in instability in the parabolic model.

In a separate regression, military aid (MA) and its square (MA^2), and level of development (PC) and its square (PC^2) were used as regressors in the parabolic model. Again, MA and MA^2) were significant. MA was negative and significant at the .001 level with a t-score of -4.07 and a coefficient of -1.63. MA^2 was positive

and significant at the .01 level with a t-score of 2.94 and a coefficient of .580.

In the linear model, military aid (MA) was negative and significant at the .001 level (t-score -5.01) when used with level of development in the equation. This indicates that the effect of military aid (MA) was to decrease political instability in Nicaragua. However, this indicates the danger for decisions made by policy-makers when using a single model which does not take into account the long-term effects of U.S. intervention clearly shown by the parabolic model described above. Level of development in the linear model, when used with military aid, is associated with a short-term increase in political instability. These findings clearly and unequivocally support the thesis that U.S. military aid to Nicaragua decreased political instability for the short term only, followed by a long-term increase in political instability.

In the case of Chile, the dependent variable, political instability was aggregated, unweighted, and logged (LOGIN). Total aid, its square, income and its square were the regressors. In this parabolic model, all four variables achieved significance after correction for autocorrelation. Total aid (TA) was negative and significant at the .05 level with a coefficient of -.008 and a t-score of -3.13. The square of total aid was

positive and significant at the .01 level with a coefficient of .00002 and a t-score of 2.62. Income was positive and significant at the .05 level with a coefficient of .0054 and t-score of 2.37. The square of income (DP^2) was negative and significant at the .05 level with a coefficient of -.0000 and t-score of -2.31. These results show that total aid to Chile initially was associated with a decrease in political instability, followed by a long-term increase in instability. Neither level of development (PC), nor its square (PC^2) achieved significance in the second regression. However, total aid and its square and economic aid and its square remained significant. Total aid (TA) was negative and significant at the .01 level with a coefficient of -.008 and t-score of -2.79. The square of total aid (TA^2) was positive and significant at the .05 level with a coefficient of .00002 and a t-score of 2.61. Economic aid and its square were also significant when used with level of development. Economic aid was negative and significant at the .01 level; the square of economic aid was positive and significant at the .01 level. These findings indicate that U.S. intervention in Chile in the form of total aid and economic aid is initially associated with a decrease in political instability and a subsequent long-term increase in political instability. Results of the foregoing analyses are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Summary of Results

Model / Dependent Variable	United States Intervention			Income			Level of Development	
	Positive Linear 	Negative/ Positive Parabolic 	Positive/ Negative Parabolic 	Positive Linear 	Positive/ Negative Parabolic 	Negative/ Positive Parabolic 	Positive Linear 	Positive/ Negative Parabolic 
Political Instability aggregated/ weighted								
Log of Political Instability aggregated/ weighted	Argentina (TA) El Salvador (MA) Tos0 (MA)	Chile (TA) Nicaragua (MA) Peru (MA) Lag=3	El Salvador (MA) Argentina (EA) Honduras (MA) Tos0 (MA)	Argentina (TA, EA) Tos0 (EA)	Peru (MA)		Tos0 (TA, EA, MA) Tos1 (MA)	Honduras (TA, EA)
Political Instability aggregated/ unweighted	Nicaragua (MA)	Nicaragua (MA) Chile (TA,EA)			Chile (TA, EA)		Nicaragua (MA)	
Pooled Regression	Central America (MA) Central and South America (MA)					Central and South America (TA, EA)		

Figure 4. Continued

Model / Dependent Variable	United States Intervention			Income			Level of Development	
	Positive Linear	Negative/ Positive Parabolic	Positive/ Negative Parabolic	Positive Linear	Positive/ Negative Parabolic	Negative/ Positive Parabolic	Positive Linear	Positive/ Negative Parabolic
								
Bombings Disaggregated Unweighted	Brazil (TA, EA)					Brazil (TA, EA)		
Log of Bombings Disaggregated Unweighted	El Salvador (TA, EA)		El Salvador (TA)					
Log of Military Attacks on Civilians Disaggregated Unweighted		Honduras (TA, EA, Ma	Nicaragua (TA)		Honduras (TA, EA, MA)		Honduras (MA)	

Summary

The most interesting and informative feature of this study is the fact that whether aggregated, disaggregated, weighted or unweighted, U.S. intervention (in the form of total aid, economic aid, and military aid) in affairs of Central and South America is clearly associated with long-term instability in both areas.

The policy implication is obvious: If U.S. aid intervention in Latin America in a majority of the cases in the sample is associated with political instability, then U.S. dollars in the billions which have been channeled into Central and South America are not only not achieving the policy objective of political stability, but over the long term have the opposite effect of exacerbating political instability.

Chapter 5 presents conclusions regarding the evidence of this analysis for support of the overall theoretical construct and the hypotheses which have been tested in this chapter. Compelling reasons which necessitate reevaluation and change of United States policy in the region are discussed. Finally, as a result of this analysis of U.S. policy in Central and South America, suggestions and guidelines for future policy options are discussed.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Political Instability and Policy Failure: Theory and Evidence

Evidence from the foregoing quantitative analysis of United States intervention in Latin America clearly and unequivocally supports a finding of policy failure in the region. Despite repeated attempts to rationalize past American policy of support for repressive regimes, political instability remains a defining characteristic of an overwhelming majority of states investigated in this dissertation. American policy for Latin America has been based on the European model of containment, on the exigencies of the Cold War, and on the unjustified assumption that repressive regimes represent the best solution to the dilemma of regional instability. Stability has been viewed as essential for economic growth and development, while democracy has been perceived as a desirable, although perhaps impractical objective, clearly secondary to the primary goal of political stability.

This research finds no plausible justification, based on the stability argument, for support of repressive civilian or military regimes. At best, such support fosters only short-term political stability; in no case has long-term political stability, the declared

policy objective, resulted from United States intervention in Latin America. Only through a distortion of reality resulting from ideological myopia, could policymakers argue that stable authentic democratic governments characterize Latin American politics in the 1990s. The problems which have challenged Latin Americans in the past, exist today, perhaps somewhat subdued, sometimes hidden, but always pregnant with revolutionary potential. The "pressure-cooker" effect, derived from the combined theoretical perspectives of Marx, Tilly and Gurr, and articulated by Walter LaFeber, remains the best single explanation for political instability in Latin America.

The theoretical model of political instability represents a reduced and simplified version of reality, easily understandable in layman's terms. The composite model which emerges is reduced to its lowest common denominator; however, it was derived only through years of painstaking and complex research. Widespread inequality leads to class polarization, to the development of class consciousness, and to subsequent demands for social equity. These demands lead to rational activity directed toward the state. If demands are met; i.e., if the state is responsive, progress will be made toward constructing a more equitable society. Relative stability will be the end result. If, on the

other hand, demands are met with severe repression, the result will be political instability over the long term. When the United States aids or supports these regimes, repressive capacity is enhanced, stability is temporary, and revolution remains a viable option for the masses. The potential for violent action is not eliminated by repression; it remains below the surface. When the pressure becomes great enough, violence will erupt. When this occurs, additional resources from the United States will be required in a never-ending cycle of foreign aid. The purpose of this research is not to build a model which explains all, or even the greatest portion, of political instability in Latin America. This study has a more modest objective--to build a theoretical and empirical model designed to quantitatively test the role of the United States in exacerbating the problem of political instability through U.S. intervention. The findings from this research support the theory. The methods utilized in the past for promoting the political, strategic and economic interests of the United States through military intervention in Latin America are not the solution; they are a part of the problem.

Discussion of Results

Hypotheses which were tested in this study were:

(1) The greater the extent of United States intervention, the higher the probability of political instability over time.

(2) The lower the level of economic development, the higher the probability of political instability (Lipset).

(3) The greater the degree of income inequality, the higher the probability of political instability (Huntington, Midlarsky, Muller and Prosterman).

Hypothesis number one links United States intervention to a high probability of political instability over time in the sample cases. The evidence from the analysis clearly supports this hypothesis. United States military aid or total aid was found to be positively and significantly associated with political instability over time in Argentina, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Peru. In Chile, total aid was initially found to be positively associated with short term political stability; while total aid over time was associated with political instability. Costa Rica is widely acknowledged to be the most stable of the countries in Latin America, therefore no positive results were expected. The results for Brazil were inconclusive when the dependent variable was aggregated and weighted, probably due to the fact that the model for this case was either misspecified, or intervention by the United States was of a more covert nature than in other cases in the sample. However, when the dependent variable was disaggregated and unweighted, U.S. intervention was clearly associated with political instability. Therefore in seven of the eight sample cases, United States

intervention was a factor which increased instability over time.

Hypothesis two links the level of economic development of selected Latin American states with political instability. Level of development, as measured by energy consumption in gigajoules per capita, is positively associated with political instability only in those societies coded non-democratic. Apparently, increased economic development is not a prerequisite (Lipset, 1963) for democracy. This finding supports O'Donnell's (1979) argument that economic development may lead to bureaucratic-authoritarianism rather than to democracy. Democracy, however, may be a condition or factor through which sustainable development over time may be achieved. It can be argued that reversal of Lipset's direction of causality between economic development and authentic democratic societies occurs because democracy provides the individual with freedom necessary to take advantage of opportunity. Entrepreneurs and innovators emerge with the capacity of creating and maintaining economic wealth in open, competitive societies where individual initiative is recognized and rewarded rather than repressed. Since upward economic mobility is a realistic goal in a democratic political system, individuals may aspire to, and achieve a quality of life which provides for more

than the basic human needs. Future research should concentrate on precise specification of the relationship between capitalist economic systems and democratic societies. It may be that capitalism is the result of democracy; thus democracy could well be the prerequisite of capitalism and stability.

Hypothesis number three states that the greater the degree of income inequality, the higher the probability of political instability. Income inequality contributes to political instability only in Argentina, Chile, Honduras, and Peru. Income for rural as well as for urban dwellers who have migrated from rural areas is low. Therefore hypothesis three is partially supported by the evidence. Income appears to be more significant than level of development as a cause of political instability.

Latin American Policy for the 1990s

There are compelling reasons which necessitate reevaluation and change of United States policy in Latin America. First, former policy has been largely ineffective in promoting either stability or authentic democracy. Second, the Cold War is over; no serious external threat from the former Soviet Union remains. Third, in a world increasingly restructured into economic blocks, Latin America is necessary for the future economic security of the United States. Fourth, military solutions are giving way to diplomatic and economic

solutions. Fifth, the economic development of Latin America is necessary to alleviate the vast inequalities between the rulers and the ruled in order that poverty will no longer create openings for revolutionary rhetoric and activities. Sixth, an economically developed Latin America will provide a stronger trading partnership and expanded market for American products. Seventh, authentic democracies in Latin America will produce the stability necessary for economic development. Finally, the United States must begin to take seriously the negative image which many Latin Americans hold of this country; there must be a concentrated effort to build political capital and a measure of trust. The reasons for change are readily apparent, but the question is--what changes will be necessary to facilitate favorable political, economic and strategic outcomes for the United States in Latin America in the future.

Suggestions and Guidelines for Future Policy Options

United States policymakers should not assume that democracy will take hold in Latin America with the demise of the Soviet threat. There are many internal obstacles to democratic government in the region, issues which must be addressed and resolved if democracy and its corollary, stability is to succeed. The issues which must be resolved are regional security, demilitarization, economic development and aid, poverty, and drug

trafficking. A final problem which must be acknowledged and dealt with in the interest of cementing a good relationship with Latin states is that of changing the image of the United States--image building.

The need for regional security is obvious, however, the definition of the term needs to be reevaluated and clarified. When one speaks of regional security, whose security is at stake? Is it the national security of the United States, the security of Latin America from outside interference in internal affairs, the security of Latin America from the spread of internal wars, or all three?

It should be recognized that regional security has different meanings for the United States and for Latin America. For the United States, regional security is equivalent to (1) the primary national security interest of preventing a rival power from establishing a foothold or base in Central and South America from which to threaten the United States, and (2) prevention of the spread of leftist revolution from one Latin American country to another. For Latin Americans, regional security is necessary to prevent United States intervention. Bloomfield and Munoz (1990) have noted that:

> ...the perceived threat to its national security from a rival European power--most recently the Soviet Union--has prompted the United States with some regularity to practice the ultimate form of political interference in the affairs of Latin American States--the overt or covert use of armed

> force. The result...is that the United States has come to be viewed in Latin America as *the* interventionist power in the hemisphere.

The United States, not the former Soviet Union, is often perceived as the enemy by Latin Americans because of its interventionist policy. Regional security for Latin Americans lies in preventing United States intervention by dealing with the problem themselves. This is the basis for the formation of the Contadora group and the Lima group, the "Group of Eight."

Lack of agreement over the origin of internal conflict sparked an ongoing debate between Latin American dependency theorists who posited external intervention (primarily by the United States) as the source of conflict, and North American theorists who viewed internal factors as responsible for insurgency and revolution. Any treaty or agreement has been almost assured of failure because of differences in definition of the problem. As Bloomfield (1990) has noted, the collective security system created in the 1940s was based on "the classic alliance" where states combine forces to combat common external threats. However, in this alliance, the dominant partner reserved the right to act unilaterally. No collegial system could develop "as the Latin Americans, viewing the cure as worse than the disease, resisted U.S. solutions that called for intervention."

The Contadora group (Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Mexico) was formed in 1983 to initiate a diplomatic solution to the Nicaraguan problem in order to prevent the United States from directly intervening in the Contra insurgency. In 1985, a "support group" was formed. Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil (also known as the Lima group) joined in the collective security effort in which Latin Americans would initiate solutions to their own problems and forestall American intervention. Collectively, these countries were called "The Group of Eight." Central Americans, under the leadership of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, also took steps to promote democracy and end regional conflict. These groups focused on negotiations. The Sandinista government was to "liberalize" and "democratize," and the Contras were to demobilize. This solution was met with resistance in the United States by the Reagan administration, which sought a change of political system in Nicaragua, not liberalization.

The problem centered on the fact that the United States was accustomed to unilateral action in Latin America, and insisted on retaining this "right." Multilateral negotiations, in which each contesting party would compromise, where each would be required to give up a measure of sovereignty, was not appealing to the United States. Latin Americans were aware that a solution

actively opposed by the United States was no true solution. Today, this situation remains unchanged. The United States in the 1990s must reevaluate this uncompromising position. Latin American states remain too important to the United States to be either dismissed summarily as unimportant international actors, or to be subjected to inflexible policies. Pastor (1991) notes that reevaluation of policy positions involves achieving a clear understanding of the difference between national security *interests*, and national security *threats*. Pastor views a security interest as the interest of the United States in keeping Soviet advisors and troops out of Nicaragua; however, their presence did not constitute a security threat to the United States. As Sorensen (1991, 80) observes, the United States must not look for clones, or pawns, "nor to our list of current arms or aid recipients, not even for loyal allies, but for authentic democracies." He also stresses the fact that local officials who govern with the permission of the U.S. military or intelligence advisors are not governing with the consent of the people, and that "not every self-proclaimed democracy deserves either that label or our support." Thus, the first and most important prerogative of the United States in the 1990s, with regard not only to Latin America, but the rest of the world, is to distinguish between interests and threats, labels and

realities. This may be the equivalent of redefining America.

The powerful militaries of Latin American states constitute one of the greatest obstacles to authentic democratization and stability. A top priority of U.S. policy should be the gradual dismantling of Latin American military forces. Neither democracy or stability is possible in the long run where military forces remain powerful independent state actors with the capacity to inhibit or prevent the emergence of mitigating factors. Latin America is traditionally an area with weak central governments and powerful military institutions which must be placated in order for civilians to remain in power. Robinson (1991) suggests retraining or retiring military men, and changing the "military mentality," although she admits that this will indeed be a difficult task. She also suggests rotating police personnel and dismissing those linked to drug trafficking and other abuses, as the Peruvian anti-drug police have done. I would suggest that in addition, military aid should be stopped, and economic aid tied securely to military reduction. As an aid to demilitarization, the United States should close those programs on bases which train Latin American military in this country.

With the image of the United States as the enemy in the minds of many Latin Americans, it makes little policy

sense to continue adding to the strength of the military forces. Neither Argentina nor Brazil have signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. While the treaty of Tlatelolco, which provides that Latin America will be designated a nuclear free zone, remains in effect, the principle of state sovereignty can effectively negate that treaty. The decimation of the political Left in Latin America has created a power vacuum which will be filled by the extreme right. A nuclearized Latin America in the hands of a powerful military not controlled by civilians is a frightening prospect. Demilitarization of Latin America must be a priority; the militarization of Latin America represents not only a national security interest, but a national security threat.

The remaining military forces, after reduction, must be convinced to submit to civilian rule, or be dismissed and replaced. Stability, and the strong democratic impulse of many Latin American states cannot be realized in the shadow of uncontrolled military power.

Economic aid (with restrictions regarding demilitarization) should be a high policy priority for the U.S. With the end of the Cold War, and a staggering federal deficit, economic aid to Central America is likely to decline at a time when it is desperately needed. There have been suggestions that one way to promote economic development in Central America is

to forgive outright their debts to the United States, since they represent only a small fraction of total Latin American debt. Another suggestion is that trade barriers should be removed, and Central America given preferential treatment. None of these actions would require large expenditures (Robinson, 1991). Again, if these suggestions become policy, they should, like demilitarization, be tied to democratic practice, rather than democratic form.

Poverty is likely to be an issue for many years. This research finds that democracy is the prerequisite to stability; stability is the prerequisite to economic growth, and economic growth is necessary to alleviate extreme inequalities in Latin America. These relationships are opposed to conventional policy wisdom (which Sklar in 1983 called the "deadly idea" promoted by many intellectuals) in which stability is assumed to be the prerequisite to both economic development and democracy. That this assumption is in error should be readily apparent; the most democratic country of all, the United States, instituted a democratic political system prior to extensive economic development. That democracy should take first priority is a matter, not of economic development, but of *political will*. What follows is stability and economic development, and redress of gross inequalities as a result of economic growth.

Most Latin American states are committed to capitalism and the free market. Yet the masses remain impoverished, providing a fertile breeding ground for discontent and insurgency. Any opposing ideology which promises to alleviate this condition would find supporters under these conditions. Costa Rica remains an example for the rest of Latin America of what can be accomplished when social reform takes place within a democratic and capitalist system. Latin America will not achieve stability until the poverty of the majority is addressed.

Funding for social programs can be provided by reducing the military apparatus within countries, and by economic aid from the United States which is earmarked for specific programs including funding for education, medical care, and housing. If this is achieved, opposing ideologies would have little support, and revolutionary potential would be greatly diminished. With the end of the Cold War and much of the regional conflict, now is not the time for the United States to retreat economically from Latin America. Today this nation has a greater opportunity and the greatest need to rehabilitate the American image in the eyes of Latin American states than ever before; our national security demands it. Active promotion of authentic democracy, and the ending of massive abuse of human rights remains the first

priority for resolution of regional instability.

The problem of drug trafficking is unlikely to go away, and some hard decisions must be made. The case of Panama shows that direct intervention by the United States in order to prevent drug-trafficking is as real a threat to the territorial integrity of Latin America as was America's perception of the threat of Communism. If Latin Americans feared that the United States would directly intervene in Nicaragua and El Salvador to eliminate a perceived Communist threat, the case of Panama is an example of the determination of the United States to intervene in Latin America to whatever extent is necessary to curtail the drug trade. Latin American collective security is at risk by drug trafficking; Latin Americans must begin to deal seriously with this problem. In addition, the United States must find alternative methods of fighting the drug trade. Reliance on, and aid to, the Latin American military as a means of challenging the power of drug cartels may be an exercise in futility--in many instances the military has become corrupted by the drug trade. This appears unlikely to change in the near future.

The United States does not have the resources to end the drug trade, and the most viable option, to legalize drugs in this country, is morally unacceptable to many Americans. However, the only way to eliminate Latin

American drug cartels is to take the profit out of the drug industry. Drugs in the United States could be controlled by highly regulated state clinics which place emphasis on maintenance dosages for registered addicts, with the primary goal of rehabilitation. Drug-related crimes would be reduced, if not eliminated for two reasons. First, when addicts can register with the state and be given maintenance dosages, the incentive to commit criminal acts to procure drugs is reduced. Second, with taking the profit out of drug-trafficking, drugs would no longer be easily available. In addition to legalization of drugs, with emphasis on rehabilitation, educational programs against drug usage should continue with increased funding. Both rehabilitation and educational programs could be more than adequately funded with money previously used to fight the drug cartels and the futile attempt to secure our borders against penetration by the industry. If there is no profit, there will be no illegal drug trade; cartels will die a natural death. Drug education should include reassurances to parents that drugs will not be available to children at local mini-marts, but will be strictly and severely regulated by state clinics.

Certainly these problems of Latin America are interrelated. And most certainly these are mutual national security interests and threats for the United

States, Central America, and South America. United States policy for Latin America in the future should focus on addressing these issues simultaneously and in concert with Latin American governments. Regional security, demilitarization, economic aid and development, poverty and drug-trafficking remain obstacles to achieving democracy, growth and stability. Hard decisions must be made for the future, acknowledging that the world has changed; the United States can no longer afford to remain the victim of naive idealism where the drug trade is concerned.

Summary

United States intervention in Latin America through total aid, and particularly military aid has, been counterproductive. The stated United States policy goal of stability has not been achieved. U.S. intervention in seven out of eight sample countries is associated with an increase in long-term political instability. The eighth country is Costa Rica, where liberal reform took place within the context of a capitalist system before the onset of the Cold War, and where democratic results accompanied democratic reform. It is an example of stability through social reform and the dismantling of the military apparatus. Costa Rica is widely recognized as a democratic success story among Latin American states.

The results of this study show that low income is a more significant predictor of political instability over time than level of development.

Theoretical synthesis is necessary to develop a comprehensive perspective of the roots of instability in Latin America. Each theorist brings to the analysis a unique perspective of what is basically the same phenomenon of political violence and instability. The theories of Karl Marx, with his emphasis on class polarization and developing class consciousness; Ted Gurr, who stressed that comparison of life-states between elites and the masses would lead to a sense of deprivation resulting in violence unless mitigating factors emerged; and Charles Tilly, who emphasized the rationality of revolutionary violence, have contributed to a greater understanding of the roots of instability than any one theorist could have alone; each has responded to a quite different aspect of the problem of instability.

The debate of Muller, Prosterman, Midlarsky, and Hung der Fu, etc., over the importance of landlessness, income, or landlessness only when it is associated with income has yet to be resolved. In Latin America, both income and land provide basic needs; for future research perhaps an index, or preferably a scaling system could be devised which would incorporate both variables, since

each variable represents the same essential need, the means to provide for basic human necessities.

Important policy issues for the 1990s include as the first priority active promotion of authentic democracy, followed by attention to regional security, demilitarization, economic development and aid, alleviation of gross economic inequalities, and elimination of drug-trafficking. The United States should not neglect Latin America in the 1990s, when opportunity and need are greatest.

Finally, the United States needs to distinguish between security interests and security threats, recognizing that these are not necessarily equivalent. In this way, the longer and more difficult task of image rehabilitation can begin.

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APPENDIX A

THE DATA SET

year	country	ea	ma	ta	nu	ws	reg	dp
58	ARGENTINA	0.1	0.0	0.1	1	570	1	2600
59	ARGENTINA	210.0	0.0	210.0	1	1160	1	2840
60	ARGENTINA	1.0	0.1	1.1	1	690	1	3091
61	ARGENTINA	82.5	12.8	95.3	1	630	1	3276
62	ARGENTINA	94.9	38.3	133.2	1	1470	1	3130
63	ARGENTINA	160.1	1.9	162.0	1	40	1	2949
64	ARGENTINA	13.0	2.4	15.4	1	670	1	3245
65	ARGENTINA	11.5	7.3	18.8	1	920	1	3470
66	ARGENTINA	31.2	7.2	38.4	1	560	1	3418
67	ARGENTINA	2.8	11.3	14.1	1	60	1	3466
68	ARGENTINA	34.9	14.9	49.8	1	170	1	3578
69	ARGENTINA	62.6	18.7	81.3	1	1510	1	3858
70	ARGENTINA	23.3	10.6	33.9	1	850	1	4002
71	ARGENTINA	38.0	16.0	54.0	1	850	1	4116
72	ARGENTINA	42.0	19.1	61.1	1	1660	1	4140
73	ARGENTINA	24.3	9.8	34.1	1	1870	1	4157
74	ARGENTINA	26.0	14.5	40.5	1	9670	1	4306
75	ARGENTINA	36.6	17.0	53.6	1	5690	1	4214
76	ARGENTINA	2.8	18.8	21.6	1	9999	1	4125
77	ARGENTINA	8.2	0.4	8.6	1	9999	1	4364
78	ARGENTINA	13.5	0.0	13.5	1	6560	1	4099
79	ARGENTINA	14.2	0.0	14.2	1	1180	1	4308
80	ARGENTINA	30.3	0.0	30.3	1	70	1	4342
81	ARGENTINA	28.9	0.0	28.9	1	3290	1	3935
82	ARGENTINA	190.7	0.0	190.7	1	890	1	3592
83	ARGENTINA	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	330	1	3509
84	ARGENTINA	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	100	1	3695
85	ARGENTINA	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	260	1	3486
86	ARGENTINA	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	350	1	3563
87	ARGENTINA	0.8	0.0	0.0	1	160	1	3563
88	ARGENTINA	4.0	0.0	0.0	1	140	1	3563
58	BRAZIL	32.3	0.0	32.3	3	580	1	920
59	BRAZIL	163.1	15.2	178.3	3	210	1	964
60	BRAZIL	19.4	32.2	51.6	3	170	1	991
61	BRAZIL	364.6	28.6	393.2	3	530	1	1389
62	BRAZIL	244.0	50.7	294.7	3	360	1	1421
63	BRAZIL	174.2	12.0	186.2	3	410	1	1400
64	BRAZIL	456.2	19.8	476.0	3	550	1	1403
65	BRAZIL	314.4	16.6	331.0	3	250	1	1391
66	BRAZIL	431.0	25.4	456.4	3	320	1	1420
67	BRAZIL	296.7	18.6	315.3	3	200	1	1453

68	BRAZIL	358.3	29.1	387.4	3	310	1	1571
69	BRAZIL	32.9	20.0	52.9	3	335	1	1685
70	BRAZIL	198.4	13.0	211.4	3	310	1	1782
71	BRAZIL	191.0	10.0	201.0	3	80	1	1951
72	BRAZIL	302.6	19.5	322.1	3	60	1	2111
73	BRAZIL	160.8	14.3	175.1	3	270	1	2338
74	BRAZIL	217.1	33.3	250.4	3	510	1	2504
75	BRAZIL	153.6	36.9	190.5	3	440	1	2589
76	BRAZIL	67.4	24.4	91.8	3	250	1	2805
77	BRAZIL	27.2	0.1	27.3	3	440	1	2924
78	BRAZIL	52.7	0.0	52.7	3	50	1	3030
79	BRAZIL	113.6	0.0	113.6	3	40	1	3190
80	BRAZIL	34.6	0.0	34.6	3	410	1	3356
81	BRAZIL	40.9	0.0	40.9	3	200	1	3252
82	BRAZIL	31.7	0.0	31.7	3	80	1	3191
83	BRAZIL	10.5	0.0	10.5	3	200	1	3075
84	BRAZIL	9.6	0.0	9.6	3	520	1	3105
85	BRAZIL	13.0	0.0	13.0	3	0	1	3282
86	BRAZIL	42.5	0.0	42.5	3	60	1	3154
87	BRAZIL	41.1	0.0	41.0	3	530	1	3154
88	BRAZIL	6.2	0.0	6.2	3	430	1	3154
58	CHILE	52.6	0.0	52.6	4	40	1	2783
59	CHILE	53.8	7.2	61.0	4	0	1	2658
60	CHILE	54.3	3.3	57.6	4	70	1	2932
61	CHILE	166.1	10.8	176.9	4	40	1	3089
62	CHILE	279.9	14.8	294.7	4	120	1	3128
63	CHILE	106.3	30.2	136.5	4	80	1	3231
64	CHILE	156.9	11.6	168.5	4	80	1	3225
65	CHILE	148.8	9.3	158.1	4	140	1	3347
66	CHILE	121.0	9.6	130.6	4	40	1	3489
67	CHILE	313.4	5.9	319.3	4	160	1	3454
68	CHILE	116.5	8.3	124.8	4	160	1	3531
69	CHILE	113.7	4.9	118.6	4	200	1	3611
70	CHILE	29.2	12.8	42.0	4	550	1	3687
71	CHILE	7.6	5.6	13.2	4	350	1	3845
72	CHILE	8.5	10.2	18.7	4	920	1	3674
73	CHILE	5.6	12.1	17.7	4	6510	1	3502
74	CHILE	68.1	10.0	78.1	4	960	1	3870
75	CHILE	72.3	0.4	72.7	4	730	1	2976
76	CHILE	51.7	0.0	51.7	4	100	1	3168
77	CHILE	17.5	0.0	17.5	4	440	1	3408
78	CHILE	26.2	0.0	26.2	4	450	1	3746

79	CHILE	5.9	0.0	5.9	4	440	1	3986
80	CHILE	3.9	0.0	3.9	4	420	1	4271
81	CHILE	4.2	0.0	4.2	4	310	1	4443
82	CHILE	2.3	0.0	2.3	4	410	1	3447
83	CHILE	1.0	0.0	1.0	4	1560	1	3314
84	CHILE	0.6	0.0	0.6	4	9610	1	3503
85	CHILE	0.9	0.0	0.9	4	1610	1	3486
86	CHILE	0.7	0.0	0.7	4	1900	1	3434
87	CHILE	0.4	0.0	0.4	4	300	1	3434
88	CHILE	1.0	0.0	1.0	4	120	1	3434
58	COSTA RICA	3.3	0.0	3.3	6	0	2	1622
59	COSTA RICA	10.1	0.0	10.1	6	0	2	1613
60	COSTA RICA	12.8	0.0	12.8	6	40	2	1663
61	COSTA RICA	12.1	0.1	12.2	6	0	2	1680
62	COSTA RICA	12.4	0.1	12.5	6	0	2	1726
63	COSTA RICA	17.1	0.7	17.8	6	0	2	1801
64	COSTA RICA	19.8	0.6	20.4	6	0	2	1817
65	COSTA RICA	17.9	0.2	18.1	6	0	2	1930
66	COSTA RICA	15.5	0.1	15.6	6	0	2	2019
67	COSTA RICA	9.0	0.1	9.1	6	0	2	2056
68	COSTA RICA	11.5	0.1	11.6	6	0	2	2127
69	COSTA RICA	19.1	0.0	19.1	6	10	2	2171
70	COSTA RICA	18.6	0.0	18.6	6	40	2	2300
71	COSTA RICA	8.1	0.1	8.2	6	0	2	2345
72	COSTA RICA	3.7	0.0	3.7	6	0	2	2438
73	COSTA RICA	2.8	0.0	2.8	6	0	2	2562
74	COSTA RICA	8.9	0.0	8.9	6	0	2	2642
75	COSTA RICA	5.1	0.0	5.1	6	120	2	2646
76	COSTA RICA	6.7	0.0	6.7	6	90	2	2744
77	COSTA RICA	6.2	2.6	8.8	6	0	2	2943
78	COSTA RICA	6.5	0.0	6.5	6	0	2	3052
79	COSTA RICA	9.8	0.0	9.8	6	30	2	3124
80	COSTA RICA	8.6	0.0	8.6	6	0	2	3031
81	COSTA RICA	7.1	0.0	7.1	6	140	2	2831
82	COSTA RICA	18.9	0.7	19.6	6	120	2	2520
83	COSTA RICA	73.3	1.6	74.9	6	70	2	2492
84	COSTA RICA	58.1	3.1	61.2	6	90	2	2677
85	COSTA RICA	75.2	3.8	79.0	6	0	2	2650
86	COSTA RICA	55.8	0.9	56.7	6	0	2	2609
87	COSTA RICA	61.4	0.6	62.0	6	0	2	2609
88	COSTA RICA	37.3	0.1	37.4	6	30	2	2609
58	EL SALVADOR	1.4	0.0	1.4	9	0	2	1059

59	EL SALVADOR	1.4	0.0	1.4	9	10	2	1064
60	EL SALVADOR	1.2	0.0	1.2	9	290	2	1062
61	EL SALVADOR	8.0	0.2	8.2	9	310	2	1057
62	EL SALVADOR	28.0	0.7	28.7	9	0	2	1182
63	EL SALVADOR	26.7	1.2	27.9	9	30	2	1207
64	EL SALVADOR	17.7	1.1	18.8	9	0	2	1256
65	EL SALVADOR	21.2	0.9	44.2	9	40	2	1290
66	EL SALVADOR	10.4	0.8	11.2	9	0	2	1334
67	EL SALVADOR	3.5	0.7	4.2	9	100	2	1363
68	EL SALVADOR	10.1	0.7	10.8	9	0	2	1377
69	EL SALVADOR	14.5	0.3	14.8	9	0	2	1375
70	EL SALVADOR	12.7	0.2	12.9	9	40	2	1358
71	EL SALVADOR	5.5	0.4	5.9	9	0	2	1356
72	EL SALVADOR	15.6	1.7	17.3	9	120	2	1389
73	EL SALVADOR	3.6	0.3	3.9	9	0	2	1438
74	EL SALVADOR	6.7	0.7	7.4	9	40	2	1463
75	EL SALVADOR	2.5	3.1	5.6	9	130	2	1482
76	EL SALVADOR	7.6	0.6	8.2	9	80	2	1539
77	EL SALVADOR	3.0	0.3	3.3	9	640	2	1603
78	EL SALVADOR	5.4	0.0	5.4	9	270	2	1651
79	EL SALVADOR	5.0	0.0	5.0	9	1580	2	1574
80	EL SALVADOR	22.3	2.3	24.6	9	5090	2	1410
81	EL SALVADOR	39.9	12.4	52.3	9	6580	2	1274
82	EL SALVADOR	63.0	28.4	91.4	9	9680	2	1173
83	EL SALVADOR	84.1	27.8	111.9	9	2720	2	1127
84	EL SALVADOR	72.9	66.4	139.3	9	4700	2	1191
85	EL SALVADOR	147.7	46.4	194.1	9	2310	2	1198
86	EL SALVADOR	109.5	41.4	150.9	9	1850	2	1172
87	EL SALVADOR	153.4	36.9	190.3	9	1010	2	1172
88	EL SALVADOR	97.2	25.2	122.4	9	1498	2	1172
58	HONDURAS	10.9	0.0	10.9	11	20	2	762
59	HONDURAS	5.5	0.1	5.6	11	300	2	762
60	HONDURAS	4.8	0.1	4.9	11	40	2	748
61	HONDURAS	6.6	0.4	7.0	11	40	2	745
62	HONDURAS	3.7	1.8	5.5	11	90	2	755
63	HONDURAS	15.2	0.0	15.2	11	200	2	759
64	HONDURAS	11.7	0.5	12.2	11	0	2	778
65	HONDURAS	4.9	0.8	5.7	11	250	2	824
66	HONDURAS	15.6	0.8	16.4	11	0	2	851
67	HONDURAS	11.1	1.1	12.2	11	40	2	866
68	HONDURAS	15.1	1.1	16.2	11	80	2	904
69	HONDURAS	4.3	0.6	4.9	11	490	2	887

70	HONDURAS	9.0	0.3	9.3	11	80	2	927
71	HONDURAS	7.5	0.6	8.1	11	120	2	936
72	HONDURAS	6.9	0.5	7.4	11	50	2	943
73	HONDURAS	11.7	0.4	12.1	11	40	2	965
74	HONDURAS	19.1	0.4	19.5	11	0	2	943
75	HONDURAS	20.8	2.4	23.2	11	290	2	895
76	HONDURAS	15.5	1.9	17.4	11	40	2	936
77	HONDURAS	6.8	1.6	8.4	11	50	2	1008
78	HONDURAS	8.7	1.6	10.3	11	40	2	1052
79	HONDURAS	13.0	1.0	14.0	11	0	2	1075
80	HONDURAS	25.3	1.5	26.8	11	190	2	1075
81	HONDURAS	13.0	3.1	16.1	11	240	2	1039
82	HONDURAS	28.1	10.8	38.9	11	490	2	976
83	HONDURAS	36.3	16.5	52.8	11	360	2	948
84	HONDURAS	32.2	26.1	58.3	11	120	2	909
85	HONDURAS	78.7	22.9	101.6	11	270	2	911
86	HONDURAS	46.5	20.7	67.2	11	0	2	923
87	HONDURAS	65.5	20.3	85.8	11	40	2	923
88	HONDURAS	48.5	12.7	61.2	11	150	2	923
58	NICARAGUA	4.3	0.0	4.3	12	10	2	1585
59	NICARAGUA	5.3	0.1	5.4	12	910	2	1478
60	NICARAGUA	15.0	0.2	15.2	12	480	2	1588
61	NICARAGUA	14.3	0.7	15.0	12	50	2	1663
62	NICARAGUA	16.5	1.2	17.7	12	40	2	1804
63	NICARAGUA	8.9	1.9	10.8	12	60	2	1888
64	NICARAGUA	8.4	1.4	9.8	12	40	2	2054
65	NICARAGUA	26.9	1.4	28.3	12	0	2	2217
66	NICARAGUA	22.8	1.1	23.9	12	0	2	2247
67	NICARAGUA	13.3	1.1	14.4	12	160	2	2388
68	NICARAGUA	29.4	1.4	30.8	12	70	2	2289
69	NICARAGUA	2.4	0.7	3.1	12	50	2	2317
70	NICARAGUA	3.1	1.1	4.2	12	0	2	2292
71	NICARAGUA	14.8	0.9	15.7	12	0	2	2319
72	NICARAGUA	4.5	0.8	5.3	12	20	2	2225
73	NICARAGUA	22.0	1.2	23.2	12	0	2	2388
74	NICARAGUA	13.0	0.8	13.8	12	80	2	2631
75	NICARAGUA	24.0	2.4	26.4	12	220	2	2461
76	NICARAGUA	3.7	1.7	5.4	12	80	2	2503
77	NICARAGUA	17.2	2.0	19.2	12	240	2	2702
78	NICARAGUA	7.0	0.2	7.2	12	1970	2	2337
79	NICARAGUA	8.0	0.0	8.0	12	3950	2	1605
80	NICARAGUA	14.8	0.0	14.8	12	620	2	2012

81	NICARAGUA	21.0	0.0	21.0	12	120	2	2076
82	NICARAGUA	2.2	0.0	2.2	12	950	2	1939
83	NICARAGUA	0.0	0.0	0.0	12	2240	2	1930
84	NICARAGUA	0.0	0.0	0.0	12	1300	2	1975
85	NICARAGUA	0.0	0.0	0.0	12	1290	2	1989
86	NICARAGUA	0.0	0.0	0.0	12	990	2	1965
87	NICARAGUA	0.0	0.0	0.0	12	1510	2	1965
88	NICARAGUA	0.1	0.0	0.0	12	820	2	1965
58	PERU	25.2	0.0	25.2	15	40	1	1509
59	PERU	72.1	5.4	77.5	15	220	1	1529
60	PERU	30.9	4.3	35.2	15	0	1	1721
61	PERU	70.8	17.2	88.0	15	40	1	1830
62	PERU	94.2	16.5	110.7	15	220	1	1940
63	PERU	22.2	9.8	32.0	15	240	1	1973
64	PERU	93.4	12.5	105.9	15	0	1	2052
65	PERU	41.9	9.5	51.4	15	440	1	2100
66	PERU	48.8	11.0	59.8	15	160	1	2188
67	PERU	35.6	7.4	43.0	15	150	1	2218
68	PERU	18.7	10.7	29.4	15	130	1	2163
69	PERU	30.3	3.1	33.4	15	260	1	2188
70	PERU	14.1	1.9	16.0	15	120	1	2285
71	PERU	18.9	0.6	19.5	15	100	1	2336
72	PERU	70.7	0.9	71.6	15	300	1	2324
73	PERU	63.7	0.6	64.3	15	260	1	2362
74	PERU	49.6	10.0	59.6	15	550	1	2470
75	PERU	26.8	12.1	38.9	15	680	1	2515
76	PERU	63.6	11.5	75.1	15	430	1	2509
77	PERU	52.3	5.9	58.2	15	220	1	2471
78	PERU	64.0	4.4	68.4	15	230	1	2364
79	PERU	57.9	2.4	60.3	15	80	1	2397
80	PERU	35.7	1.3	37.0	15	40	1	2456
81	PERU	33.6	1.5	35.1	15	130	1	2494
82	PERU	18.9	1.7	20.6	15	550	1	2439
83	PERU	41.0	1.6	42.6	15	3600	1	2124
84	PERU	55.7	3.6	59.3	15	1590	1	2145
85	PERU	27.4	3.0	30.4	15	1190	1	2114
86	PERU	19.8	0.2	20.0	15	2530	1	2128
87	PERU	21.7	0.0	21.7	15	1110	1	2128
88	PERU	21.9	0.1	22.0	15	390	1	2128

pc	tos	in	ri	dem	str	bom	knp	asn
40.5	1	23	5	1	7	3	0	0
41	0	36	0	1	5	15	0	0
41	0	20	0	1	0	10	0	0
42	0	23	3	3	2	8	0	0
42	0	43	3	4	4	0	0	0
43	0	7	0	1	0	1	0	0
43	0	25	1	5	6	4	0	0
43.5	0	18	0	5	1	3	0	0
43.5	0	16	0	0	4	2	0	0
44	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
44.5	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
45	0	64	4	5	16	17	0	1
46.21066	0	29	1	11	3	11	3	3
48.48128	0	25	1	2	2	11	1	0
48.93099	0	60	3	0	2	32	3	4
51.42533	0	549	0	8	4	5	500	11
50.20061	1	337	0	5	6	106	8	195
48.33189	1	168	0	3	5	25	20	35
48.74188	0	946	0	5	0	0	0	0
49.60026	0	594	0	0	0	0	0	0
49.13357	0	166	0	0	0	3	5	0
52.54541	0	30	0	0	0	1	0	0
50.95643	0	3	0	1	0	2	0	0
48.82877	0	85	0	1	2	1	0	0
49.19319	0	73	0	2	1	4	3	1
51.33611	0	10	0	57	3	1	0	1
51.20084	1	3	0	5	1	0	0	0
48.33711	1	8	0	0	1	3	1	0
51.13518	1	11	0	0	2	0	0	0
56.08361	0	4	0	2	1	0	0	0
57.86577	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
10.5	1	12	6	4	0	0	0	0
10.6	1	8	0	2	3	0	0	0
10.7	1	8	3	0	3	0	0	0
10.8	1	21	0	7	5	2	0	0
11.5	1	15	2	2	4	0	0	2
11.6	0	10	0	0	0	2	0	1
11.7	0	19	1	3	1	1	0	0
11.8	0	10	0	3	2	3	0	1
12.2	0	15	4	4	0	3	0	1
12.3	0	5	0	0	0	3	0	0

12.4	0	10	1	1	0	0	0	0
12.5	0	9	0	3	0	0	1	2
12.58875	0	11	0	3	0	0	4	0
13.77955	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	2
15.07954	0	5	2	2	1	0	0	0
16.74092	0	9	0	3	0	0	0	0
18.50061	0	18	0	7	0	0	0	0
19.13165	0	15	0	4	2	2	0	0
20.09913	0	7	0	0	0	0	1	0
20.76029	0	17	0	8	0	0	0	0
22.06124	0	5	0	5	0	0	0	0
22.73884	0	4	0	4	0	1	0	0
22.34473	0	15	0	5	1	2	0	1
20.55121	0	7	0	2	0	0	0	0
20.49404	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
19.47082	0	9	3	1	2	0	0	0
19.72506	1	37	0	32	0	0	0	0
20.80052	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
22.28044	0	5	0	4	1	0	0	0
22.64741	0	15	0	2	0	0	1	0
22.88713	0	13	0	3	0	0	0	0
26.5	1	4	2	2	0	0	0	0
26.7	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
27.5	1	4	0	3	0	0	0	0
27.7	1	4	1	3	0	0	0	0
29.5	1	5	1	0	1	3	0	0
29.7	1	3	0	0	2	0	0	0
30.5	1	5	0	2	1	0	0	0
30.7	1	8	2	3	1	1	0	0
31.5	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
31.7	1	6	2	0	1	0	0	0
32.5	1	6	0	2	0	2	0	0
33	1	8	2	2	1	0	0	0
33.27017	1	24	5	7	0	5	0	1
36.31211	1	18	5	7	0	1	0	0
35.01855	1	43	9	8	9	1	0	0
33.52691	0	189	1	20	15	0	1	0
32.84762	0	25	0	1	0	1	1	0
27.60011	0	19	0	1	0	0	1	0
27.73589	0	5	0	3	0	1	1	0
27.60605	0	13	0	0	0	0	1	0
27.87221	0	16	0	6	0	1	1	0

29.05871	0	14	0	4	0	0	9	0
29.93609	0	18	0	1	0	0	0	2
29.38805	0	10	0	3	0	0	0	0
26.63269	0	12	0	2	0	0	3	1
26.64891	0	67	3	30	4	2	0	0
26.86371	0	84	2	10	1	37	0	0
26.06302	0	58	0	14	0	29	1	0
26.78882	0	83	0	13	1	56	0	0
26.92233	0	12	1	5	0	0	0	0
30.57244	0	9	0	8	0	0	0	0
4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9.5	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
10.95437	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
12.73957	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13.83217	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15.67641	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14.56108	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
15.35373	1	4	0	0	0	3	0	0
15.55368	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
17.63689	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18.68558	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17.85968	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
16.54006	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
15.30507	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0
13.52205	1	4	0	0	0	0	1	0
13.35735	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1
13.89906	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
14.05478	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15.20095	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14.92045	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14.44953	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
2.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

3	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
3.2	0	8	0	1	0	0	0	1
3.5	0	9	0	2	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4.2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
4.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4.6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.2	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	0
5.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.60341	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.72254	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.08782	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0
6.87647	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.70771	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.83007	0	6	0	3	0	1	0	0
7.18379	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.30001	0	19	0	1	1	0	3	4
7.65148	0	9	0	1	0	1	5	0
7.63535	0	57	1	10	1	8	5	7
6.19184	0	136	0	3	2	12	6	7
5.89666	0	199	0	0	1	22	1	105
5.70844	0	272	0	3	0	8	177	2
6.06329	0	72	0	2	0	3	1	9
5.40389	0	237	0	0	0	3	173	6
5.78407	0	62	0	0	0	0	13	7
5.72154	0	49	0	3	1	3	0	0
6.45169	0	28	0	4	2	1	0	1
6.58915	0	58	0	0	0	7	1	38
5	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
5.3	1	7	0	0	0	2	0	0
5.6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.9	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
6.3	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0
6.35	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
6.45	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.66	0	2	10	0	0	0	0	0
6.67	0	16	0	3	0	3	0	0

6.67147	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.09471	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.64663	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.75236	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.56011	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.82037	0	8	0	1	0	0	0	1
7.15848	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.93625	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.73534	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.23238	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.23486	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	1
6.43898	0	8	0	2	0	1	1	0
6.44254	0	15	0	2	0	4	1	0
6.54558	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.59867	0	6	0	4	0	0	0	0
6.41919	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	1
5.97869	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.59085	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.48279	0	6	0	2	0	0	0	0
8	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
8.2	0	23	2	0	1	0	0	1
8.3	0	13	1	0	0	2	1	0
8.4	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
8.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
8.6	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0
8.7	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
8.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	6	2	1	0	0	1	0
9.1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1
9.2	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
9.37911	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9.55467	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10.37973	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
10.84519	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.23349	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.00252	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
12.11791	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
14.15262	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	0
13.08946	0	58	2	3	7	7	0	2
8.97416	0	117	0	4	2	61	0	0
10.34386	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0

10.48654	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
10.09423	0	24	0	1	0	0	0	0
9.63978	0	54	0	1	0	0	0	0
8.90794	0	29	0	1	0	0	1	0
9.01083	1	29	0	3	0	0	1	0
8.99872	1	20	0	1	1	0	1	0
8.68444	1	36	0	4	4	0	1	0
8.60784	0	19	0	2	2	0	0	0
15	1	3	0	2	1	0	0	0
15.3	1	5	0	0	1	0	0	0
15.6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
15.9	1	3	1	1	1	0	0	0
16	0	10	0	6	0	1	0	0
16.3	1	7	0	1	0	1	0	0
16.6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
16.9	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
17.33	1	5	0	1	1	0	0	0
17.34	0	5	1	1	1	0	0	0
17.35	0	9	0	2	0	4	0	0
17.36952	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
17.28422	0	5	0	0	5	0	0	0
16.60218	0	9	0	0	6	0	0	0
16.84171	0	9	2	0	2	0	0	0
17.79102	0	15	0	1	0	1	0	0
18.74326	0	23	2	1	7	1	0	1
18.50834	0	14	2	1	2	0	0	0
18.04006	0	6	1	1	2	0	0	0
17.91586	0	12	0	5	3	0	0	0
17.90076	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
18.68603	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
19.04168	1	5	0	0	1	4	0	0
18.86001	1	15	0	0	0	3	0	2
16.18361	0	111	0	0	4	78	0	0
16.28137	0	45	0	1	6	12	0	0
14.96851	0	36	1	1	4	8	0	3
15.64718	0	79	0	0	0	62	0	1
16.95454	0	38	0	5	0	26	0	0
16.45591	0	11	0	0	1	0	0	2

cou	atk	maj	mil
0	1	0	6
0	2	0	13
2	0	0	7
1	0	0	6
2	0	1	29
0	0	0	5
0	1	0	8
0	1	0	8
2	0	0	8
0	0	0	1
0	0	0	3
0	3	0	6
1	3	0	2
2	3	1	4
0	4	1	3
1	0	0	4
0	7	0	12
0	20	1	57
0	0	0	0
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0	0	0	158
0	0	1	27
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	80
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	5
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	3
1	0	0	6
3	0	0	0
2	0	0	1
0	0	0	2
1	0	0	2
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	9
0	0	0	3
2	0	0	7
1	1	0	11
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	3
0	0	0	1

0	1	0	5
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	4
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	6
0	0	0	11
0	0	0	9
0	0	0	4
0	0	0	9
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0	1	0	6
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	2
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0	0	0	12
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0	0	0	3
0	0	0	2
0	0	1	2
1	1	0	4
0	1	0	4
0	0	0	16
1	0	0	151
0	0	0	23
0	0	0	18
0	0	0	1
0	0	0	11
0	1	0	9

0	2	0	10
0	0	0	5
0	2	0	5
0	2	0	9
0	1	0	23
0	1	0	32
0	1	0	14
0	0	0	10
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0	0	0	2
0	0	0	10
0	0	0	2
1	0	1	23
1	0	1	104
0	0	1	69
0	19	1	62
0	18	1	38
0	14	1	40
0	7	1	34
0	26	1	15
0	4	1	16
0	7	1	4
0	0	0	0
0	1	0	2
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0	0	0	1
0	0	0	2
1	1	0	2
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0	0	0	4
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	9

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1	0	0	0
0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0
1	0	0	5
0	0	0	1
1	0	0	0
0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0
0	1	0	2
0	1	0	3
0	1	0	7
0	0	0	9
0	0	0	2
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0	3	1	15
0	1	1	7
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0	0	0	1
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0	0	0	0
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0	0	1	4
0	0	0	2
0	1	1	3
0	4	1	32
0	6	1	43
0	0	0	13

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0	0	1	22
0	0	1	54
0	0	1	29
0	0	1	29
0	0	0	20
0	0	0	36
0	0	0	19
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0	0	0	4
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
1	0	0	2
0	1	0	4
0	0	0	0
0	1	0	10
0	1	0	1
0	0	0	3
1	0	0	1
0	0	0	3
0	0	0	3
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	3
0	0	0	5
0	0	0	13
1	0	0	10
0	0	0	9
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	4
0	0	0	2
0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0
0	6	0	4
0	12	1	16
0	17	0	9
0	8	0	11
0	6	0	10
0	4	0	3
0	5	0	3

Data Sources

Data on total aid (TA), economic aid (EA), and military aid (MA) from 1958-1988 are from SALA (Statistical Abstract of Latin America) deflated, using export price index in 1970 U.S. dollars. This data is operationalized as the U.S. Intervention variable.

Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita is the operationalization of the income variable, and is taken from the International Comparisons Project, United Nations, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1958-1985 only in 1980 international dollars. Heston, Alan and Robert Summers.

Energy Consumption Per Capita data is from World Development Report, 1990. This variable is the operationalization for the Level of Development variable.

Political Instability data is from the New York Times Index for the years 1958-1988.

Variables used in the study are as follows:

(1) year
(2) country (name)
(3) ta (total aid)
(4) ea (economic aid)
(5) ma (military aid)
(6) nu (country number)
(7) ws (weighted instability score)
(8) reg (region)
(9) dp (real gross domestic product per capita)
(10) pc (energy consumption per capita)
(11) tos (type of society)
(12) in (raw instability score)
(13) ri (riots)
(14) dem (demonstrations)
(15) str (strikes)
(16) bom (bombings)
(17) knp (kidnappings)
(18) asn (assassinations)
(19) cou (coups)
(20) atk (guerrilla attacks)
(21) maj (civil war, insurgency, revolution)
(22) mil (military attacks on civilians)

APPENDIX B

SET OF TABLES

Table 1. The Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability, 1958-1988

	Argentina					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	-.476	-.148	.997	5.13	5.90	6.55
	(-.408)	(-.119)	(.888)	(.637)	(.478)	(1.05)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.004*			.005		
	(2.08)			(.813)		
Economic Aid		.002			.004	
		(1.06)			(.526)	
Military Aid			.023			.011
			(1.86)			(.343)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.401)		
Economic Aid					-.000	
					(.703)	
Military Aid						.000
						(.389)
Income	9.49**	.000*	.000	-.002	-.003	-.003
	(3.60)	(2.48)	(1.53)	(-.000)	(-.562)	(.787)
Sq. of Income				.000	.000	.000
				(.723)	(.441)	(.951)
Adjusted R^2	.27	.24	.22	.23	.21	.27
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 1. Continued

	Brazil					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.62**	2.64**	2.48**	2.38**	2.41**	2.71**
	(8.74)	(8.98)	(8.95)	(3.35)	(3.42)	(3.93)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.000			-.003		
	(-.043)			(-1.56)		
Economic Aid		-.000			-.003	
		(-.093)			(-1.43)	
Military Aid			.003			-.002
			(.665)			(-.106)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.64)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.49)	
Military Aid						.000
						(.209)
Income	-.000	-.000	-.000	.000	.000	-.000
	(-1.05)	(-1.09)	(-.711)	(.542)	(-.453)	(-.397)
Sq. of Income				-.000	-.000	-.000
				(-.703)	(-.610)	(.-276)
Adjusted R^2	-.00	-.00	-.00	.02	.01	-.05
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 1. Continued

	Chile					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.49*	2.49*	2.56*	-6.28	-5.67	-7.62
	(2.24)	(2.24)	(2.32)	(-1.03)	(-.941)	(-.554)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.000			-.009*		
	(.068)			(-2.79)		
Economic Aid		.000			-.010**	
		(.041)			(-2.94)	
Military Aid			.005			.002
			(.272)			(.041)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000*		
				(2.57)		
Economic Aid					.000**	
					(2.73)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(.116)
Income	-.000	-.000	-.000	.005	.005	.004
	(-.096)	(-.091)	(-.172)	(1.48)	(1.40)	(.867)
Sq. of Income				-.000	.000	-.000
				(-1.46)	(1.38)	(-.861)
Adjusted R^2	.25	.25	.10	.44	.45	.21
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 1. Continued

	Costa Rica					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1.13	1.14	1.08	-1.26	-1.30	-.211
	(1.33)	(1.34)	(1.35)	(-.323)	(-.329)	(-.048)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.001			.-023		
	(.262)			(-1.09)		
Economic Aid		-.002			-.028	
		(-.300)			(1.05)	
Military Aid			.077			.099
			(.603)			(.178)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.07)		
Economic Aid					.002	
					(1.02)	
Military Aid						-.012
						(-.066)
Income	.000	.000	.000	.003	.003	.001
	(.738)	(.732)	(.748)	(.772)	(.773)	(.363)
Sq. of Income				-.000	-.000	-.000
				(-.712)	(-.713)	(-.300)
Adjusted R^2	-.09	-.09	-.02	-.08	-.09	-.30
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variables is aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 1. Continued

	El Salvador					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	3.97	4.38	2.95	1.40	1.91	.298
	(1.77)	(1.96)	(1.53)	(.898)	(.178)	(.030)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.000			.015		
	(-.223)			(.153)		
Economic Aid		-.004			.023	
		(-.771)			(1.63)	
Military Aid			.015			.061*
			(1.37)			(2.18)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.266)		
Economic Aid					-.000	
					(-1.43)	
Military Aid						-.001
						(-1.49)
Income	-.001	-.002	-.000	.000	-.000	.002
	(-.757)	(-.933)	(-.391)	(.977)	(-.028)	(.120)
Sq. of Income				-.000	.000	-.000
				(-.998)	(.060)	(-.064)
Adjusted R^2	.29	.26	.36	.41	.44	.43
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 1. Continued

	Honduras					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1.67*	1.66*	1.66*	-.109	-.589	.319
	(2.07)	(2.03)	(2.11)	(-.015)	(-.081)	(043)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.003			.015		
	(.975)			(1.11)		
Economic Aid		.004			.015	
		(.887)			(.879)	
Military Aid			.012			.072
			(1.10)			(1.47)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.908)		
Economic Aid					-.000	
					(-.699)	
Military Aid						-.002
						(-1.30)
Income	.000	.000	.000	.004	.005	.004
	(.334)	(.334)	(.382)	(.267)	(.326)	(.216)
Sq. of Income				-.000	-.000	-.000
				(-.265)	(-.320)	(-.043)
Adjusted R^2	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.08	.-10	-.02
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 1. Continued

	Nicaragua					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	3.73**	3.74**	3.63**	8.39	8.04	2.90
	(3.19)	(3.19)	(3.09)	(1.61)	(1.52)	(.690)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.005			-.054		
	(-.407)			(-.865)		
Economic Aid		-.005			-.031	
		(-.392)			(-.475)	
Military Aid			-.110			-1.95***
			(-.481)			(-3.84)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.002		
				(.783)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.394)	
Military Aid						.708**
						(2.99)
Income	-.000	-.001	-.001	-.005	-.005	-.000
	(-1.24)	(-1.26)	(-1.11)	(-1.04)	(-.964)	(-.093)
Sq. of Income				.000	.000	.000
				(.929)	(.832)	(.193)
Adjusted R^2	.08	.06	.23	.07	.03	.42
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 1. Continued

	Peru					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.72	2.61	2.57*	-4.72	-4.51	-40.83**
	1.99)	(1.93)	(2.04)	(-.883)	(-.795)	(-3.44)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.004			.007		
	(1.37)			(.508)		
Economic Aid		.005			.000	
		(1.41)			(.020)	
Military Aid			.000			-.166**
			(.039)			(-3.09)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.275)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.224)	
Military Aid						.008*
						(2.53)
Income	-.000	-.000	-.000	.007	.007	.039***
	(-.402)	(-.314)	(-.144)	(1.23)	(1.22)	(3.68)
Sq. of Income				- .000	-.000	-.001***
				(-1.24)	(1.23)	(-3.79)
Adjusted R^2	-.04	-.05	-.03	.02	.02	.57
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. The Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability, 1958-1988

	Argentina					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.93	5.35*	3.57	-12.92	-11.13	-15.09
	(1.68)	(2.51)	(1.90)	(-.423)	(-.690)	(.977)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.925			.002		
	(-.038)			(.232)		
Economic Aid		-.002			.000	
		(-1.11)			(.086)	
Military Aid			.025			.004
			(1.99)			(.099)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.354)		
Economic Aid					-.000*	
					(-2.99)	
Military Aid						.000
						(.595)
Level of Development	-.001	-.050	-.019	.679	.615	.753
	(-.036)	(-1.15)	(-.480)	(1.04)	(.931)	(1.18)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.007	-.007	-.008
				(-1.09)	(-.990)	(-1.20)
Adjusted R^2	.00	.07	.04	.04	.02	.07
Method		ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. Continued

	Brazil					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.73***	2.74***	2.55***	2.38	2.44	2.81
	(7.17)	(7.35)	(7.41)	(1.49)	(1.55)	(1.55)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.000			-.003		
	(-.111)			(-.151)		
Economic Aid		-.000			-.002	
		(-.160)			(-1.37)	
Military Aid			.004			-.002
			(.628)			(-.106)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.56)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.41)	
Military Aid						.000
						(.369)
Level of Development	-.021	-.021	-.013	-.054	.040	-.041
	(-1.09)	(-1.13)	(-.757)	(-.255)	(.191)	(-.194)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.002	-.002	.001
				(-.380)	(-.310)	(.114)
Adjusted R^2	.00	.00	.02	.01	-.00	.05
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. Continued

	Chile					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA^2)	(EA^2)	(MA^2)
Constant	2.62	2.62	2.68	-.880	-.747	-3.17
	(1.60)	(1.61)	(1.62)	(-.753)	(-.651)	(-.236)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.000			-.010*		
	(.067)			(-2.40)		
Economic Aid		.000			-.010*	
		(.040)			(-2.59)	
Military Aid			.004			.024
			(.263)			(.507)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000*		
				(2.47)		
Economic Aid					.000**	
					(2.64)	
Military Aid						-.001
						(-.492)
Level of Development	-.007	-.008	-.010	.779	.691	.385
	(-.141)	(-.138)	(-.185)	(1.01)	(.910)	(.436)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.013	-.012	-.007
				(-1.02)	(-.927)	(-.466)
Adjusted R^2	.23	.23	.02	.34	.36	.06
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. Continued

	Costa Rica					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1.33*	1.33*	1.27*	1.08	1.06	1.26
	(2.68)	(2.69)	(2.77)	(.925)	(.906)	(.991)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.001			-.029		
	(-.267)			(-1.05)		
Economic Aid		-.002			-.028	
		(-.305)			(-1.02)	
Military Aid			.080			.178
			(.647)			(.325)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.05)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.00)	
Military Aid						-.032
						(-.186)
Level of Development	.032	.032	.032	.156	.159	.030
	(.899)	(.894)	(.943)	(.664)	(.670)	(.122)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.006	-.006	.000
				(-.551)	(-.556)	(.012)
Adjusted R^2	-.04	-.04	.04	-.09	-.09	-.24
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. Continued

	El Salvador					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.18	3.06*	1.23	-1.79	-2.67	-.901
	(1.83)	(2.15)	(1.34)	(-.524)	(-1.94)	(-.312)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.002			.006		
	(.457)			(.552)		
Economic Aid		-.002			-.014	
		(-.494)			(-.834)	
Military Aid			.022*			.040
			(2.22)			(1.44)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.512)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.638)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-.867)
Level of Development	.019	-.125	.171	1.45	2.09	1.02
	(.094)	(-.538)	(1.09)	(1.12)	(1.41)	(.941)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.123	-.188	-.082
				(-1.68)	(-.151)	(.-839)
Adjusted R^2	.35	.31	.42	.41	.43	.42
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. Continued

	Honduras					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1.69	1.67	1.74*	-8.17	-8.39	-2066.34
	(2.02)	(1.98)	(2.15)	(-1.78)	(-1.79)	(-1.25)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.004			.014		
	1.10)			(1.27)		
Economic Aid		.005			.016	
		(1.01)			(1.08)	
Military Aid			.013			29.73*
			(1.19)			(2.08)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-1.02)		
Economic Aid					-.000	
					-.827)	
Military Aid						-1.22
						(-1.95)
Level of Development	.039	.040	.035	3.13*	3.20*	676.82
	(.307)	(.302)	(.280)	(2.18)	(2.19)	(1.31)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.243*	-.247*	-52.58
				(-2.18)	(-2.18)	-(1.01)
Adjusted R^2	-.02	-.03	-.02	.10	.09	.04
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	PW

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. Continued

	Nicaragua					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.74*	2.75*	1.24	3.07	3.10	2.47
	(2.35)	(2.36)	(1.87)	(.455)	(.448)	(.520)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.008			-.060		
	(-.607)			(-1.02)		
Economic Aid		-.008			-.038	
		(-.573)			(-.609)	
Military Aid			-.669***			-1.78***
			(-4.60)			(-3.76)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.002		
				(.883)		
Economic Aid					.001	
					(.480)	
Military Aid						.643*
						(2.73)
Level of Development	-.043	-.045	.168*	-.092	-.105	.003
	(-.357)	(-.375)	(2.37)	(-.074)	(-.081)	(.004)
Sq. of Level of Development				.004	.004	.004
				(.072)	(.063)	(.099)
Adjusted R^2	.10	.07	.35	.09	.04	.43
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 2. Continued

	Peru					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	3.39	3.20	3.74*	-9.13	-10.81	-12.63
	(1.90)	(1.84)	(2.18)	(-.478)	(-.567)	(-.735)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.004			.004		
	(1.23)			(.287)		
Economic Aid		.004			-.004	
		(1.27)			(-.248)	
Military Aid			.003			.093
			(.162)			(1.75)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.056)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.480)	
Military Aid						-.006
						(1.80)
Level of Development	-.064	-.059	-.081	1.40	1.62	1.85
	(-.641)	(-.582)	(-.796)	(.619)	(.718)	(.917)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.043	-.050	-.057
				(-.647)	(-.747)	(.969)
Adjusted R^2	.00	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.09	-.04
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=31

Table 3. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability 1958-1988, Controlled for Income

	Type of Society: Democratic					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1.63**	1.64***	1.62***	2.43***	2.43***	2.15**
	(5.63)	(5.71)	(5.85)	(4.97)	(5.02)	(4.10)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.001			-.002		
	(.684)			(-.937)		
Economic Aid		.000			-.003	
		(.577)			(-1.10)	
Military Aid			.010			.024
			(1.21)			(1.15)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.28)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.43)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-.845)
Income	.000	.000	.000	-.001	-.000	-.000
	(1.85)	(1.84)	(1.91)	(-1.17)	(-1.13)	(-.740)
Sq. of Income				.000	.000	.000
				(1.64)	(1.59)	(1.11)
Adjusted R^2	.02	.02	.06	.12	.13	.10
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=98

Table 4. Effect of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability 1958-1988, Controlled for Level of Development

	Type of Society: Democratic					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1.85**	1.86**	1.82***	2.05***	2.05***	2.13***
	(10.10)	(10.18)	(10.33)	(6.52)	(6.56)	(6.83)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.000			-.003		
	(.361)			(-1.02)		
Economic Aid		.000			-.004	
		(.253)			(-1.26)	
Military Aid			.009			.031
			(1.11)			(1.56)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.25)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.47)	
Military Aid						-.001
						(-1.17)
Level of Development	.014	.014	.014*	.002	.004	-.022
	(1.92)	(1.93)	(2.02)	(.056)	(.122)	(-.780)
Sq. of Level of Development				.000	.000	.001
				(.461)	(.393)	(1.25)
Adjusted R^2	.08	.08	.07	.13	.14	.14
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=98

Table 5. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability 1958-1988, Controlled for Income

	Type of Society: Non-Democratic					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.08***	2.10***	2.04***	2.36***	2.39***	2.11***
	(9.96)	(10.03)	(10.66)	(5.57)	(5.55)	(5.27)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.000			.000		
	(.586)			(.448)		
Economic Aid		.000			-.000	
		(.200)			(-.054)	
Military Aid			.018***			.022*
			(3.42)			(2.12)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-.152)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.209)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-.392)
Income	.000	.000*	.000	-.000	-.000	-.000
	(2.05)	(1.98)	(1.91)	(-.354)	(-.307)	(-.029)
Sq. of Income				.000	.000	.000
				(.810)	(.738)	(.587)
Adjusted R^2	.08	.08	.18	.10	.09	.19
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and unweighted.
N=150

Table 6. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability 1958-1988, Controlled for Level of Development

	Type of Society: Non-Democratic					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.22***	2.24***	2.17***	2.00***	2.01***	1.88***
	(15.55)	(15.64)	(16.30)	(8.74)	(8.68)	(8.87)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.000			-.000		
	(.467)			(-.033)		
Economic Aid		.000			-.001	
		(.098)			(-.547)	
Military Aid			.018***			.020
			(3.33)			(1.91)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(.162)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.532)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-1.29)
Level of Development	.013*	.013*	.011	.041	.044	.040
	(2.26)	(2.22)	(2.02)	(1.76)	(1.87)	(1.91)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.001	-.001	-.000
				(-1.26)	(-1.39)	(-1.29)
Adjusted R^2	.09	.08	.17	.08	.08	.18
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=150

Table 7. Effects of U.S. Intervention and Income on Political Instability 1958-1988, Pooled Analysis

	Central America					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1816.54*	1968.23*	1258.89	902.51	904.68	453.20
	(2.64)	(2.89)	(2.00)	(.658)	(.648)	(.312)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	1.96			12.08		
	(.555)			(1.74)		
Economic Aid		-2.15			12.92	
		(-.539)			(1.55)	
Military Aid			54.89***			44.25
			(4.53)			(1.61)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.064		
				(-1.66)		
Economic Aid					-.120	
					(-.210)	
Military Aid						.219
						(.569)
Income	-.728	-.768	-4.96	.053	.106	.442
	(-1.97)	(-2.09)	(-1.47)	(.034)	(.070)	(.290)
Sq. of Income				-.000	-.000	.000
				(-.434)	(.487)	(.624)
Adjusted R^2)	.00	.00	.14	.02	.01	.15
Method	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=124

Table 8. Effects of U.S. Intervention and Level of Development on Political Instability 1958-1988, Pooled Analysis

Central America

	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1368.23*	1515.31*	1018.31	1772.48	1853.16	1358.5
	(2.48)	(2.75)	(2.00)	(1.77)	(1.85)	(1.50)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	2.65			11.82		
	(.731)			(1.71)		
Economic Aid		-1.80			12.25	
		(-.429)			(1.50)	
Military Aid			56.37***			37.93
			(4.66)			(1.51)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.060		
				(-1.55)		
Economic Aid					-.113	
					-1.99)	
Military Aid						.264
						(.730)
Level of Development	-102.25	-109.15	-77.17	-217.59	-222.94	-142.29
	-1.71)	(-1.81)	(-1.41)	(-1.12)	(-1.16)	(-.842)
Sq. of Level of Development				5.76	.586	3.26
				(.665)	(.688)	(.445)
Adjusted R^2	.02	.00	.15	.01	.01	.13
Method	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=124

Table 9. Effects of U.S. Intervention and Income on Political Instability 1958-1988, Pooled Analysis

	South America					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	-576.65	-710.87	-797.42	1911.21	4679.42	1566.21
	(-.542)	(-.676)	(-.765)	(.780)	(2.00)	(.563)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.437			-3.81		
	(-.388)			(-.928)		
Economic Aid		-.500			-3.84	
		(-.427)			(-.812)	
Military Aid			.231			.879
			(.660)			(.795)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.008		
				(.812)		
Economic Aid					.009	
					(.754)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-.651)
Income	.483	.539	.546	-.140	-3.94	-1.44
	(1.43)	(1.62)	(1.63)	(-.788)	(-2.41)	(-.720)
Sq. of Income				.000	.000	.000
				(.760)	(3.08)	(1.05)
Adjusted R^2	.02	.02	.02	.01	.00	.00
Method	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=124

Table 10. Effects of U.S. Intervention and Level of Development on Political Instability 1958-1988 Pooled Analysis

	South America					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	180.98	178.41	-96.79	-370.76	-252.52	-944.48
	(.242)	(.259)	(-.138)	(-.250)	(-1.82)	(-.599)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.959			-4.89		
	(-.648)			(-1.33)		
Economic Aid		-1.20			-6.19	
		(-.799)			(-1.54)	
Military Aid			.325			1.03
			(.778)			(1.02)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.010		
				(1.10)		
Economic Aid					.014	
					(1.25)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-.651)
Level of Development	27.22	27.47	32.43	78.02	71.71	91.86
	(1.09)	(1.17)	(.326)	(.782)	(.759)	(.863)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.710	-.715	-.936
				(-.514)	(-.479)	(-.566)
Adjusted R^2	.02	.03	.02	.01	.02	.00
Method	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=124

Table 11. Effects of U.S. Intervention and Income on Political Instability 1958-1988, Pooled Analysis

Central and South America

	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	129.29	140.71	201.37	2794.68*	2593.84*	2432.86
	(.355)	(.034)	(.430)	(2.27)	(2.11)	(1.97)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.190			-1.96		
	(-.025)			(-.712)		
Economic Aid		-.000			-.006	
		(-.000)			(-.798)	
Military Aid			23.39*			6.18
			(2.48)			(.277)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.004		
				(.589)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.868)	
Military Aid						.473
						(1.20)
Income	.240	.232	.180	-2.04*	-1.88	-1.92
	(1.70)	(1.62)	(1.05)	(-2.02)	(-1.88)	(-1.90)
Sq. of Income				.000*	.000*	.000
				(2.29)	(2.16)	(2.20)
Adjusted R^2	.00	.01	.03	.01	.01	.03
Method	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=248

Table 12. Effects of U.S. Intervention and Level of Development on Political Instability 1958-1988, Pooled Analysis

	Central and South America					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	492.77	463.09	391.69	702.26	659.35	502.46
	(1.44)	(1.36)	(1.08)	(1.27)	(1.21)	(.890)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.560			-.247		
	(-.580)			(-.814)		
Economic Aid		-.401			-.013	
		(-.004)			(-1.45)	
Military Aid			23.22*			10.36
			(2.47)			(.474)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(.454)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.26)	
Military Aid						.420
						(1.08)
Level of Development	14.47	14.52	12.91	-9.41	-7.29	-7.71
	(1.07)	(1.07)	(.910)	(-.198)	(-1.56)	(-1.58)
Sq. of Level of Development				.555	.516	.528
				(.630)	(.594)	(.584)
Adjusted R^2	.01	.01	.03	.01	.01	.04
Method	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA	GLS/ ARMA

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and weighted.
N=248

Table 13. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Bombings: 1958-1988

	Brazil					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	-.124	-2.21	1.66	2.32*	2.20**	.935
	(-.161)	(-.296)	(1.69)	(2.12)	(1.92)	(.370)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.004**			.008		
	(2.62)			(1.76)		
Economic Aid		.005**			.008	
		(2.90)			(1.71)	
Military Aid			-.011			.054
			(-.651)			(.997)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.002		
				(.238)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(.182)	
Military Aid						-.001
						(-1.37)
Income	4.83	.000	-.000	-.004**	-.004	-.000
	(.188)	(.294)	(-1.12)	(-2.89)	(-2.59)	(-.114)
Sq. of Income				.000**	.000*	.000
				(3.07)	(2.77)	(.051)
Adjusted R^2	.22	.24	.22	.23	.24	.02
Method	NA	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 14. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Bombings, 1958-1988

	Brazil					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	-.329	-.586	1.96	3.59	3.54	5.51
	(-.339)	(-.637)	(1.58)	(1.34)	(1.29)	(1.01)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.004**			.002		
	(2.70)			(.446)		
Economic Aid		.005**			.003	
		(3.20)			(.655)	
Military Aid			-.012			.067
			(-.667)			(1.38)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.38)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.13)	
Military Aid						-.002
						(-1.66)
Level of Development	.017	.028	-.074	-.582	-.570	-.659
	(.364)	(.621)	(-1.11)	(-1.60)	(-1.54)	(-.913)
Sq. of Level of Development				.020	.019	.019
				(1.76)	(1.69)	(.876)
Adjusted R^2	.22	.24	.02	.21	.23	.06
Method		ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 15. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Bombings, 1958-1988

	El Salvador					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	3.84	4.06*	1.34	-19.62	-20.43	-16.47
	(2.01)	(2.21)	(.762)	(-1.73)	(-1.49)	(-1.01)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.010*			.026*		
	(-2.70)			(2.14)		
Economic Aid		-.013*			.033	
		(-2.93)			(1.80)	
Military Aid			-.000			.030
			(-.027)			(.743)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000*		
				(-2.48)		
Economic Aid					-.000	
					(-2.13)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-.759)
Income	-.002	-.002	-.001	.027	.028	.024
	(-1.68)	(-1.88)	(-.572)	(1.68)	(1.50)	(1.06)
Sq. of Income				-.000	-.000	-.000
				(-1.65)	(1.48)	(-1.08)
Adjusted R^2	-.15	-.14	-.18	.33	.25	.27
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 16. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Bombings, 1958-1988

	El Salvador					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	.494	1.15	.287	-2.44	-2.99	-2.75
	(.408)	(.928)	(.223)	(-.536)	(-.649)	(-.452)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.001			-.017		
	(-.205)			(-1.88)		
Economic Aid		-.008			.019	
		(-1.72)			(1.68)	
Military Aid			.003			.009
			(.292)			(.311)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.000		
				(-2.11)		
Economic Aid					-.000	
					(-2.01)	
Military Aid						-.000
						(-.309)
Level of Development	-.014	-.007	.012	.692	.861	1.05
	(-.073)	(-.393)	(.066)	(.435)	(.538)	(.502)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.046	-.058	-.086
				(-.344)	(-.435)	(-.500)
Adjusted R^2	-.20	-.20	-.19	.18	.12	.32
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 17. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Military Attacks on Civilians, 1958-1988

	Honduras					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	-5.21	-.582	-1.38	-30.50**	-28.68**	-32.94***
	(-.228)	(-.263)	(-.830)	(3.35)	(-2.97)	(-4.22)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.010			-.043**		
	(1.47)			(-3.14)		
Economic Aid		.012			-.052**	
		1.47)			(-2.81)	
Military Aid			-.008			-.167**
			(-.354)			(-2.96)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000*		
				(2.60)		
Economic Aid					.001*	
					(2.40)	
Military Aid						.006*
						(2.20)
Income	.001	.001	.002	.068**	.064**	.072**
	.364)	(.414)	(1.26)	(3.32)	(2.96)	(3.96)
Sq. of Income				-.000**	-.000**	-.000**
				(-3.14)	(-2.80)	(-3.73)
Adjusted R^2	.23	.21	.28	.54	.50	.60
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 18. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Military Attacks on Civilians, 1958-1988

	Honduras					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	-2.15	-2.17	-2.18	-6.35	-6.27	-6.29
	(-1.44)	(-1.45)	(-1.56)	(-.822)	(-.808)	(-.803)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.005			-.020		
	(.894)			(-1.19)		
Economic Aid		.008			-.023	
		(1.11)			(-1.04)	
Military Aid			.000			-.072
			(.995)			(-.977)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000		
				(1.57)		
Economic Aid					.000	
					(1.48)	
Military Aid						.003
						(1.00)
Level of Development	.421	.418	.450*	1.93	1.91	1.79
	(1.84)	(1.82)	(2.10)	(.798)	(.782)	(.733)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.124	-.122	-.106
				(-.656)	(-.642)	(-.557)
Adjusted R^2	.29	.29	.30	.27	.27	.27
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 19. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Military Attacks on Civilians, 1958-1988

	Nicaragua					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	.479	.472	.703	-.945	-1.11	1.04
	(.784)	(.771)	(1.17)	(-.319)	(-.364)	(.041)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.005			.062		
	(.720)			(2.06)		
Economic Aid		.004			.060	
		(.659)			(1.91)	
Military Aid			.198			.277
			(1.55)			(.672)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.002		
				(-1.83)		
Economic Aid					-.002	
					(-1.71)	
Military Aid						-.030
						(-.191)
Income	.000	.000	-.000	.001	.001	-.000
	(.006)	(.027)	(-.493)	(.414)	(.464)	(-.161)
Sq. of Income				-.000	-.000	.000
				(-.430)	(-.470)	(.101)
Adjusted R^2	.01	.03	.10	-.19	.18	.01
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 20. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Military Attacks on Civilians, 1958-1988

	Nicaragua					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	.384	.380	.589	-4.10	-1.11	-3.46
	(.604)	(.595)	(.936)	(-1.37)	(-.364)	(-.973)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	.567			.067*		
	(.715)			(2.46)		
Economic Aid		.005			.060	
		(.656)			(1.91)	
Military Aid			.181			.140
			(1.44)			(.388)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				-.002*		
				(-2.19)		
Economic Aid					-.002	
					(-1.71)	
Military Aid						.020
						(.138)
Level of Development	.011	.012	-.019	.815	.001	.739
	(.159)	(.175)	(-.282)	(1.45)	(.464)	(1.12)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.037	-.000	-.034
				(-1.45)	(-.470)	(-1.16)
Adjusted R^2	.03	.02	.08	.30	.18	.08
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable disaggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 21. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability, 1958-1988

	Nicaragua					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	2.35*	2.36*	2.22*	6.28	5.91	2.81
	(2.38)	(2.39)	(2.22)	(1.38)	(1.28)	(.455)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.010			-.054		
	(-.867)			(-1.03)		
Economic Aid		-.010			-.032	
		(-.855)			(-.586)	
Military Aid			-.137			-1.71***
			(-.689)			(-3.74)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.001		
				(.834)		
Economic Aid					.001	
					(.397)	
Military Aid						.618**
						(3.06)
Income	-.001	-.001	-.000	-.005	-.004	-.002
	(-1.54)	(-1.56)	(-1.35)	(-1.04)	(-.944)	(-.455)
Sq. of Income				.000	.000	.000
				(.901)	(.785)	(.501)
Adjusted R^2	.14	.27	.12	.13	.09	.49
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 22. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability, 1958-1988

	Nicaragua					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	1.35	1.38	-.030	3.09	3.12	2.46
	(1.35)	(1.37)	(-.053)	(.534)	(.522)	(.608)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.013			-.060		
	(-1.08)			(-1.19)		
Economic Aid		-.013			-.040	
		(-1.04)			(-.749)	
Military Aid			-.622***			-1.63***
			(-5.01)			(-4.07)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.001		
				(.921)		
Economic Aid					.001	
					(.502)	
Military Aid						.580**
						(2.94)
Level of Development	-.049	-.053	.136	-.366	-.375	-.271
	(-.480)	(-.513)	(2.25)	(-.339)	(-.338)	(-.354)
Sq. of Level of Development				.016	.015	.015
				(.326)	(.307)	(.439)
Adjusted R^2)	.14	.11	.33	.12	.07	.49
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 23. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability, 1958-1988

	Chile					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	.892	.906	.863	-10.74***	-8.38*	-4.62
	(.972)	(.986)	(.959)	(-2.26)	(-2.08)	(-.413)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.000			-.008*		
	(-3.15)			(-3.13)		
Economic Aid		-.000			-.009**	
		(-.228)			(-3.32)	
Military Aid			-.008			-.010
			(-.615)			(-.280)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000**		
				(2.62)		
Economic Aid					.000**	
					(2.78)	
Military Aid						.000
						(.003)
Income	.000	.000	.000	.005*	.005*	.370
	(.206)	(.179)	(.258)	(2.37)	(2.39)	(.503)
Sq. of Income				-.000*	-.000*	-.006
				(-2.31)	(-2.34)	(-.495)
Adjusted R^2	.28	.28	.15	.53	.54	.12
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and unweighted.
N=31

Table 24. Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Instability 1958-1988

	Chile					
	Linear			Parabolic		
Regressor	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)	(TA)	(EA)	(MA)
Constant	.887	.896	.782	-4.09	-3.61	-4.62
	(.663)	(.667)	(.582)	(-.400)	(-.358)	(-.413)
U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid	-.000			-.008*		
	(-.286)			(-2.79)		
Economic Aid		-.000			-.009**	
		(-.207			(-2.81)	
Military Aid			-.009			-.010
			(-.615)			(-.280)
Sq. of U.S. Intervention						
Total Aid				.000*		
				(2.61)		
Economic Aid					.000**	
					(2.67)	
Military Aid						.000
						(.003)
Level of Development	.006	.006	.010	.346	.318	.370
	(.139)	(.125)	(.229)	(.511)	(.477)	(.503)
Sq. of Level of Development				-.005	-.005	-.006
				(-.485)	(-.459)	(-.495)
Adjusted R^2	.25	.25	.07	.38	.39	.12
Method	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML	ML

*Coefficients significant at the .05 level.
**Coefficients significant at the .01 level.
***Coefficients significant at the .001 level.
t-scores are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable aggregated and unweighted.
N=31

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